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Abstract
Frontiers of Conditional Logic
by
Yale Weiss
Adviser: Professor Graham Priest
Conditional logics were originally developed for the purpose of modeling intuitively correct
modes of reasoning involving conditional—especially counterfactual—expressions in natural
language. While the debate over the logic of conditionals is as old as propositional logic,
it was the development of worlds semantics for modal logic in the past century that cat-
alyzed the rapid maturation of the field. Moreover, like modal logic, conditional logic has
subsequently found a wide array of uses, from the traditional (e.g. counterfactuals) to the
exotic (e.g. conditional obligation). Despite the close connections between conditional and
modal logic, both the technical development and philosophical exploitation of the latter has
outstripped that of the former, with the result that noticeable lacunae exist in the literature
on conditional logic. My dissertation addresses a number of these underdeveloped frontiers,
producing new technical insights and philosophical applications.
I contribute to the solution of a problem posed by Priest of finding sound and complete
labeled tableaux for systems of conditional logic from Lewis’ V-family. To develop these
tableaux, I draw on previous work on labeled tableaux for modal and conditional logic; errors
and shortcomings in recent work on this problem are identified and corrected. While modal
logic has by now been thoroughly studied in non-classical contexts, e.g. intuitionistic and
relevant logic, the literature on conditional logic is still overwhelmingly classical. Another
contribution of my dissertation is a thorough analysis of intuitionistic conditional logic,
in which I utilize both algebraic and worlds semantics, and investigate how several novel
vembedding results might shed light on the philosophical interpretation of both intuitionistic
logic and conditional logic extensions thereof.
My dissertation examines deontic and connexive conditional logic as well as the un-
derappreciated history of connexive notions in the analysis of conditional obligation. The
possibility of interpreting deontic modal logics in such systems (via embedding results) serves
as an important theoretical guide. A philosophically motivated proscription on impossible
obligations is shown to correspond to, and justify, certain (weak) connexive theses. Finally, I
contribute to the intensifying debate over counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents, and take—in contrast to Lewis and Williamson—a non-vacuous line. Thus,
in my view, a counterpossible like “If there had been a counterexample to the law of the
excluded middle, Brouwer would not have been vindicated” is false, not (vacuously) true, al-
though it has an impossible antecedent. I exploit impossible (non-normal) worlds—originally
developed to model non-normal modal logics—to provide non-vacuous semantics for coun-
terpossibles. I buttress the case for non-vacuous semantics by making recourse to both novel
technical results and theoretical considerations.
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In what follows, I introduce the subject of conditional logic and explain what this dissertation
contributes to it. The history and scope of conditional logic is canvassed in section 1.1.
An overview of the results and aims of the main chapters of this dissertation is given in
section 1.2.
1.1 The Scope of Conditional Logic
Debate over the logic of conditionals is as old as propositional logic. Sextus famously reports
that in third century BCE Alexandria, “even the crows on the roof tops” cawed about the
truth conditions for conditionals (Adv. Math. I, 309-310) [77, pp. 42-3].1 More recently,
during the hegemony of classical logic in the early 20th century, the interpretation of natural
language conditionals as material conditionals faced criticism from C. I. Lewis [65] and
others.2 Although defenses of the material conditional have been made (at least as an
interpretation of indicative conditionals; more on this anon), most notably by Grice [42] and
1For an overview of the debate over conditionals in antiquity, see Kneale and Kneale [53, Ch. 3].
2Incidentally, the material conditional and the paradoxes thereof date back to the Megarian Philo at least
(Sextus, Hyp. Pyrrh. II, 110 ff.).
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Jackson [48], these cannot be considered wholly successful.3
If the classical material conditional is unsatisfactory as an interpretation of the nat-
ural language conditional, what conditional is satisfactory? This question, however, pre-
supposes that there is a unique natural language conditional. Following Adams’ famous
Oswald/Kennedy pair [1], it has been conventional, if not entirely uncontroversial,4 to hold
that there are two distinct types of conditional, distinguished according to the use of the
indicative or subjunctive mood. Consider the following two conditionals from [1, p. 90]:
(Sub) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy in Dallas, then no one else would have
(Ind) If Oswald didn’t shot Kennedy in Dallas, then no one else did
Since the antecedent and consequent are the same in each (modulo tense and mood) but
(Sub) is true whereas (Ind) is false, they must express different types of conditionals, or so
it is claimed.
Unfortunately, matters get even more complicated from here. Another distinction, at
most approximately coincident with that between indicative and subjunctive, is frequently
drawn between counterfactual and non-counterfactual conditionals. Although ‘subjunctive’
and ‘counterfactual’ are both used to label ‘would’-type conditionals, neither, arguably, is
entirely appropriate, nor are the two really interchangeable.5
For the purposes of this dissertation, I mostly prefer to stay aloof from this debate (for
some applications discussed below, I will take an explicit position on which fragment of natu-
ral language uses of conditional expressions, if any, the logic is intended to capture). Whether
there is a multiplicity of conditionals or not, there is certainly a multiplicity of conditional
logics. The earliest of these were either intended as general accounts of conditionality or else
were uniquely tailored to counterfactual (if you prefer, subjunctive) conditionals.
3For critical discussion, see Bennett [7, Ch. 2, 3], Priest [103], and Whitaker [127].
4Adams’ paper has generated a considerable amount of literature. For several criticisms, see Lowe [72]
and Priest [103, 104].
5For further discussion, see Lewis [67, pp. 3-4] and Bennett [7, pp. 11-2].
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Stalnaker [114] exemplifies the first approach. Although counterfactuals are given much
attention by Stalnaker, his account is explicitly ecumenical in that it is supposed to apply to
conditionals in general, rather than counterfactuals alone [115, p. 274]. Stalnaker [114] and
Stalnaker and Thomason [117] aim to give a non-truth functional account of conditionals
and draw heavily on worlds semantics for modal logic for that purpose.6 In approximation,
Stalnaker [114, p. 102] holds that a conditional is true at a world if the consequent holds
at the (unique) world which differs minimally from the world of evaluation except that the
antecedent obtains there.
Interest in the logical analysis of counterfactuals specifically can be traced at least as far
back as Chisholm [15] and Goodman [41]. But the most ambitious instance of the second
approach is clearly Lewis [66, 67]. Famously, Lewis holds (loosely) that a counterfactual is
true at a world if the worlds most similar to it which satisfy the antecedent also satisfy the
consequent [67, p. 16]. Lewis proposes to analyze the key notion in this truth condition—
similarity—primarily in terms of an apparatus of nested spheres, but an equivalent semantics
using indexed preorders indicating comparative similarity turns out to be more germane for
many technical results (see chapter 3) and perhaps better suited to philosophical purposes
as well.7
The pioneer work of Lewis and Stalnaker established conditional logic as a subject in its
own right, and lent it its name, but did not, ultimately, dictate its scope. As logicians and
philosophers began investigating systems contained in, and containing, the Lewis-Stalnaker
systems, applications quite unrelated to natural language conditionality arose.
Probably the best example of this is the deontic interpretation of conditional logic. Deon-
tic conditional logics (or “dyadic deontic logics” as they are sometimes called) were developed
6More than anything else, it was the development of worlds semantics for modal logic, especially in Kripke
[57, 58, 60], that paved the way for penetrating intensional analyses of conditionality.
7I agree with Kit Fine, who notes, “The rationale and status of these two formulations [of the semantics]
are not altogether clear. It is surely the formulation in terms of [comparative] similarity that is the more
basic” [25, p. 457].
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and investigated using logical resources from, or related to, conditional logic by Hansson [43],
van Fraassen [33], Lewis [67, 70], and Chellas [13, 14]. I develop deontic applications of cer-
tain conditional logics of my own in chapter 4. In chapter 6, I discuss a possible epistemic
interpretation of the conditional connective in intuitionstic conditional logic; such interpre-
tations are, of course, far removed from concerns about the logic of counterfactuals.
Because of the variety of applications of conditional logic, one should not read too much
into the name. Even formally specifying what a conditional logic is—beyond stipulating the
language—turns out to be a rather fruitless task. Conditional logics without any unique
validities naturally arise in the examination of counterpossibles (see chapter 5) and condi-
tional logics which are not subsystems of any Lewis-Stalnaker systems naturally arise in the
examination of conditional obligation (see chapter 4). Therefore, let a conditional logic be,
in the first instance, a system from one of Stalnaker’s or Lewis’ works on the subject; and
in the second instance, a system bearing a family resemblance to one of those systems.
Throughout this dissertation, I use Lewis’ symbol for the novel conditional connec-
tive (in some chapters, I also use) and treat this as a primitive.8 If a counterfactual
interpretation is intended, φ ψ is to be read: if φ were the case, then ψ would be the
case. If no particular natural language conditional is intended, it may simply be read: if φ,
then ψ. More exotic interpretations of the connective will be discussed in due course.
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation has, in addition to its introduction and conclusion chapters, five chapters.
Of these five chapters, one is primarily a review of standard results, one presents purely
technical results, and three aim to make both philosophical and technical contributions to
8Some philosophers, notably A˚qvist [4], have sought to define (understood to be a subjunctive condi-
tional) in terms of unary connectives, e.g. a modal box and selection operator, and the material conditional.
I will not pursue any development along these lines here.
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the subject. I review the material to be covered in each of these chapters below.
Chapter 2 is primarily dedicated to a review of the major conditional logics from the
literature. These include Stalnaker’s [114] C2 (=VCS), Lewis’ [66, 67] C1 (=VC), and
Chellas’ [13] CK. I examine these systems both syntactically and semantically. On the
syntactic side, I taxonomize and axiomatize various systems of conditional logic and discuss
embeddings of modal logics into these, drawing on previous work by Williamson [128, 129] (cf.
Lewis [67, Ch. 6.3]). Adapting previous work by Chellas [13], Nute [92], and Segerberg [111],
uniform neighborhood-type and algebraic semantics are presented for the major systems
and determination—soundness and completeness—results are proved.9 I also review more
specialized kinds of semantics, including the sphere and preorder semantics of Lewis [66, 67].
Although most of the material presented in this chapter is not novel, it is essential to include
a review of this sort since all subsequent chapters will draw on and modify this material in
various ways.
The proof theory of certain strong conditional logics—those from the V-family of Lewis
[67]—is investigated in chapter 3. In connection with this subject, it is worth pointing out
that, by far, the most popular way of presenting conditional logics proof theoretically in
the literature is with axiom (Hilbert) systems. While this has many drawbacks, I mention
two specifically. First, axiom systems, unlike tableaux and sequent calculi, cannot be used
to obtain many interesting proof-theoretic results nor are they particularly amenable to
automated proof search techniques. Second, axiom systems are poor pedagogical tools and
make the teaching and learning of derivations in conditional logic needlessly difficult.
While the proof theory of modal logic is by now quite mature,10 the proof theory of
conditional logic is comparably underdeveloped.11 In this chapter, I develop sound and
9Following Chellas [14, p. 60], I sometimes say that a system is determined by a semantics (more
particularly, a class of interpretations) if it is sound and complete with respect to it.
10For (labeled) sequent calculi for a range of modal logics, see Negri [85, 86, 87]. For modal tableaux, see
Fitting [30] and Priest [102]. For modal natural deduction systems, see Roy [110].
11After axiom systems, sequent calculi are the most popular proof systems for conditional logic. Sequent-
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complete analytic tableaux for the basic Lewis system from the V-family, C0 (=V), and
many of its extensions, including C1. Stalnaker’s C2 is also given sound and complete
tableaux, but not all of the rules are analytic. The tableaux developed in this chapter are
closely related to a sequent calculus developed for C1 by Negri and Sbardolini [86]. However,
while their calculus is seen to be unfaithful to C1, the calculus I develop for C1 does not
suffer from this problem.
Chaper 4 is dedicated to the investigation of connexive conditional logic.12 Contemporary
connexive logic, which has its roots in work by Angell [2] and McCall [78], is characterized by
heterodox principles of conditionality like Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses.13 These distinctly
non-classical principles engender inconsistency in even quite weak conditional logics (see, e.g.,
Unterhuber [121]). They do, however, have a certain measure of intuitive plausibility for a
variety of applications.
As chapter 4 will make clear, (weak versions of) Boethius’ theses, in particular, arise
naturally from the deontic interpretation of conditional logic as the logic of conditional
obligation (for which, see Lewis [67, Ch. 5.1] and Chellas [14, Ch. 10]). Deontically,
φ ψ can be read: given φ, ψ is obligatory (i.e. it ought to be that ψ is the case). This
chapter investigates systems of conditional obligation, determines which of these is best, and
examines the relationship between such systems and systems of unconditional obligation
(i.e. deontic modal logics) via embedding results. In addition, several non-deontic connexive
and partially connexive conditional logics (including systems and subsystems of Lowe [71])
type calculi for C1 and C2 have been given by de Swart [118] and Gent [38]; more recently, Negri and
Sbardolini [89] developed a sequent calculus for C1, but it turns out to be unfaithful. Labeled sequent
calculi for conditional logics in the neighborhood of CK have been developed by Pozzato [98] and Poggiolesi
[97]. Fitch-style natural deduction systems for several conditional logics have been given by Thomason [119]
and Roy [110]. Tableaux for some conditional logics not stronger than Ck+(ID)+(CMP) were given by
Priest [102, Ch. 5]. Ro¨nnedal [109] and Zach [134] extended tableaux methods to additional conditional
logics, but faced difficulties in obtaining (cut-free) completeness results for the strong systems.
12The term ‘connexive’ was introduced into contemporary logic by McCall [78, p. 415], drawing inspiration
from the third account of conditionals surveyed in a famous passage of Sextus (Hyp. Pyrrh. II, 111).
13Aristotle’s theses, for example, are ¬(φ ¬φ) and ¬(¬φ φ). For the names, see McCall [78, 80].
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are axiomatized and discussed. Finally, determination and independence results are proved
for these systems using neighborhood-type and algebraic semantics. This chapter extends
previous work of mine in [126].
As is well known, counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, are ren-
dered vacuously true in the semantics for most extant conditional logics. Although vacu-
ousness has had its defenders, including, most recently, Williamson [130], it is increasingly a
minority position.14 Within the last several years, criticisms of vacuousness have been made
by, among others, Berto et al. [8], Bjerring [9], Brogaard and Salerno [11], Jago [49, 50],
and Krakauer [55, 56]. Despite the emerging philosophical consensus against vacuousness,
technical developments have not kept pace. Few critics of vacuousness have proposed de-
tailed replacement semantics, and those that have (e.g. Berto et al. [8] and Mares [74]) have
largely shunned proof theory.15
I propose a detailed study of systems of counterpossible logic and their semantics in
chapter 5. The most characteristic feature of the non-vacuous approach to counterpossibles
is the utilization of impossible, or non-normal, worlds.16 Such worlds make available new
and interesting model constraints governing the relation between possible and impossible
worlds, including the famous ‘strangeness of impossibility’ constraint discussed by Nolan [90].
These non-vacuous semantics are used to prove determination results for various systems of
counterpossible logic discussed in the chapter.
Besides the previously mentioned technical developments and results, chapter 5 also en-
gages in the philosophical debate over vacuousness and what, if anything, should replace it.
I take a non-vacuous line but also endorse a system for counterpossibles that is consider-
ably weaker than those which many opponents of vacuousness defend. This chapter further
14Which is not to say that it’s false!
15Mares and Fuhrmann [76] is one notable exception to this.
16It should be noted that there is, at least technically speaking, no problem whatsoever about impossible
worlds. As Priest [100, p. 291] observes, such worlds were developed and used by Kripke himself in [60] to
model weak systems of modal logic including C. I. Lewis’ S2.
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develops views of mine previously published in [124].
Conditional logic is studied in a non-classical context, viz. intuitionistic logic, in chap-
ter 6. Given the overwhelmingly classical orientation of the literature on conditional logic,
a detailed investigation of the subject from a non-classical perspective should be most wel-
come.17 In [13], Chellas developed the basic (normal) classical conditional logic CK. This
chapter, extending previous work of mine in [125], investigates its intuitionistic counterpart,
ICK, as well as various extensions thereof. A number of systems are axiomatized and given
both algebraic and worlds semantics.18 These semantics are shown to be equivalent and
determination results are proved.
Chapter 6 not only examines intuitionistic conditional logic, but examines intuitionistic
logic via conditional logic, giving a Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski inspired embedding of it into
a natural extension of Lewis’ main logic of counterfactuals, viz. C1.19 This embedding,
and also embeddings of certain intuitionistic epistemic logics into intuitionistic conditional
logics, suggest various philosophically interesting (and exotic!) interpretations of which I
discuss as appropriate. Moreover, each of these interpretations relate to the BHK (Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov) interpretation of the standard connectives of intuitionistic logic.20
17Previous work on paraconsistent or relevant conditional logic has been done by Mares [73, 74, 75], Mares
and Fuhrmann [76], and Priest [102, pp. 208-11]. The only previous work on intuitionistic conditional logic
that I am aware of is Genovese et al. [36, 37] (which is primarily proof-theoretically oriented) and Weiss
[125].
18It is worth noting that it is exceptionally easy to give algebraic semantics for many intuitionistic condi-
tional logics by exploiting previous work by Nute [91, 92]. Nute’s algebraic semantics, which uses boolean
algebras with operators (cf. the work of McKinsey [81], McKinsey and Tarski [82], and Lemmon [63, 64] on
classical modal logic), can be easily “Heyting-ized” to give algebraic semantics for intuitionistic conditional
logics (cf. the work of Bull [12] and Fischer Servi [28] on intuitionistic modal logic).
19For the Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski embedding, see Go¨del [40] and McKinsey and Tarski [82].
20For the BHK interpretation of the standard connectives of intuitionistic logic, see (for example) Dummett
[23] and section 6.1 below.
Chapter 2
Conditional Logic
Contemporary conditional logic has its origins in the pioneer work of Stalnaker [114, 117]
and Lewis [66, 67]. It attained maturity in the work of Chellas [13, 14], Nute [92], and
finally Segerberg [111]. The primary purpose of this chapter is to review the main systems
of conditional logic both semantically and axiomatically. Reviewing this material is essential
since all subsequent chapters will adapt and repurpose it in various ways. Most, though not
all, of the results and ideas discussed in this chapter are well-established. Nevertheless, I
have found it beneficial for what follows to introduce some generalizations and modifications.
In section 2.1, I discuss systems of conditional logic syntactically and present axiom-
atizations for the major systems (table 2.3). The close relationship between modal and
conditional logic is discussed in subsection 2.1.2, where embeddings of various modal logics
into conditional logics are examined.
Uniform semantic treatments of conditional logic are turned to in section 2.2. An appar-
ently novel neighborhood variant of Chellas-Segerberg relational semantics [13, 111, 122] is
introduced in subsection 2.2.1. The relation of this semantics to the more standard relational
version as well as the algebraic semantics due to Nute [92] is discussed in subsections 2.2.1 and
2.2.2. Finally, determination—soundness and completeness—results for the major systems
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of conditional logic with respect to this semantics are sketched in subsection 2.2.3.
Three other kinds of more specialized semantics for conditional logic are discussed in
section 2.3. Semantics for systems for which substitution of logical equivalents does not
generally hold is discussed in subsection 2.3.1. In subsection 2.3.2, two intuitively rich kinds
of semantics developed by Lewis [66, 67, 68] are examined and shown to be equivalent.
2.1 Syntax
Let L be the language of classical propositional logic augmented with the binary conditional
connective.1 The formation rules are standard (in particular, arbitrary nesting of
is allowed). Π denotes the set of all propositional variables (p, q, . . .) and Φ the set of all
formulae (φ, ψ, . . .).
2.1.1 Axiom Systems
This section reviews the terminology and taxonomy of systems of conditional logic. The
following definitions are standard (cf. [13, 14], [92]):
DEFINITION 1. A set of formulae L (in the language L) is a system of conditional logic





DEFINITION 2. `L φ (φ is a theorem of L) if and only if φ ∈ L. Γ `L φ if and only if
there is a set {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ Γ(n ≥ 0) such that `L (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn) → φ. L is consistent if
and only if 6`L ⊥. Γ is L consistent if and only if Γ 6`L ⊥ and Γ is maximally L consistent if
it is L consistent and has no L consistent proper extensions.
1Take → and ¬ as primitive; the other connectives, including the constants > and ⊥, are introduced
using the usual definitions.
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It is obvious from definition 1 that every system of conditional logic contains classical
propositional logic (PL). As such, PL can be appealed to in axiomatic proofs wherever clas-
sical inferences or tautologies are used. Nontrivial systems of conditional logic are obtained
by closing under rules from table 2.1 and adding axioms from table 2.2.
Table 2.1: Rules
φ↔ ψ
(φ χ)↔ (ψ χ) (RCEA)
φ↔ ψ
(χ φ)↔ (χ ψ) (RCEC)
(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn)→ φ
((ψ φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (ψ φn))→ (ψ φ) (RCK)
Each rule from table 2.1 is taken to apply only if the premise is a theorem. The standard
convention is adopted that when n = 0, (RCK) licenses the inference from φ to ψ φ.
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Table 2.2: Axiom Schemata
(φ (ψ ∧ θ))→ ((φ ψ) ∧ (φ θ)) (CM)
((φ ψ) ∧ (φ θ))→ (φ (ψ ∧ θ)) (CC)
φ > (CN)
φ φ (ID)
(φ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) (CMP)
(φ ∧ ψ)→ (φ ψ) (CS)
(¬ψ ψ)→ (φ ψ) (MOD)
(φ ψ) ∨ (φ ¬ψ) (CEM)
((φ ψ) ∧ ¬(φ ¬θ))→ ((φ ∧ θ) ψ) (CV)
((φ ψ) ∧ (ψ φ))→ ((φ θ)↔ (ψ θ)) (CSO)
DEFINITION 3. A system of conditional logic L closed under (RCEC) is half-classical.
A half-classical system of conditional logic L closed under (RCEA) is classical. Let L be a
classical system: L is monotonic if it contains all instances of (CM), regular if it contains
all instances of (CM) and (CC), and normal if it contains all instances of (CM), (CC), and
(CN).
In the literature, most normal systems of conditional logics are axiomatized using closure
under (RCK) and (RCEA) rather than the schemes indicated in definition 3. It is not difficult
to show that a classical system of conditional logic is normal if and only if it is closed under
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(RCK).2 Although this result is well-known (see, e.g., Chellas [13, pp. 137-8]), it is worth
reviewing here so as to give a feel for proofs in systems of conditional logic.
PROPOSITION 1. Every classical system of conditional logic closed under (RCK) is
normal
Proof is omitted.
PROPOSITION 2. Every monotonic system of conditional logic is closed under the fol-
lowing rule (the rule applies only if the premise is a theorem):
φ→ ψ
(θ φ)→ (θ ψ) (RCM)
1 φ→ ψ ` (Assumption)
2 (φ ∧ ψ)↔ φ PL 1
3 (θ (φ ∧ ψ))↔ (θ φ) RCEC 2
4 (θ (φ ∧ ψ))→ ((θ φ) ∧ (θ ψ)) CM
5 (θ φ)→ (θ ψ) PL 3, 4
PROPOSITION 3. Every regular system of conditional logic contains all instances of the
following scheme:
(φ (ψ → θ))→ ((φ ψ)→ (φ θ)) (CK)
2More generally, a system of conditional logic is normal if and only if it is closed under (RCK) and
(RCEA).
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1 (φ (ψ ∧ (ψ → θ)))↔ ((φ ψ) ∧ (φ (ψ → θ))) CM, CC
2 (ψ ∧ (ψ → θ))→ θ `
3 (φ (ψ ∧ (ψ → θ)))→ (φ θ) RCM 2
4 ((φ ψ) ∧ (φ (ψ → θ)))→ (φ θ) PL 1, 3
5 (φ (ψ → θ))→ ((φ ψ)→ (φ θ)) PL 4
PROPOSITION 4. Every normal system of conditional logic is closed under (RCK)
The proof is by induction on n in (RCK). When n = 0, it must be shown that from the
theorem φ the result ψ φ follows. This is immediate from (CN) and (RCEC). (CK) is
then used with the induction hypothesis to complete the proof.
THEOREM 1. Let L be a classical system of conditional logic: L is normal if and only if
L is closed under (RCK)
Immediate from propositions 1 and 4.
An incomplete list of major systems of conditional logic, in increasing logical strength,
is given in table 2.3. Each system is taken to be the smallest set of formulae containing all
instances of the listed axiom schemata and closed under the listed rules. The axiomatizations
used generally follow Nute [92, pp. 129-30].3
3I am not aware of any proof, nor have I been able to prove, that Nute’s axiomatization of Lewis’ C1 is
equivalent to Lewis’ own axiomatization of it in [67, p. 132]. I have been able to show that Lewis’ system
contains Nute’s, but the converse seems to be more difficult.
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C0 CK, (ID), (MOD), (CSO), (CV)
C1 C0, (CMP), (CS)
C2 C0, (CMP), (CEM)
For “two-letter” systems, the convention is adopted that Xy is XY where closure under
(RCEA) has been dropped (i.e. Xy is the merely half-classical version of XY). Chronolog-
ically, the first of these is C2 (=VCS), introduced by Stalnaker [114]. C0 (=V) and C1
(=VC) were first introduced by Lewis [66]. Chellas [13] characterized the remaining four
(and developed the terminology for describing them used in definition 3). Their little-letter
variants (e.g. Ck) seem to have first appeared in Chellas [13, n. 14] and Nute [92].
DEFINITION 4. Let Φc be the set of all formulae of classical propositional logic. Define
a function τ : Φ→ Φc as follows:
1. τ(p) = p
2. τ(¬φ) = ¬τ(φ)
3. τ(φ→ ψ) = τ(φ ψ) = τ(φ)→ τ(ψ)
THEOREM 2 (Consistency). Each of the systems in table 2.3 is consistent
The proof is essentially as in Nute [92, pp. 24-5]. It is trivial to verify that every axiom in
table 2.2 is mapped to a classical tautology by τ . Moreover, if the premise of any rule in
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table 2.1 is mapped by τ to a tautology, so is the conclusion. Consequently, every theorem
of every system, under τ , is a tautology. Since τ(⊥) is not a tautology, ⊥ is not a theorem
of any of the systems.
2.1.2 Modal Logic in Conditional Logic
Given the close relationship between modal and conditional logic, some remarks are in order
about how to interpret modal logic in conditional logic.4 I begin by briefly reminding the
reader of some of the basic features of modal logic. Let the language of modal logic, L, be
the same as L except that there is a unary connective  in place of. Let Φ be the set
of formulae in L (the formation rules are standard). Systems of modal logic, theoremhood,
etc. are defined essentially as in definitions 1 and 2. Some of the major normal modal logics
are then obtained by closing under the rule,5
φ
φ (NEC)
and adding all instances of (K) and of some selection of the other axiom schemata listed in
table 2.4.
4For comprehensive treatments of modal logic, the reader is referred to Hughes and Cresswell [45, 46],
Chellas [14], and Fitting and Mendelsohn [32].
5(NEC) only applies if the premise is a theorem.
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Table 2.4: Modal Axiom Schemata




Normal systems of modal logic will simply be named by listing their axioms in bold, where
it is understood that each system is to be closed under (NEC). Thus, K4 (for example) is
the smallest system of modal logic closed under (NEC) which contains all instances of (K)
and (4).
Beginning with Stalnaker [114, p. 105], it has been conventional to introduce  into a
given conditional logic via the following definition:6
φ ≡ (¬φ φ) (Df. 1)
It should be clear that (Df. 1) is especially closely related to one scheme from table 2.2 in
particular, viz. (MOD). But how exactly are they related?
Let L be the smallest normal system of conditional logic containing all instances of
(MOD). Following Williamson [129, pp. 88-90] (see also Williamson [128, pp. 298-300]),
with some adjustments, consider the following results:7
DEFINITION 5. Define a function σ : Φ → Φ as follows:
6(Df. 1) corresponds to Lewis’ definition of “outer necessity” while (Df. 2), below, approximates his
definition of “inner necessity” [67, p. 22, 30]. The nomenclature is motivated by his sphere semantics, for
which see subsection 2.3.2 below.
7These results—in particular, theorem 3—actually represent a slight refinement of Williamson’s; more on
this anon.
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1. σ(p) = p
2. σ(¬φ) = ¬σ(φ)
3. σ(φ→ ψ) = σ(φ)→ σ(ψ)
4. σ(φ) = ¬σ(φ) σ(φ)
LEMMA 1. If `K φ, then `L σ(φ)
By induction on the length of proof. The only somewhat difficult part is showing that
`L σ(K). Here is a (condensed) proof:
1 ¬(σ(φ)→ σ(ψ)) (σ(φ)→ σ(ψ)) Assumption
2 ¬σ(φ) σ(φ) Assumption
3 ¬σ(ψ) σ(φ) MOD, PL 2
4 ¬σ(ψ) (σ(φ)→ σ(ψ)) MOD, PL 1
5 (¬σ(ψ)→ σ(φ))→ (¬σ(ψ)→ σ(ψ)) CK, PL 4
6 ¬σ(ψ)→ σ(ψ) PL 3, 5
Thus, by conditional proof and definition 5, `L σ((φ→ ψ))→ (σ(φ)→ σ(ψ)) = σ(K).
DEFINITION 6. Define a function σ−1 : Φ→ Φ as follows:8
1. σ−1(p) = p
2. σ−1(¬φ) = ¬σ−1(φ)
3. σ−1(φ→ ψ) = σ−1(φ)→ σ−1(ψ)
4. σ−1(φ ψ) = (σ−1(φ)→ σ−1(ψ))
8The inverse notation is not intended literally, but it is suggestive; see lemma 3 below.
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LEMMA 2. If `L φ, then `K σ−1(φ)
Again, the result is by induction on the length of proof.
LEMMA 3. `K φ↔ σ−1(σ(φ))
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. The only case of interest is that in which
φ is of the form ψ. Then: σ−1(σ(ψ)) = σ−1(¬σ(ψ)  σ(ψ)) = (¬σ−1(σ(ψ)) →
σ−1(σ(ψ))). In K, by the induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to (¬ψ → ψ), which is
clearly equivalent to ψ.
THEOREM 3 (Modal Embedding). `K φ if and only if `L σ(φ)
The result follows immediately from lemmata 1, 2, and 3.
Results akin to theorem 3 for stronger systems of modal logic can be obtained by consider-
ing stronger systems of conditional logic. Note that Williamson [129, p. 85] does not consider
the system L, but rather L extended by (ID). In that system, ¬φ φ and ¬φ ⊥ are
equivalent [129, p. 87], and Williamson proves his main results using the latter as a definition
of φ.9
K can be embedded into even weaker systems of conditional logic using definitions besides
(Df. 1). Consider the following interesting definition (cf. Lowe [71, p. 360]):
φ ≡ > φ (Df. 2)
Let σ∗ be the same as σ except that σ∗(φ) = > σ∗(φ). Then the following result can
9That these formulae are not equivalent in L can be shown semantically (it is perhaps most convenient
to use the algebraic semantics from subsection 2.2.2).
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be proved with little modification to the proof of theorem 3 (in particular, the same function
σ−1 can be used):
THEOREM 4 (Modal Embedding). `K φ if and only if `CK σ∗(φ)
The result follows from suitably modified versions of lemmata 1, 2, and 3.
2.2 Uniform Semantics
While the most popular semantics for conditional logic is, at base, a worlds semantics,
other sorts of semantics have been developed. Nute, building on previous work for modal
logic (e.g. Lemmon [63]), provided algebraic semantics for various conditional logics in [91,
92]. More recently, Fine [27] has developed a truthmaker semantics for certain conditional
logics, specifically to avoid problems associated with the substitution of logical equivalents
(for which, see also Fine [26]). I will have nothing to say about truthmaker semantics for
conditional logic here; I will, however, discuss both worlds semantics and algebraic semantics
in detail.
Under the umbrella of worlds semantics, there are many variations in the literature on
conditional logic (some of these are canvassed by Nute in [92, Ch. 3]). In subsection 2.2.1,
I present a neighborhood-type worlds semantics which is intended to be able to characterize
any classical system of conditional logic (“classical” in the sense of definition 3). Algebraic
semantics suitable for any classical system are presented in subsection 2.2.2. Finally, deter-
mination results are proved for each of the systems listed in table 2.3 in subsection 2.2.3.
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2.2.1 Proposition Indexed Interpretations
The semantics described in this section is a hybrid of semantics taken from Chellas [13]
and Segerberg [111]. It is, in effect, a neighborhood variant of so-called Chellas-Segerberg
semantics (for which, see Unterhuber [120] and Unterhuber and Schurz [122]). The reader
will note its similarities to the more familiar neighborhood semantics for modal logic.10
DEFINITION 7. A proposition indexed interpretation is a structure I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈
P}, V 〉 such that (cf. Segerberg [111]):
1. W is a nonempty set of worlds
2. P ⊆ P(W ) such that:
(a) ∅ ∈ P
(b) If S ∈ P , then −S = W − S ∈ P
(c) If S ∈ P and T ∈ P , then S ∩ T ∈ P
(d) If S ∈ P and T ∈ P , then {x ∈ W : T ∈ fS(x)} ∈ P
3. fX : W → P(P )
4. V : Π→ P(W ) such that for all p ∈ Π, V (p) ∈ P
Given a proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉, the truth of a
formula at a world of the interpretation (|=Iw) is defined as follows (let [φ] be {x ∈ W :|=Ix φ}):
1. |=Iw p if and only if w ∈ V (p)
2. |=Iw ¬φ if and only if 6|=Iw φ
3. |=Iw φ→ ψ if and only if 6|=Iw φ or |=Iw ψ
10For neighborhood semantics, see Chellas [14, Ch. 7] and Pacuit [94].
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4. |=Iw φ ψ if and only if [ψ] ∈ f[φ](w)
Logics of any real interest require imposing additional constraints on the function fX .
Some of the most important constraints are given below in table 2.5 (X,S, T ∈ P ):11
Table 2.5: Function Constraints
If S ∩ T ∈ fX(w), then S ∈ fX(w) and T ∈ fX(w) (cm)
If S ∈ fX(w) and T ∈ fX(w), then S ∩ T ∈ fX(w) (cc)
W ∈ fX(w) (cn)
X ∈ fX(w) (id)
If S ∈ fX(w) and w ∈ X, then w ∈ S (cmp)
If w ∈ S ∩ T, then S ∈ fT (w) (cs)
If X ∈ f−X(w), then X ∈ fS(w) (mod)
Either S ∈ fX(w) or − S ∈ fX(w) (cem)
If S ∈ fX(w) and − T 6∈ fX(w), then S ∈ fX∩T (w) (cv)
If S ∈ fX(w) and X ∈ fS(w), then T ∈ fX(w) iff T ∈ fS(w) (cso)
The semantic constraints listed in table 2.5 correspond to the axiom schemata listed in
table 2.2 in the obvious way. Let CL designate the class of all proposition indexed inter-
pretations satisfying the constraints corresponding to the system of conditional logic L.12
11Many the constraints listed in table 2.5 are identical with those given by Arlo-Costa in [5, §3.1.2].
12Example: CCK is the class of all proposition indexed interpretations in which fX satisfies (cm), (cc),
and (cn).
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Proofs that these correspondences in fact hold (i.e. determination results) will be given in
subsection 2.2.3.
DEFINITION 8. Where Σ is a set of formulae and C is a class of proposition indexed
interpretations, Σ |=C φ if and only if for all worlds w of all interpretations I ∈ C, if |=Iw ψ
for each ψ ∈ Σ, then |=Iw φ. If Σ |=C φ, the inference is called valid (in C). φ is a valid
formula (in C) if ∅ |=C φ.
LEMMA 4. Given a proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉, for
all φ ∈ Φ, [φ] ∈ P
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. If φ is a propositional variable p ∈ Π,
then [p] = V (p) ∈ P by definition 7. Suppose the result holds for ψ and θ. If φ is of
the form ¬ψ, then [¬ψ] = −[ψ] ∈ P since [ψ] ∈ P . If φ is of the form ψ → θ, then
[ψ → θ] = −[ψ] ∪ [θ] = −([ψ] ∩ −[θ]) ∈ P . Finally, if φ is of the form ψ  θ, then
[ψ θ] = {x ∈ W :|=Ix ψ θ} = {x ∈ W : [θ] ∈ f[ψ](x)} ∈ P since [θ] ∈ P and [ψ] ∈ P .
It is worth briefly examining the relation of the semantics offered above to its better
known counterpart in the literature.
DEFINITION 9. A relational proposition indexed interpretation (cf. [111, p. 160]) is
a structure IR = 〈W,P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 where everything is defined as in definition 7
except:
1. In place of fX , there is a relation RX ⊆ W ×W
2. In place of 2(d), if S ∈ P and T ∈ P , then {x ∈ W : ∀y(xRSy ⇒ y ∈ T )} ∈ P
Then the truth conditions for complex formulae at a world w are the same as above except :
|=IRw φ ψ if and only if {y ∈ W : wR[φ]y} ⊆ [ψ]
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A number of constraints can be put on the relation RX in order to semantically charac-
terize a range of logics; many of these can be found in [111, p. 163]. I will, however, confine
my attention to the class of all relational proposition indexed interpretations, which I denote
by CCKR .13
A natural question is: what class of proposition indexed interpretations determines the
same validities as CCKR ? Using purely semantic methods, CCKR can be shown to be equivalent
(modulo validity) to a subset of CCK (the class of all proposition indexed interpretations
satisfying the constraints (cm), (cc), and (cn)), viz. the subset of augmented proposition
indexed interpretations:
DEFINITION 10. Call a proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉
augmented (cf. Chellas [14, p. 220]) if it satisfies the condition (X, Y ∈ P,w ∈ W ):
Y ∈ fX(w) if and only if
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ Y
Let CA denote the class of all augmented proposition indexed interpretations.
LEMMA 5. CA ⊆ CCK
Consider an arbitrary augmented proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈
P}, V 〉; it suffices to show that I satisfies (cm), (cc), and (cn). For (cm), suppose S ∩ T ∈
fX(w); then, since I is augmented,
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ S∩T . Since
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ S and
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ T ,
it follows that S ∈ fX(w) and T ∈ fX(w), as desired. For (cc), suppose that S ∈ fX(w)
and T ∈ fX(w); from
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ S and
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ T , it follows that
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ S ∩ T .
Consequently, S ∩ T ∈ fX(w). Since
⋂
fX(w) ⊆ W , W ∈ fX(w), as required by (cn).
13Of course, CK is sound and complete with respect to this class; for a proof sketch, see Segerberg [111,
p. 162].
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A straightforward adaptation of proofs relating neighborhood and relational models for
modal logic from Chellas [14, pp. 220-22] suffices to show that CCKR and CA determine the
same validities.
LEMMA 6. Given an augmented proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈
P}, V 〉, there is a relational proposition indexed interpretation IR = 〈W,PR, {RX : X ∈
PR}, V 〉 such that |=IRw φ if and only if |=Iw φ
Construct IR = 〈W,PR, {RX : X ∈ PR}, V 〉 from I by taking W and V to be the same,
making PR the closure of P under the required operations, and setting xRXy if and only
if y ∈ ⋂ fX(x) for X ∈ P ; else, set RX = ∅. It is obvious that this structure meets the
conditions of definition 9.
It remains to show, by induction, that |=IRw φ if and only if |=Iw φ. The only case of
interest is that in which φ is of the form ψ θ. By the induction hypothesis and lemma 4,




|=Iw ψ θ if and only if [θ]I ∈ f[ψ]I(w)⋂
f[ψ]I(w) ⊆ [θ]I
{y ∈ W : wR[ψ]IRy} ⊆ [θ]IR
|=IRw ψ θ
LEMMA 7. Given a relational proposition indexed interpretation IR = 〈W,PR, {RX : X ∈
PR}, V 〉, there is an augmented proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈
P}, V 〉 such that |=IRw φ if and only if |=Iw φ
Construct I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 from IR by taking W and V to be the same, making
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P the closure of PR under the required operations, and setting fX(w) = {Y ⊆ W : {x ∈
W : wRXx} ⊆ Y } for X ∈ PR; else, set fX = {W}. If X ∈ PR, then it is obvious that⋂
fX(w) = {x ∈ W : wRXx}. Hence, it follows immediately that Y ∈ fX(w) if and only if⋂
fX(w) ⊆ Y . Moreover, since Y ∈ {W} if and only if
⋂{W} ⊆ Y , the result also holds
for fX when X 6∈ PR. Therefore, I meets the conditions of definition 10. That |=IRw φ if and
only if |=Iw φ now follows by a routine induction argument, as above.
THEOREM 5 (Equivalence). Γ |=CA φ if and only if Γ |=CCKR φ
The result follows directly from lemmata 6 and 7.
It follows from theorem 5, the completeness of CK with respect to CCKR , and the sound-
ness of CK with respect to CCK (see subsection 2.2.3) that if Γ |=CA φ, Γ |=CCK φ. By
lemma 5, if Γ |=CCK φ, then Γ |=CA φ. Consequently, CCKR , CA, and CCK all determine the
same validities. It would be nice to have a purely semantic proof of this fact; I have none to
offer here.
2.2.2 Algebraic Semantics
In this subsection, I briefly review algebraic semantics for classical systems of conditional
logic. The semantics I present here is essentially due to Nute [92, Ch. 7], although I
freely modify his notation. The main interest here will be to establish a correspondence
between certain classes of algebraic interpretations and proposition indexed interpretations.
Such a correspondence is useful because it is often easier to establish certain results (e.g.
independence and decidability) using algebraic resources than using worlds semantics.
DEFINITION 11. A conditional algebra is a structureA = 〈B, ∗〉 in which B = 〈B, 1, 0,−,∪,∩〉
is a boolean algebra and ∗ is a binary operation on B.
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Conditional algebras corresponding to logics of any real interest must impose various
constraints on ∗. Some of the most important of these are given in table 2.6. They correspond
in the obvious way to the constraints listed in table 2.5.14
Table 2.6: Algebraic Constraints
a ∗ (b ∩ c) ≤ (a ∗ b) ∩ (a ∗ c) (cm?)
(a ∗ b) ∩ (a ∗ c) ≤ a ∗ (b ∩ c) (cc?)
a ∗ 1 = 1 (cn?)
a ∗ a = 1 (id?)
a ∗ b ≤ −a ∪ b (cmp?)
a ∩ b ≤ a ∗ b (cs?)
−a ∗ a ≤ b ∗ a (mod?)
−(a ∗ b) ≤ a ∗ −b (cem?)
(a ∗ b) ∩ −(a ∗ −c) ≤ (a ∩ c) ∗ b (cv?)
(a ∗ b) ∩ (b ∗ a) ∩ (a ∗ c) ≤ (b ∗ c) (cso?)
DEFINITION 12. A conditional algebraic interpretation is a structure I∗ = 〈A, g〉 in
which A is a conditional algebra and g : Π→ B is extended in such a way that:
1. g(¬φ) = −g(φ)
2. g(φ→ ψ) = −g(φ) ∪ g(ψ)
14Most of the constraints listed in table 2.6 can be found in Nute [92, pp. 132-3].
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3. g(φ ψ) = g(φ) ∗ g(ψ)
DEFINITION 13. For I∗ = 〈A, g〉, write |=I∗ φ if and only if g(φ) = 1. Where C∗ is a
class of conditional algebraic interpretations, write |=C∗ φ if |=I∗ φ for all I∗ ∈ C∗, in which
case φ is said to be valid (in C∗).
Let CL∗ designate the class of all conditional algebraic interpretations satisfying the con-
straints corresponding to the system of conditional logic L. For any system L from table 2.3,
I show that CL (a class of proposition indexed interpretations) and CL∗ (a class of conditional
algebraic interpretations) characterize the same valid formulae (cf. Nute [92, pp. 138-46]).
A few preliminary lemmata and definitions will expedite the proof (for what follows, if I is
a proposition indexed interpretation, I write |=I φ if and only if |=Iw φ for all worlds w of the
interpretation).
LEMMA 8. In any conditional algebra satisfying (cm?), a ≤ b implies c ∗ a ≤ c ∗ b
This short proof is due to Nute [92, p. 133]. Suppose a ≤ b; then a = a ∩ b. Thus,
c ∗ a = c ∗ (a ∩ b) ≤ (c ∗ a) ∩ (c ∗ b)⇒ c ∗ a ≤ c ∗ b.
LEMMA 9. Given a proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉, there
is a conditional algebraic interpretation I∗ = 〈A, g〉 such that |=I∗ φ if and only if |=I φ
A conditional algebra must be constructed from I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉. Set B = P
(the set of propositions in I) and take each of the boolean algebraic operations to be the
obvious set-theoretical operations. Finally, set a ∗ b = {w ∈ W : b ∈ fa(w)}. It is immediate
from the conditions imposed on P in definition 7 that A = 〈〈B, 1, 0,−,∪,∩〉, ∗〉, so defined,
is a conditional algebra.
It must be shown that if I satisfies a constraint from table 2.5, A satisfies the corre-
sponding constraint from table 2.6. For most constraints, this is trivial to establish; I take
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(cmp?) as an example. Suppose I satisfies (cmp) and x ∈ a ∗ b = {w ∈ W : b ∈ fa(w)}; then
b ∈ fa(x). Either x ∈ a or x ∈ −a = W − a. In the first case, by (cmp), x ∈ b; in the second
case, x ∈ −a. So, in any case, x ∈ −a ∪ b. Therefore, a ∗ b ≤ −a ∪ b, as desired.
Having constructed a suitable algebra A, a conditional algebraic interpretation I∗ =
〈A, g〉 is defined by putting g(φ) = [φ] (recall that [φ] is the proposition expressed by φ in
I). Note that, for all φ, g(φ) ∈ B by lemma 4. It only remains to be shown that the truth
conditions specified in definition 12 are satisfied; the verification of this simple fact is left to
the reader.
I remind the reader of some terminology from lattice theory for what follows.15 A filter
in a bounded distributive lattice 〈D, 1, 0,−,∪,∩〉 is a set ∅ 6= ∇ ⊆ D such that a ∩ b ∈ ∇
if and only if a, b ∈ ∇ (it is immediate from the definition that every filter contains 1 and
is upward closed). A filter ∇ is proper if ∇ 6= D. A proper filter ∇ is prime if whenever
a ∪ b ∈ ∇, either a ∈ ∇ or b ∈ ∇. Note that every prime filter in a boolean algebra is
maximal in the sense that, for every a ∈ D, either a ∈ ∇ or −a ∈ ∇ (this is immediate from
the definition of primeness and the fact that 1 = a ∪ −a for all a in a boolean algebra).
LEMMA 10. Given a distributive lattice 〈D, 1, 0,∪,∩〉 with a, b ∈ D, if b 6≤ a, then there
exists a prime filter ∇ such that a 6∈ ∇ and b ∈ ∇
The proof of this result can be found in, e.g., Rasiowa and Sikorski [106, p. 49].
LEMMA 11. Given a conditional algebraic interpretation I∗ = 〈A, g〉, there is a proposition
indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 such that |=I∗ φ if and only if |=I φ
To construct a proposition indexed interpretation from I∗ = 〈A, g〉, take W to be the set
of all prime filters in A and write bac = {w ∈ W : a ∈ w}. Then put P = {bac : a ∈ B},
15These definitions basically follow Rasiowa and Sikorski [106, pp. 44-50].
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bbc ∈ fbac(w) if and only if w ∈ ba ∗ bc, and |=Iw φ if and only if w ∈ bg(φ)c; since w ∈ V (p)
if and only if |=Iw p if and only if w ∈ bg(p)c, note that V (p) = bg(p)c ∈ P .
It must be shown that the structure I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 is a proposition indexed
interpretation. That W 6= ∅ follows from the fact that 1 6≤ 0 and lemma 10. Since 0 is not
in any prime filter (else it would not be proper), b0c = ∅ ∈ P , as desired. Showing that the
boolean closure conditions on P obtain is straightforward. Suppose bac and bbc are arbitrary
in P ; then since a, b ∈ B, a ∗ b ∈ B. Therefore, {w ∈ W : bbc ∈ fbac(w)} = ba ∗ bc ∈ P , as
desired.
It must also be shown that if A satisfies a constraint from table 2.6, I satisfies the
corresponding constraint from table 2.5. Take (cm?) as an example; pick an arbitrary w ∈ W
such that bbc ∩ bcc = bb∩ cc ∈ fbac(w). Then a ∗ (b∩ c) ∈ w, from which it follows by (cm?)
and the fact that w is a filter that a∗b, a∗c ∈ w. Consequently, bbc, bcc ∈ fbac(w), as desired.
Lastly, it must be shown that the truth conditions are satisfied. The only case I examine
is that concerning. |=Iw φ ψ if and only if w ∈ bg(φ ψ)c = bg(φ) ∗ g(ψ)c = {x ∈
W : bg(ψ)c ∈ fbg(φ)c(x)}, as desired.
Now, if |=I∗ φ, g(φ) = 1 ∈ w for all w ∈ W (since each w is a filter); that is, |=I φ.
Conversely, if 6|=I∗ φ, then since g(φ) 6= 1, it is clear that 1 6≤ g(φ). Hence, by lemma 10,
there is a prime filter w ∈ W such that g(φ) 6∈ w; therefore, 6|=I φ, as desired.
THEOREM 6 (Equivalence). |=CL φ if and only if |=CL∗ φ
The result follows directly from lemmata 9 and 11.
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2.2.3 Determination Results
Throughout this subsection, let L be any classical system of conditional logic from table 2.3.
I prove soundness and completeness results for each such L. Note that for the basic system
(CE), the relevant class of proposition indexed interpretations (CCE) is simply the class of
all proposition indexed interpretations.
THEOREM 7 (Soundness). Σ `L φ implies Σ |=CL φ
It must be shown that all of the axioms of L are valid in CL and that each of the rules
preserve this property. I take (RCEA), (CM), and (CN) as representative cases. Note that
lemma 4 will frequently be appealed to, but only implicitly.
If L is closed under (RCEA), suppose that |=CL φ ↔ ψ but (without loss of generality)
6|=CL (φ  χ) → (ψ  χ). Then there is a world w of an interpretation I ∈ CL such
that |=Iw φ χ but 6|=Iw ψ χ. Therefore, [χ] ∈ f[φ](w) but [χ] 6∈ f[ψ](w). Since by the
assumption [φ] = [ψ], it follows that f[φ](w) = f[ψ](w), which is a contradiction. The case of
(RCEC) is similar.
If L contains (CM), then for any I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 ∈ CL, fX satisfies
(cm). Take an arbitrary world w of an arbitrary I ∈ CL such that |=Iw φ  (ψ ∧ θ).
By (cm), [ψ] ∈ f[φ](w) and [θ] ∈ f[φ](w). Consequently, |=Iw (φ  ψ) ∧ (φ  θ). The
case of (CC), which uses (cc), is essentially the reverse. If L contains (CN), then for any
I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 ∈ CL, fX satisfies (cn). Take an arbitrary world w of an
arbitrary I ∈ CL. By (cn), [>] = W ∈ f[φ](w). Therefore, |=Iw φ >, as desired.
COROLLARY 1 (Algebraic Soundness). `L φ implies |=CL∗ φ
The (weak) soundness of L with respect to CL∗ is an immediate consequence of theorems 6
and 7.
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LEMMA 12 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). Given a set of formulae Γ, if Γ 6`L ⊥, then there is
a maximally L consistent set of formulae ∆ such that Γ ⊆ ∆
The proof of this lemma is standard and is omitted; see, e.g., [14].
I now prove completeness results for each of the systems. As usual, this is more compli-
cated than proving soundness, though not by much.
DEFINITION 14. dφeL = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is maximally L consistent, φ ∈ Γ}.
Except where necessary to disambiguate, I write simply dφe. Using definition 14, canonical
models can be defined:
DEFINITION 15. The canonical model for L is a structure IL = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉
such that:
1. W = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is maximally L consistent}
2. P = {dφe : φ ∈ Φ}
3. fdφe(w) = {dψe ∈ P : (φ ψ) ∈ w}
4. V (p) = dpe for all p ∈ Π
LEMMA 13. Let IL = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 be the canonical model for L. Then IL is
well-defined and IL ∈ CL
Observe that (RCEA) guarantees the correctness of definition 15. If dφe = dψe, then `L
φ ↔ ψ by lemma 12. By (RCEA), `L (φ θ) ↔ (ψ θ). Therefore, because (φ
θ) ∈ w if and only if (ψ  θ) ∈ w, dθe ∈ fdφe(w) if and only if dθe ∈ fdψe(w), and so
fdφe(w) = fdψe(w).
Verifying that IL meets the general conditions imposed by definition 7 is fairly straight-
forward. That W is nonempty is a consequence of theorem 2 and lemma 12. I check one of
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the conditions on P : for dφe, dψe ∈ P ,16 it must be shown that {x ∈ W : dψe ∈ fdφe(x)} ∈ P .
It suffices to show that {x ∈ W : dψe ∈ fdφe(x)} = dφ ψe, but this is obvious given
definition 15.
Turning to the special conditions, all of the semantic constraints from table 2.5 associated
with CL must be shown to hold of IL. I take (cm) and (cn) as representative cases. For
(cm), suppose L contains (CM) and dαe ∩ dβe ∈ fdγe(w) (for dαe, dβe, dγe ∈ P ). Since
dαe ∩ dβe = dα ∧ βe ∈ fdγe(w), it follows that γ (α ∧ β) ∈ w. By PL and (CM), γ
α ∈ w and γ β ∈ w. Consequently, dαe ∈ fdγe(w) and dβe ∈ fdγe(w), which establishes
(cm). For (cn), suppose L contains (CN) and take some dφe ∈ P . Since φ  > ∈ w,
W = d>e ∈ fdφe(w), as required.
LEMMA 14 (Truth Lemma). Let IL be the canonical model for L. Then for all φ ∈ Φ and
all w ∈ W : |=ILw φ if and only if φ ∈ w (i.e. [φ] = dφe)
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. Since it presents no special complications,
I omit it.
THEOREM 8 (Completeness). Σ |=CL φ implies Σ `L φ
Suppose that Σ 6`L φ. Then Σ∪{¬φ} is L consistent. By lemma 12, there is a maximally L
consistent set w such that Σ,¬φ ⊆ w. Where IL is the canonical model for L, it is clear that
w ∈ W . By lemma 14, for all ψ ∈ Σ, |=ILw ψ, but 6|=ILw φ. By lemma 13, IL ∈ CL. Therefore,
Σ 6|=CL φ.
COROLLARY 2 (Algebraic Completeness). |=CL∗ φ implies `L φ
16Observe that any X ∈ P must be of the form dφe for some φ ∈ Φ.
CHAPTER 2. CONDITIONAL LOGIC 34
The (weak) completeness of L with respect to CL∗ follows directly from theorems 6 and 8.
2.3 Niche Semantics
Later chapters—especially chapters 3 and 5—will make indispensable use of non-uniform
worlds semantics. Three kinds of specialized semantics are reviewed below along with basic
determination results concerning them.
2.3.1 Half-Classical Semantics
A system of conditional logic L is non-classical either if it fails to be closed under (RCEA)
or (RCEC). It is easy to see that neither the neighborhood-type nor the algebraic semantics
of section 2.2.1 can be used to characterize any non-classical system.17 Since non-classical
systems will be important in chapter 5, I examine how to semantically characterize some of
them here.
In this section, I restrict my attention to half-classical systems, i.e. systems where closure
under (RCEA) may fail. More specifically, I restrict my attention to half-classical systems
closed under (RCK).18 The semantics of this section is ultimately due to Chellas [13, pp.
149-150, n. 14].
DEFINITION 16. A formula indexed interpretation is a structure IΦ = 〈W, {fφ : φ ∈
Φ}, V 〉 such that:
1. W is a nonempty set of worlds
2. fφ : W → P(W )
17Although, see Nute [92, pp. 152-56] for an algebraic approach to non-classical systems.
18Nute [92, p. 53] calls such systems “half-normal.”
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3. V : Π→ P(W )
Given a formula indexed interpretation IΦ = 〈W, {fφ : φ ∈ Φ}, V 〉, the truth conditions
for complex formulae at a world w are the same as before except :
|=IΦw φ ψ if and only if fφ(w) ⊆ [ψ]
Here, as before, [ψ] is nothing more than the proposition expressed by ψ in IΦ = 〈W, {fφ :
φ ∈ Φ}, V 〉. Intuitively, fφ(w) can be understood as the set of worlds ceteris paribus the
same as w such that φ holds.19 Then to say that φ ψ is true at w is just to say that ψ
is true at all of those worlds.
Many constraints might be imposed on formula indexed interpretations, and I will discuss
a number of them in chapter 5. In this section, however, I mention just one (for all w ∈ W ,
all φ, ψ ∈ Φ):
If [φ] = [ψ], then fφ(w) = fψ(w) (rcea)
The constraint (rcea) allows fully classical conditional logics to be characterized using
this semantics. Let CCkΦ be the class of all formula indexed interpretations and let CCKΦ be
the class of all formula indexed interpretations satisfying (rcea). Then validity with respect
to classes such as these is defined essentially as before (definition 8).
THEOREM 9 (Soundness). Σ `Ck φ implies Σ |=CCkΦ φ
Proof is omitted.
For what comes later, it will be useful to review the proof of the completeness of these
systems with respect to their “half-classical” semantics. The argument makes use of many
19For this interpretation, see Priest [102, p. 85] (also [103]).
CHAPTER 2. CONDITIONAL LOGIC 36
of the same ideas as in subsection 2.2.3 and I adapt these accordingly. In particular, then,
let dφeCk = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is maximally Ck consistent, φ ∈ Γ}.
DEFINITION 17. The canonical model for Ck is a structure ICkΦ = 〈W, {fφ : φ ∈ Φ}, V 〉
such that:
1. W = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is maximally Ck consistent}
2. fφ(w) = {x ∈ W : {ψ : (φ ψ) ∈ w} ⊆ x}
3. V (p) = dpe
Since it is obvious that ICkΦ is a formula indexed interpretation, it only remains to prove
the truth lemma.
LEMMA 15 (Truth Lemma). Let ICkΦ be the canonical model for Ck. Then for all φ ∈ Φ
and all w ∈ W : |=ICkΦw φ if and only if φ ∈ w (i.e. [φ] = dφe)
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. The result holds for the basis case by
definition 17. The only case of interest is that in which φ is of the form α  β. The
induction hypothesis is that [α] = dαe and [β] = dβe.
Suppose that α  β ∈ w and x ∈ fα(w). Then by the definition of fα(w), β ∈ x.
By the induction hypothesis, x ∈ [β]. Since x is arbitrary in fα(w), fα(w) ⊆ [β]. Thus,
|=ICkΦw α β, as desired.
Conversely, suppose that α β 6∈ w. Since w is maximally consistent, ¬(α β) ∈ w.
Let S = {χ : (α χ) ∈ w} ∪ {¬β}. I prove that S is consistent. Suppose otherwise; then
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∃χ0, . . . , χn ∈ S such that χ0, . . . , χn `Ck ⊥. Then:
χ0, . . . , χn,¬β `Ck ⊥
`Ck (χ0 ∧ . . . ∧ χn ∧ ¬β)→ ⊥
`Ck (χ0 ∧ . . . ∧ χn)→ β
`Ck ((α χ0) ∧ . . . ∧ (α χn))→ (α β)
w `Ck α β
w `Ck ⊥
But this is impossible because w is maximally consistent. Therefore, S is consistent. By
lemma 12, extend S to a maximally Ck consistent set x. Then x ∈ W , {χ : (α χ) ∈
w} ⊆ x, and β 6∈ x. By the induction hypothesis and definition 17, x ∈ fα(w) and x 6∈ [β].
Therefore, 6|=ICkΦw α β, as desired.
THEOREM 10 (Completeness). Σ |=CCkΦ φ implies Σ `Ck φ
The result follows straightforwardly from lemma 15 as in the proof of theorem 8.
Essentially the same argument works for CK. The only significant difference is that the
canonical model for CK, ICKΦ , must be shown to be in the appropriate class.
LEMMA 16. The canonical model ICKΦ ∈ CCKΦ
Suppose that [φ] = [ψ] in ICKΦ . Then, by lemma 15, dφeCK = dψeCK. Since this implies
that `CK φ↔ ψ, it follows by (RCEA) that `CK (φ θ)↔ (ψ θ). Since φ θ ∈ w
if and only if ψ θ ∈ w, by definition 17, it is clear that fφ(w) = fψ(w).
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THEOREM 11 (Determination). Σ |=CCKΦ φ if and only if Σ `CK φ
Proof follows from previously mentioned results and lemma 16.
2.3.2 Preorder and Sphere Semantics
Lewis [66] defines three types of equivalent interpretations using selection functions, nested
spheres, and preorders. The last of these is most germane to the project of chapter 3, and
will accordingly receive the lion’s share of my attention. However, since the Lewis’ sphere
semantics is more familiar, and will be of some use in chapter 6, I also review it here.
Lewis developed two different versions of his preorder semantics in [66] and later in [67,
pp. 48-50]. While I (generally) follow the former version below, my presentation borrows
some notation and terminology developed or discussed more fully elsewhere, for example in
Lewis [69] and Friedman and Halpern [34].
DEFINITION 18. A preorder interpretation is a structure I≤ = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉,
where W is a non-empty set of worlds and ≤i is a subset of W ×W with Si ⊆ W as its
field.20 The following conditions are imposed:
∀x ∈ Si, x ≤i x (refl)
∀x, y, z ∈ Si, x ≤i y and y ≤i z imply x ≤i z (trans)
∀x, y ∈ Si, x ≤i y or y ≤i x (tot)
Thus, each ≤i is a total preorder of Si. Finally, V is a function from propositional variables
to sets of worlds.
20In other words, Si = {x ∈W : ∃y ∈W,x ≤i y} ∪ {y ∈W : ∃x ∈W,x ≤i y}.
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Truth conditions for complex formulae at a world w are the same as before except :
|=I≤w φ ψ if and only if either Sw ∩ [φ] = ∅, or
∃x ∈ Sw ∩ [φ] such that ∀y ∈ W , if y ≤w x, then y ∈ [φ→ ψ]
Observation. For any preorder interpretation I≤ = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉 and i, j ∈ W ,
j ≤i j if and only if j ∈ Si.
For the analysis of counterfactuals, a simple intuitive gloss of this semantics is possible.
The meaning of x ≤i y is that world x is at least as close (as similar) to world i as world y
is; Si is the set of pertinent, accessible worlds for i. Then the truth condition for φ ψ
comes to this: φ ψ is true at a world w if either there are no accessible φ worlds (the
vacuous case) or there is some accessible φ world x such that for every φ world y at least as
close to w as x, y satisfies ψ.
Besides the constraints on preorder interpretations mentioned above in definition 18,
several additional constraints that might be imposed on preorder interpretations are listed
in table 2.7 (for all i, j ∈ W , all φ):21
21These more or less correspond to a number of conditions discussed by Lewis in [66, pp. 76-77] and [67,
pp. 118-121].
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Table 2.7: Preorder Constraints
Si 6= ∅ (norm)
i ∈ Si (sa)
i ∈ Si and ∀x ∈ Si, i ≤i x (wc)
j ≤i i only if j = i (cs)
Si = W (univ)
≤i=≤j (abs)
If [φ] ∩ Si 6= ∅,∃x ∈ [φ] ∩ Si such that ∀y ∈ [φ], y ≤i x only if x = y (stal)
Validity is defined essentially as before. Let C≤ denote the class of all preorder interpretations.
Of special importance is the class CC1≤ , the class of all preorder interpretations satisfying, in
addition to the basic constraints, those of weak and strong centering: (wc) and (cs). This
class characterizes Lewis’ preferred logic of counterfactuals, C1.
THEOREM 12 (Determination). Σ |=CC1≤ φ if and only if Σ `C1 φ
For the proof of this, see Lewis [66].
I now turn to a presentation of sphere semantics. Here, I focus simply on a basic version
of the semantics. For a more detailed presentation, the reader is referred to Lewis [66, 67].
DEFINITION 19. A sphere interpretation is a structure I$ = 〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉, where
W is a non-empty set of worlds and $i ⊆ P(W ) is such that:
∀S, T ∈ $i, S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S (nest)
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If S ⊆ $i, then
⋃
S ∈ $i (uni)
If ∅ 6= S ⊆ $i, then
⋂
S ∈ $i (int)
Finally, V is a function from propositional variables to sets of worlds.
Truth conditions for complex formulae at a world w are the same as before except :
|=I$w φ ψ if and only if either
⋃
$w ∩ [φ] = ∅, or
∃S ∈ $w such that S ∩ [φ] 6= ∅ and S ⊆ [φ→ ψ]
Let C$ be the class of all sphere interpretations and define validity as usual. Then,
following Lewis [67, pp. 48-9], with adjustments, it can be shown that C≤ and C$ determine
the same validities.
LEMMA 17. Given a preorder interpretation I≤ = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉, there is a sphere
interpretation I$ = 〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉 such that |=I≤w φ if and only if |=I$w φ
Given a preorder interpretation I≤ = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉, a sphere interpretation I$ =
〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉 is constructed where W and V are the same and, for each i ∈ W , set
$i = {T ⊆ Si : ∀j, k ∈ Si(j ∈ T and k 6∈ T ⇒ j <i k)}.22
It must be verified that I$ satisfies the conditions of definition 19. Suppose that X, Y ∈ $i
and X 6⊆ Y ; I show that Y ⊆ X. Since X 6⊆ Y , ∃x ∈ X ⊆ Si such that x 6∈ Y . Pick an
arbitrary y ∈ Y ⊆ Si; since y ∈ Y and x 6∈ Y , y <i x. Now, if y 6∈ X, it would follow by
parallel reasoning that x <i y, which is impossible. Hence, y ∈ X, as required by (nest).
For (uni), suppose that T ⊆ $i and
⋃ T 6∈ $i. Then ∃x, y ∈ Si such that x ∈ ⋃ T , y 6∈ ⋃ T ,
and x 6<i y. Since x ∈
⋃ T , ∃T ∈ T ⊆ $i such that x ∈ T ; note that y 6∈ T since y 6∈ ⋃ T .
Then it follows from the definition of $i that x <i y, which is impossible. The case of (int)
is similar.
22I write j <i k if and only if j ≤i k and j 6= k.
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It remains to show that |=I≤w φ if and only if |=I$w φ. The proof is by induction on the
complexity of φ. The only case of interest is that in which φ is of the form θ ψ, which
subdivides into two cases depending on whether there are antecedent worlds. Since
⋃
$w =
Sw, it is clear that the vacuous cases are equivalent. Write R
x
w = {y : y ≤w x} and observe
that, for all x ∈ Sw, Rxw ∈ $w.23 Now, suppose ∃x ∈ Sw ∩ [θ]I≤ such that ∀y ∈ W , if y ≤w
x, then y ∈ [θ → ψ]I≤ . Then Rxw ∈ $w, x ∈ Rxw ∩ [θ]I$ 6= ∅, and Rxw ⊆ [θ → ψ]I$ , that is,
|=I$w θ ψ. Conversely, suppose that ∃S ∈ $w such that S ∩ [θ]I$ 6= ∅ and S ⊆ [θ → ψ]I$ ;
then ∃y ∈ S ∩ [θ]I$ . Since Ryw ⊆ S,24 it follows easily that |=I≤w θ ψ, as desired.
LEMMA 18. Given a sphere interpretation I$ = 〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉, there is a preorder
interpretation I≤ = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉 such that |=I≤w φ if and only if |=I$w φ
Construct I≤ = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉 from I$ = 〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉 by putting j ≤i k if
and only if, for all T ∈ $i, if k ∈ T , then j ∈ T (where i ∈ W and j, k ∈
⋃
$i). Then it is
obvious that Si =
⋃
$i.
Verifying that I≤ satisfies the conditions of definition 18 is mostly straightforward; I
examine only the case of (tot). Let j, k ∈ Si and suppose j 6≤i k; I show k ≤i j. Take an
arbitrary T ∈ $i such that j ∈ T . Since j 6≤i k, ∃X ∈ $i such that k ∈ X and j 6∈ X, by the
specification of ≤i. It is clear that T 6⊆ X, since j ∈ T ; therefore, by (nest), X ⊆ T , from
which it follows that k ∈ T , which was to be proved. I omit the routine induction proof that
|=I≤w φ if and only if |=I$w φ.
THEOREM 13 (Equivalence). Γ |=C≤ φ if and only if Γ |=C$ φ
23Suppose some Rxw 6∈ $w; then ∃m,n ∈ Sw such that m ∈ Rxw, n 6∈ Rxw, and m 6<w n, which implies
n ≤w m by (tot). Since m ∈ Rxw, m ≤w x, from which it follows that n ≤w x, contradicting the claim that
n 6∈ Rxw.
24Observe that every T ∈ $w is downward closed: if x ∈ T and y ≤w x, then y ∈ T . For suppose that
x ∈ T , y ≤w x, and y 6∈ T ; then it follows from T ∈ $w that x <w y, which is impossible.
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The result follows directly from lemmata 17 and 18.
Chapter 3
Tableaux for Lewis-Stalnaker Logics
In his Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Graham Priest notes that “there are presently no
known tableau systems of the kind used in this book for S [basic sphere semantics]” [102, p.
93]. The aim of this chapter is to provide tableaux in the style of Priest’s work for several
conditional logics which have traditionally been given a sphere semantics a` la Lewis [67].
The systems given tableaux here include Lewis’ preferred logic of counterfactuals (C1/VC)
and Stalnaker’s conditional logic (C2/VCS).
Systems in the neighborhood of CK have already been given sound and complete tableaux
by Priest [102], Ro¨nnedal [109], and Zach [134]. Sequent calculi or tableaux for some of the
stronger systems have been given by de Swart [118], Gent [38], Negri and Sbardolini [89], and
Zach [134]. However, problems have regularly been encountered in proof-theoretic treatments
of conditional logic. For example, the tableau system developed for Lewis’ C1 by Zach is
non-analytic in that it makes use of rules in which the conclusion-formulae are not generally
subformulae of the premise-formulae [134, §3]. In particular, his tableaux require a version
of Gentzen’s Cut rule, which is in turn apparently ineliminable.1
Moreover, Negri and Sbardolini [89], pace the authors’ claims therein, do not in fact
1For Gentzen’s sequent calculus and the Cut rule, see [39, 88]. For a discussion of Cut in a tableaux
setting, see Smullyan [113] or Fitting [31].
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provide a sequent calculus for Lewis’ C1. For it can be shown that the following version of
the (4) axiom,2
(¬φ φ)→ (¬(¬φ φ) (¬φ φ)) (4C)
is derivable in their calculus. However, (4C) is independent of Lewis’ C1. It is, along with
a conditional version of the (5) axiom, one of the characteristic axioms of Lewis’ VCU, a
lesser known system in Lewis’ family of V-logics (for which, see Lewis [67, Ch. 6]).3
The crux of the problem in the work of Negri and Sbardolini [89] is that they prove
determination results for their sequent calculus with respect to a semantics that is implic-
itly universalized—that implicitly satisfies (univ)—in addition to the constraints required by
C1. Since C1 is determined by a class of preorder interpretations that need not satisfy this
condition (see subsection 2.3.2 above), their calculus is unfaithful. This problem notwith-
standing, I believe that their approach can be modified in such a way as to capture not only
Lewis’ C1, but almost every logic in the V-family. The principal asset of their approach
lies in its modularity. Briefly, the sequent calculus they present is labeled (or prefixed) and
so integrates semantic structure—worlds and ordering—into the proof theoretic apparatus.
That labeled sequent calculi have important advantages over their unlabeled counterparts
in terms of modularity and semantic insight is clear from the history of proof theory: while
older sequent calculi for modal logic are all unlabeled (e.g. Ohnishi and Matsumoto [93]),
more recent work has tended to appreciate and utilize labels (e.g. Negri [85]).
Sticking to the problem posed by Priest [102], quoted above, I will not pursue the de-
velopment of sequent calculi here; instead, I will focus squarely on tableaux. Nevertheless,
as is well known, tableaux and sequent calculi are generally isomorphic.4 Note, moreover,
2Why do I call this a version of the (4) axiom? Because in many conditional logics, φ can be defined as
¬φ φ (see the discussion in section 2.1.2).
3I have communicated this observation to the authors and I am grateful for their acknowledging it.
4The conversion techniques discussed by Smullyan [113] are easily generalized to labeled tableaux and
sequent calculi.
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that most of the tableaux presented below are analytic (contrast Zach [134]), as are all of
the tableaux for conditional logic presented by Priest [102, Ch. 5].
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Tableaux in the style of Priest [102] are presented for
various conditional logics from the V-family (not including Stalnaker’s C2 or its extensions)
in section 3.1. These tableaux rules effectively mirror the preorder constraints and structure
outlined in subsection 2.3.2. Thus, for example, tableaux for C1 are obtained by taking
the general rules as well as rules specifically corresponding to weak and strong centering,
i.e. (wc) and (cs). Soundness and completeness results for these tableaux are proved in
subsection 3.1.2.
Tableaux for Stalnaker’s C2 have proven significantly more difficult to obtain. I discuss
some of these difficulties in section 3.2 before proposing a system of tableaux that is sound
and complete with respect to the preorder semantics for C2; unfortunately, not all of its
rules are analytic. Nevertheless, I conjecture (but have been unable to prove) that (Cut) is
eliminable from this system.
3.1 Tableaux for Lewis Systems
In subsection 3.1.1, tableaux in the style of Priest [102] are given for conditional logics
(not including Stalnaker’s C2) determined by various classes of preorder interpretations (for
which, see subsection 2.3.2). Soundness and completeness results for these systems with
respect to their semantics are presented in subsection 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Tableaux Systems
I begin by briefly reviewing some basic terminology for tableaux systems (for a fuller treat-
ment, see Smullyan [113] or Priest [102]).
DEFINITION 20. A tree is a structure such as this:






A, B, etc. are nodes. Nodes can have any of the following eight forms (where i, j, and k are
non-negative integers and φ ∈ Φ):
1. j i k







A branch is a maximal path, e.g. {A, B, D}. A branch is closed if it contains nodes of the
form φ,+i and φ,−i. A tableau is closed if each branch is closed. A tableau is complete if
every applicable rule has been applied.
Tableaux rules are presented below. The following notational conventions should be
noted: α(j) is an arbitrary j-containing node and α(i/j) is the result of replacing some
occurrences of j by i in α. αi(j) is any relational node in which j occurs and i occurs as a
subscript (example: j i k).
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2. Order Rules. (REFL) is applied to any branch containing the first node. (TRANS)
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αi(j)
αi(k)
j i k k i j
(TOT)
3. Identity Rules. (IDE) is applied to any branch containing i. (SUB) is applied to any








4. Subscript Box Rules.5 (−) is applied to any branch containing the first node with k
new. (+) is applied to any branch containing the first two nodes.
5A similar device to this is employed by Negri and Sbardolini [89, pp. 48-50] in their sequent calculus.
For the intuition behind these rules, consider (+) and imagine a world j and an ordering j of some set of
worlds by their similarity to j. If jφ is true at some world i, then every world at least as similar to j as i
must satisfy φ. Informally, this is what (+) says.









5. Dot Box Rules.6 ( −) is applied to any branch containing the first node with k new.





6For the intuition behind these rules, consider ( +) and imagine a world k that is in the “similarity field”
of i. Informally, ( +) says that if  φ is true at i, φ is true at k. That is, if  φ is true at a world, φ is true
at any world similar to it (i.e. all worlds in the given world’s similarity ordering).





6. Fundamental Preorder Rules. To obtain tableaux faithful to basic preorder semantics,
add to the rules of sections 1, 2, 4, and 5 the following rules. (−1 ) is applied to any
branch containing the first node. (−2 ) is applied to any branch containing the first
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7. Special Rules. The rules of this section correspond to special semantic constraints
considered above in table 2.7. Note that some of these semantic constraints require
multiple rules.








(c) Weak-Centering. The Weak-Centering rules are (SA) and (WC), which is applied




(d) Strong-Centering. The Strong-Centering rules are the identity rules of section 3
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DEFINITION 21. A system of preorder tableaux LT is any collection of tableaux rules
which extends the set of tableaux rules from sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and which respects
dependencies (for example, it doesn’t contain (CS) unless it also contains the identity rules
from section 3).
Example. C1T is the set of tableaux rules from sections 1–6 and 7b–d.
DEFINITION 22. Where Σ is a (finite) set of formulae and LT is a system of preorder
tableaux, Σ `LT φ if and only if there is a closed tableau (constructed using the appropriate
rules) whose initial list consists of nodes of the form ψ,+0 for all ψ ∈ Σ and φ,−0.
Example. φ, ψ `C1T φ ψ












Explanation: the ‘initial list’ consists of the first three nodes. The next node is introduced
by (SA). The tree branches by an application of (−2 ) where i = j = 0; the left branch
is closed. On the right branch, the next two nodes follow by (−). The node 0 = 1 is
introduced by (CS). Consequently, the use of (SUB) and the extensional rules closes the
branch.
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3.1.2 Determination Results
If LT is a system of preorder tableaux, CL≤ is the corresponding class of preorder interpre-
tations (the reader should carefully review definition 18 for what follows). Thus, if (for
example) LT contains (NORM), CL≤ is taken to be a class of preorder interpretations satis-
fying (norm). In this section, I prove soundness and completeness for systems of preorder
tableaux with respect to various classes of preorder interpretations. To avoid unnecessary
clutter, preorder subscripts are suppressed and I write (for example) I for I≤ and CL for CL≤.
Given a preorder interpretation I = 〈W, {≤w: w ∈ W}, V 〉, recall that for any w ∈ W , Sw is
defined to be the field of ≤w.
DEFINITION 23. Let I = 〈W, {≤w: w ∈ W}, V 〉 be a preorder interpretation (I ∈ CL)
and b be a branch of an LT tableau. I is faithful to b if and only if there is a function
g : Z→ W such that:
1. If φ,+i is on b, g(i) ∈ [φ] in I
2. If φ,−i is on b, g(i) 6∈ [φ] in I
3. If i j k is on b, g(i) ≤g(j) g(k) in I
4. If i = j is on b, g(i) = g(j) in I
5. If jφ,+i is on b, ∀x ∈ W , if x ≤g(j) g(i), then x ∈ [φ] in I
6. If jφ,−i is on b, ∃x ∈ W such that x ≤g(j) g(i) and x 6∈ [φ] in I
7. If  φ,+i is on b, ∀x ∈ Sg(i), x ∈ [φ] in I
8. If  φ,−i is on b, ∃x ∈ Sg(i) such that x 6∈ [φ] in I
LEMMA 19. If I is faithful to b and an LT tableau rule is applied to b, then I is faithful
to at least one of the resulting branches
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The proof is by cases of the rule applied. Since the extensional cases are routine, I only
examine the rules which pertain to intensional connectives.
Suppose that I is faithful to b and jφ,−i occurs on b. If (−) is applied, then b is
extended to a branch b* with nodes k j i and φ,−k, for k new. By the faithfulness of I
to b, there is an x ∈ W such that x ≤g(j) g(i) and x 6∈ [φ]. If f is the same as g except that
f(k) = x, f shows that I is faithful to b*.
Suppose that I is faithful to b and jφ,+i and k j i occur on b. By the faithfulness of
I, g(k) ≤g(j) g(i) and, consequently, g(k) ∈ [φ]. Then g shows I is faithful to the branch b*
which results from applying (+) and appending the node φ,+k to b.
Suppose that I is faithful to b and  φ,−i occurs on b. If ( −) is applied, then b is
extended to a branch b* with nodes k i k and φ,−k, for k new. By the faithfulness of I
to b, there is an x ∈ Sg(i) such that x 6∈ [φ]. If f is the same as g except that f(k) = x, f
shows that I is faithful to b*.
Suppose that I is faithful to b and  φ,+i and αi(k) occur on b. By the faithfulness of
I, g(k) ∈ Sg(i) and g(k) ∈ [φ]. Consequently, g shows I is faithful to the branch b* which
results from applying ( +) and appending the node φ,+k.
Suppose that I is faithful to b and (φ ψ),−i occurs on b. By the faithfulness of I,
there is a z ∈ Sg(i) ∩ [φ], i.e. Sg(i) 6⊆ [¬φ]. If (−1 ) is applied, b is extended to a branch b*
with node  ¬φ,−i. Then g shows that I is faithful to b*.
Suppose that I is faithful to b and (φ ψ),−i and αi(j) occur on b. By the faithfulness
of I, ∀x ∈ Sg(i), either x 6∈ [φ] or ∃y ∈ W such that y ≤g(i) x and y 6∈ [φ → ψ]. If
(−2 ) is applied, b is extended to a branch b* with node φ,−j and a branch b** with
node i(φ → ψ),−j. Since g(j) ∈ Sg(i), if g(j) 6∈ [φ], g shows that I is faithful to b*.
Alternatively, g shows that I is faithful to b** because ∃y ∈ W such that y ≤g(i) g(j) and
y 6∈ [φ→ ψ].
Suppose that I is faithful to b and (φ ψ),+i occurs on b. (+) is applied and b
CHAPTER 3. TABLEAUX 57
is extended to a branch b* with node  ¬φ,+i and a branch b** with nodes φ,+k, k i k,
and i(φ→ ψ),+k, where k is new. By the faithfulness of I, either Sg(i) ∩ [φ] = ∅ or there
is an x ∈ Sg(i) ∩ [φ] such that ∀y ∈ W , if y ≤g(i) x, then y ∈ [φ → ψ]. In the first case, g
shows I is faithful to b*. In the second case, if f is the same as g except that f(k) = x, f
shows that I is faithful to b**.
Let b be a branch of an LT tableau where LT includes (NORM). Suppose that I is
faithful to b and i occurs on b. Since CL is subject to (norm), ∃x ∈ Sg(i) 6= ∅. If (NORM) is
applied, b is extended to a branch b* with node j i j, for j new. Then if f is the same as
g except that f(j) = x, f shows that I is faithful to b*.
Let b be a branch of an LT tableau where LT includes (SA). Suppose that I is faithful
to b and i occurs on b. Since CL is subject to (sa), g(i) ∈ Sg(i). If (SA) is applied, b is
extended to a branch b* with node i i i. Then g shows that I is faithful to b*.
Let b be a branch of an LT tableau where LT includes (WC). Suppose that I is faithful
to b and αi(j) occurs on b. Since CL is subject to (wc) and, by the faithfulness of I to b,
g(j) ∈ Sg(i), it follows that g(i) ≤g(i) g(j). If (WC) is applied, b is extended to a branch b*
with node i i j. Then g shows that I is faithful to b*.
Let b be a branch of an LT tableau where LT includes (CS). Suppose that I is faithful
to b and j i i occurs on b. Since CL is subject to (cs) and, by the faithfulness of I to b,
g(j) ≤g(i) g(i), it follows that g(j) = g(i). If (CS) is applied, b is extended to a branch b*
with node i = j. Then g shows that I is faithful to b*.
Let b be a branch of an LT tableau where LT includes (UNIV). Suppose that I is
faithful to b and i and j occur on b. Since CL is subject to (univ), Sg(i) = Sg(j) = W . Then
g(j) ∈ Sg(i). If (UNIV) is applied, b is extended to a branch b* with node j i j. Then g
shows that I is faithful to b*.
Let b be a branch of an LT tableau where LT includes (ABS). Suppose that I is faithful
to b and j k l and i occur on b. By faithfulness, g(j) ≤g(k) g(l) in I. Since CL is subject
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to (abs), ≤g(k)=≤g(i) in I, whence g(j) ≤g(i) g(l). If (ABS) is applied, b is extended to a
branch b* with node j i l. Then g shows that I is faithful to b*.
THEOREM 14 (Soundness). Where LT is a system of preorder tabeaux, if Σ `LT φ, then
Σ |=CL φ
Suppose that Σ `LT φ but Σ 6|=CL φ. Then there is an interpretation I ∈ CL such that
∃w ∈ W for which ∀χ ∈ Σ, |=Iw χ and 6|=Iw φ. As Σ `LT φ, there is a closed tableau T and
I is faithful to the initial segment of T (i.e. the initial list, the nodes antecedent to rule
applications) because of the function g(0) = w. By repeated application of lemma 19, there
is a branch b of T such that I is faithful to each segment of b. If T is closed, however, b
must be as well; then b has nodes of the form ψ,+k and ψ,−k. Then by definition 23, |=Iw ψ
and 6|=Iw ψ, which is impossible.
DEFINITION 24. Let LT be a system of preorder tableaux excluding the identity rules.
Then a preorder interpretation I = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉 induced by an open branch b of an
LT tableau is such that:
1. W = {wi : i on b}
2. wk ≤wi wj if and only if k i j is on b
3. For propositional variables p, wi ∈ V (p) if p,+i is on b
4. For propositional variables p, wi 6∈ V (p) if p,−i is on b
Note that for any propositional variables which do not occur on the branch, V can be
arbitrary.
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LEMMA 20 (Truth Lemma). Let LT be a system of preorder tableaux excluding the identity
rules. If b is an open, complete branch of an LT tableau and I is a preorder interpretation
induced by b, then:
1. If φ,+i occurs on b, wi ∈ [φ] in I
2. If φ,−i occurs on b, wi 6∈ [φ] in I
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. The only case of interest is that in which
φ is of the form ψ θ.
Suppose (ψ θ),+i is on b; since b is complete and (+) has been applied, either
 ¬ψ,+i is on b or (for some k) ψ,+k, k i k, and i(ψ → θ),+k are on b. In the first
case, by the completeness of b, ( +) has been applied for every j such that αi(j) is on b.
Hence, if wj ∈ Swi , ψ,−j appears on b, from which it follows (by the induction hypothesis)
that wj 6∈ [ψ]. Thus, since Swi ∩ [ψ] = ∅, wi ∈ [ψ  θ]. In the second case, for every
non-negative integer l such that l i k is on b, (ψ → θ),+l is on b by the completeness of b
and rule (+). Therefore, by the induction hypothesis and definition 24, wk ∈ [ψ]∩Swi and
{wl ∈ W : wl ≤wi wk} ⊆ [ψ → θ], from which it follows that wi ∈ [ψ θ].
Suppose (ψ θ),−i is on b; since b is complete and (−1 ) has been applied,  ¬ψ,−i is
on b. Consequently, (for some k) k i k and ψ,+k are on b, again by the completeness of b.
By the induction hypothesis, wk ∈ Swi ∩ [ψ] 6= ∅. By the completeness of b, (−2 ) has been
applied for every non-negative integer l such that αi(l) appears on b; hence, for every such l,
either ψ,−l or i(ψ → θ),−l is on b. In the latter case, by the completeness of b and (−),
for each such l there is some h such that h i l and ψ → θ,−h are on b. Now consider an
arbitrary wl ∈ Swi∩ [ψ]; it is clear from the construction and induction hypothesis that ψ,−l
does not occur on b, so it follows that i(ψ → θ),−l is on b. Consequently, by definition 24
and the induction hypothesis, there is some wh such that wh ≤wi wl and wh 6∈ [ψ → θ]. This
suffices to show that wi 6∈ [ψ θ].
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LEMMA 21. Let LT be a system of preorder tableaux excluding the identity rules. If b is
an open, complete branch of an LT tableau and I is a preorder interpretation induced by b,
then I ∈ CL
It must be verified that I satisfies the basic constraints on preorder interpretations (see
definition 18) in addition to any constraints particular to L (see table 2.7).
For (refl), consider an arbitrary wj ∈ Swi . It is clear that some αi(j) must occur on b,
from which it follows that j i j occurs on b by (REFL). Thus, by definition 24, wj ≤wi wj,
as required.
For (trans), suppose wj ≤wi wk and wk ≤wi wl; then j i k and k i l occur on b, from
which it follows by (TRANS) that j i l occurs on b, and consequently that wj ≤wi wl in I,
as desired.
For (tot), suppose that wj, wk ∈ Swi and wj 6≤wi wk. By (TOT), either j i k or k i j
are on b. By definition 24, it cannot be the first; therefore, k i j is on b and wk ≤wi wj in
I, as desired.
Suppose that LT includes (NORM); it must be shown that I satisfies (norm). Take an
arbitrary wi ∈ W . Since i occurs on b, by (NORM), j i j occurs on b for some j. Thus,
wj ∈ Swi 6= ∅.
Suppose that LT includes (SA); it must be shown that I satisfies (sa). Take an arbitrary
wi ∈ W . Since i occurs on b, by (SA), i i i occurs on b. Thus, wi ∈ Swi .
Suppose that LT includes (WC); it must be shown that I satisfies (wc). Insofar as the
proof requires showing that (sa) holds, the proof proceeds as before with the observation
that (SA) is a dependency of (WC). For the remainder, consider an arbitrary wj ∈ Swi ; then
it is clear that some αi(j) occurs on b. By (WC), i i j occurs on b, from which it follows
that wi ≤wi wj, as desired.
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Suppose that LT includes (UNIV); it must be shown that I satisfies (univ). For arbitrary
wi, it is obvious that Swi ⊆ W , hence it remains to show the converse. Pick an arbitrary
wj ∈ W ; then j occurs on b, as does i. By (UNIV), j i j occurs on b, from which it follows
that wj ∈ Swi .
Suppose that LT includes (ABS); it must be shown that I satisfies (abs). Suppose that
wk ≤wi wj; for wl ∈ W , I show that wi ≤wl wj. Since k i j occurs on b and l occurs on b,
by (ABS), k l j occurs on b, from which the desired result follows. The converse direction
(required to show that ≤wi=≤wi) is the same.
THEOREM 15 (Completeness). Let LT be a system of preorder tableaux excluding the
identity rules. If Σ |=CL φ, then Σ `LT φ
Suppose that Σ 6`LT φ. Then the attempted proof results in a completed open tableau with
at least one complete open branch b. Let I be a preorder interpretation induced by b (it is
obvious that such interpretations exist). Then in I, ∀ψ ∈ Σ, |=Iw0 ψ but 6|=Iw0 φ by lemma 20.
Moreover, by lemma 21, I ∈ CL. Therefore, Σ 6|=CL φ.
To prove the completeness of systems of preorder tableaux including the identity rules,
definition 24 must be modified. Let b be a complete branch of an LT tableau where LT
includes the identity rules. If i and j are non-negative integers on b, say i ∼ j if and only if
i = j occurs on b.
LEMMA 22. If b is a complete branch of an LT tableau where LT includes the identity
rules, then ∼ is an equivalence relation on {i ∈ Z : i occurs on b}
By (IDE), if i occurs on b, then i = i occurs on b. Hence, for any such i, i ∼ i. Suppose
that i ∼ j and j ∼ k; then i = j and j = k occur on b. By (SUB), i = k occurs on b, from
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which it follows that i ∼ k. Finally, suppose that i ∼ j; since i = j occurs on b, it follows
by (SUB) and (IDE) that j = i occurs on b. Thus, j ∼ i, as desired.
Fixing a complete branch b, lemma 22 shows that {i ∈ Z : i occurs on b} can be partitioned
by ∼; write ‖x‖ = {y : x ∼ y}.
DEFINITION 25. Let LT be a system of preorder tableaux including the identity rules.
Then a preorder interpretation I = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉 induced by an open, complete
branch b of an LT tableau is such that:
1. W = {w‖i‖ : i on b}
2. w‖k‖ ≤w‖i‖ w‖j‖ if and only if k i j is on b
3. For propositional variables p, w‖i‖ ∈ V (p) if p,+i is on b
4. For propositional variables p, w‖i‖ 6∈ V (p) if p,−i is on b
Note that such induced interpretations are well-defined. For example, suppose that
w‖k‖ ≤w‖i‖ w‖j‖, w‖k‖ = w‖k′‖, w‖i‖ = w‖i′‖, and w‖j‖ = w‖j′‖. Then k i j, k = k′,
i = i′, and j = j′ are on b. Consequently, by the completeness of b and the identity rules,
k′ i′ j′ is on b. Thus, w‖k′‖ ≤w‖i′‖ w‖j′‖, which was to be proved.
Using definition 25, proofs of versions of the truth lemma (lemma 20) and constraints
lemma (lemma 21) go through essentially as before. I omit the truth lemma and consider
only one case of the constraints lemma, viz. that pertaining to (CS).
LEMMA 23. Let LT be a system of preorder tableaux containing the identity rules. If b is
an open, complete branch of an LT tableau and I is a preorder interpretation induced by b,
then I ∈ CL
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Suppose that LT includes (CS); it must be shown that I satisfies (cs). Suppose that
w‖j‖ ≤w‖i‖ w‖i‖; then j i i occurs on b. By (CS), j = i occurs on b. Since j ∼ i, it
follows that w‖j‖ = w‖i‖, as desired.
THEOREM 16 (Completeness). Let LT be a system of preorder tableaux including the
identity rules. If Σ |=CL φ, then Σ `LT φ
The proof is just like that of theorem 15, using lemma 23.
3.2 Tableaux for Stalnaker’s System
In the previous section, I gave sound and complete analytic tableaux for a number of systems
of conditional logic, including Lewis’ preferred logic of counterfactuals, C1. However, the
approach of the previous section cannot, it seems, be made to work for Stalnaker’s C2. It
is worth briefly considering why. Recall that Stalnaker’s condition, (stal), is the following
monstrosity:7
If [φ] ∩ Si 6= ∅,∃x ∈ [φ] ∩ Si such that ∀y ∈ [φ], y ≤i x only if x = y (stal)
Tableaux rules which are sound with respect to this condition can be concocted without
too much difficulty. Nodes of the form @iφ,+j, where i and j are non-negative integers and
φ is a formula, are now allowed. Then the rules corresponding to (stal) are:
7A somewhat less ugly condition would be to require that ≤i well-order Si, i.e. to impose the stated
condition on all nonempty subsets of Si rather than just formula-indexed ones (cf. Lewis [67, p. 79]).
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8. Subscript At Rule. (@+) is applied to any branch containing the first two nodes.
@iφ,+j
k i j
j = k φ,+k
(@+)







The proof that (@+) and (±) are sound with respect to classes of preorder interpreta-
tions satisfying (stal) proceeds just as in subsection 3.1.2. For what follows, let LT be any
system of preorder tableaux including the Stalnaker rules.
DEFINITION 26. Let I = 〈W, {≤i: i ∈ W}, V 〉 be a preorder interpretation (I ∈ CL) and
b be a branch of an LT tableau. I is faithful to b if and only if there is a function g : Z→ W
such that g is just as in definition 23 but, in addition:
If @iφ,+j is on b, ∀x ∈ W , if x ≤g(i) g(j), then either x = g(j) or x ∈ [φ]
LEMMA 24. If I is faithful to b and an LT tableau rule is applied to b, then I is faithful
to at least one of the resulting branches
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The proof is by cases of the rule applied. I only examine the two cases which differ from
those covered in the proof of lemma 19.
Suppose that I is faithful to b and @iφ,+j and k i j occur on b. (@+) is applied and
b is extended to a branch b* with node j = k and a branch b** with node φ,+k. By the
faithfulness of I to b, g(k) ≤g(i) g(j) and ∀x ∈ W , if x ≤g(i) g(j), then either x = g(j) or
x ∈ [φ]. Thus, either g(k) = g(j) (in which case g shows that I is faithful to b*) or g(k) ∈ [φ]
(in which case g shows that I is faithful to b**).
Suppose that I is faithful to b and φ ψ,±i occurs on b. If (±) is applied, b is
extended to a branch b* with node  ¬φ,+i and a branch b** with nodes φ,+k, k i k,
and @i¬φ,+k. Since CL is (by assumption) subject to (stal), either [φ] ∩ Sg(i) = ∅ or
∃x ∈ [φ] ∩ Sg(i) such that ∀y ∈ [φ], y ≤g(i) x only if x = y. In the first case, g shows that I
is faithful to b*. In the second, if h is the same as g except that h(k) = x, h shows that I
is faithful to b**.
THEOREM 17 (Soundness). Where LT is a system of preorder tableaux including the
Stalnaker rules, if Σ `LT φ, then Σ |=CL φ
From lemma 24, as in the proof of theorem 14.
DEFINITION 27. Let C2T be C1T (the rules of sections 1–6 and 7b–d) extended by the
rules of sections 8 and 9, i.e. (@+) and (±).
It is immediate from theorem 17 that C2T is sound with respect to the class of preorder
interpretations which determines Stalnaker’s C2. But is it complete? One reason to suspect
that it is is that (CEM), the characteristic scheme of Stalnaker’s C2, is a theorem of C2T :
PROPOSITION 5. `C2T (φ ψ) ∨ (φ ¬ψ)
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In virtue of proposition 5, it is prima facie plausible to expect that C2T is complete
with respect to the validities of CC2. However, there is a serious mismatch between what
the characteristic rules of C2T establish and what must hold in any interpretation induced
by an open branch, i.e. interpretations used to show completeness. For the rules given in
sections (8) and (9) above only establish that Stalnaker’s condition obtains for formulae
which occur as antecedents of  conditionals on the branch. But Stalnaker’s condition
must be shown to obtain for all formulae, including those which do not occur anywhere on
the branch. It may be possible to define induced interpretations in such a way that they
automatically satisfy (stal) for φ which do not occur on the branch, but given the complexity
of the condition, it is not at all clear how one might do this.
Now, completeness can be proved for an extension of C2T with a special sort of non-
analytic tableau rule. (Cut) is a rule which can be applied to any branch, for any formula φ





The significance of (Cut) lies in the following observation: if a system of preorder tableaux
LT includes (Cut), then the set of formulae provable in LT (i.e. its theorems), or the set
of formulae derivable in LT from some (finite) set of formulae Σ, is closed under (MP). For
suppose that (Cut) is included in LT , Σ `LT φ, and Σ `LT φ → ψ. Then there are closed
trees, T0 and T1, corresponding (respectively) to each of those inferences. It follows that
Σ `LT ψ (let Σ = {σ0, . . . , σn}):
8This is simply a “modalized” analogue of Fitting [31, p. 227] (cf. Zach [134, p. 612]).











Using this observation, it is easily shown that the system of preorder tableaux C2T+(Cut)
is sound and complete with respect to CC2:
THEOREM 18 (Soundness). If Σ `C2T +(Cut) φ, then Σ |=CC2 φ
It is obvious that (Cut) is sound with respect to CC2; that is, if an interpretation I ∈ CC2
is faithful to a tableau branch b and (Cut) is applied, then I must be faithful to one of the
resulting branches. Thus, the proof of soundness proceeds as before.
THEOREM 19 (Completeness). If Σ |=CC2 φ, then Σ `C2T +(Cut) φ
Suppose that Σ |=CC2 φ. By the completeness of the axiom system C2 with respect to CC2,
it follows that Σ `C2 φ. Now, every axiom of C2 is provable in C2T : this follows from
proposition 5 and the fact that C2T includes all the rules of a system of preorder tableaux
that is complete with respect to CC1. Moreover, the set of formulae provable in C2T is closed
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under (RCEA) and (RCEC).9 Finally, closure under (MP) is a consequence of (Cut). Thus,
if Σ `C2 φ, it follows that Σ `C2T +(Cut) φ.
While I have given a system of tableaux for C2 that is sound and complete, this system
is quite unlike the other tableaux systems given in this chapter. C2T contains a non-analytic
rule, (Cut), which I appealed to in proving completeness. It would be very nice to show that
the use of (Cut) is not, in fact, essential.
DEFINITION 28. If (R) is a tableau rule and LT is a system of preorder tableaux including
(R), then (R) is eliminable from LT if whenever Σ `LT φ, Σ `LT −(R) φ. In other words, a
tableau rule is eliminable in a given system if everything provable using it can be proved
without it.
It is easily shown that the addition of (Cut) to any of the sound and complete systems
discussed in section 3.1 has no effect on what’s provable. In other words, (Cut) is eliminable
from all such extensions:10
COROLLARY 3 (Hauptsatz). Where LT is a system of preorder tableaux for which theo-
rems 14 and 15 (16) apply, if Σ `LT +(Cut) φ, then Σ `LT φ
Suppose Σ `LT +(Cut) φ. By soundness, and the fact that (Cut) is obviously sound with
respect to any class of interpretations, Σ |=CL φ. Then, by completeness, Σ `LT φ.
The methods used in the proof of corollary 3 are non-constructive: no method is provided
for turning a proof using (Cut) into one which does not use it. In fact, constructive proofs of
(Cut) elimination are forthcoming for at least some of the systems surveyed in section 3.1.11
9It is a good exercise to show that if there is a closed tree for φ ↔ ψ, there is also one for (θ φ) ↔
(θ ψ), as required by (RCEC). An analogous result holds for (RCEA).
10If you prefer, (Cut) is admissible for all the systems discussed there.
11Basically, the approach of Negri and Sbardolini [89, §3] works, with slight modifications, and everything
must be flipped upside down.
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Unfortunately, I have been unable to discover a proof of this kind for the tableaux I have
devised for C2. Nevertheless, I conjecture that (Cut) is in fact eliminable:
CONJECTURE 1 (Hauptsatz). If Σ `C2T +(Cut) φ, then Σ `C2T φ
I leave for future work either a proof, or a refutation, of this conjecture concerning C2T .
Chapter 4
Connexive Conditional Logic
What is most characteristic of connexive logic are the following distinctively non-classical
conditional theses, typically referred to as Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses:1
¬(φ ¬φ) (AT1)
¬(¬φ φ) (AT2)
(φ ψ) ¬(φ ¬ψ) (BT1)
(φ ¬ψ) ¬(φ ψ) (BT2)
Putting aside the ancient history of connexive logic, its modern history, interestingly, is often
traced to a paper on subjunctive conditionals by Angell [2]. Angell proposes a system PA1
which contains what he calls the principle of subjunctive contrariety, that is:
The principle that ‘If p were true then q would be true’ and ‘If p were true then
q would be false’ are incompatible [2, p. 327]
In Angell’s axiomatization of PA1, this principle corresponds to (BT1) above [2, p. 328].
1For the names, and their historical credentials, see McCall [78, pp. 415-6].
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However, the statement of the principle is ambiguous. To say that φ ψ and φ ¬ψ
are incompatible could just be to say that ¬((φ ψ) ∧ (φ ¬ψ)) is true. That is, the
principle could reasonably be read as making the following claims:2
(φ ψ)→ ¬(φ ¬ψ) (WBT1)
(φ ¬ψ)→ ¬(φ ψ) (WBT2)
I follow Pizzi and Williamson [96, pp. 569-70] in referring to (WBT1) and (WBT2) as weak
Boethius’ theses. All of what I have to say in the sequel will concern (WBT1) and (WBT2)
rather than (BT1) and (BT2).
While connexive logic was originally developed alongside conditional logic, the two have
largely grown apart. To speculate, this seems to mainly have been due to the difficulties
faced in semantically modeling connexive principles and, relatedly, in identifying intuitively
plausible interpretations of logics containing them. Thus, Routley and Montgomery write
disparagingly,
The effect of Boethius [(BT1)] or even of Aristotle [(AT2)] alone, in quite weak
sentential logics, is sufficient to cast serious doubt both on the merit of proceeding
in the directions Angell suggests and on the value of connexive logics [84, p. 82]
While connexive logic languished in the heyday of conditional logic (at least in relative
terms), there has since been a resurgence of interest in it. Connexive theses have by now
been studied in a variety of settings: consistent and inconsistent, classical and nonclassical,
etc.
This chapter belongs to a tradition which examines connexivism in a consistent classical
context. More particularly, I intend to examine connexive principles situated in (weak)
2Incidentally, both (WBT1) and (WBT2) are theorems of PA1 [2, p. 336].
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systems of classical conditional logic, as developed in chapter 2.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. I motivate interest in connexive conditional logic
by proposing a deontic interpretation of in section 4.1. There is a long history of deontic
applications of conditional logic, an unappreciated aspect of which includes the examination
and use of connexive theses. Where appropriate, I review this history. Under a deontic
interpretation of, I argue both that connexive principles like (WBT1) and (WBT2) are
quite natural and that principles which must be abandoned to maintain consistency in the
presence of such connexive theses are quite unnatural.
Systems of connexive conditional logic are presented in section 4.2. There, among other
things, I show how to develop deontic modal logic within deontic conditional logic. Semantics
along the lines of those from section 2.2 are presented in section 4.3. Determination and
independence results are also proved there.
4.1 Obligation: Absolute and Conditional
Deontic logic is concerned with reasoning about obligations, prohibitions, and permissions.
Note, however, that each of these come in two subspecies. Some obligations (for example) are
unconditional: it is (unconditionally) obligatory not to steal. Other obligations, however, are
conditional: it is obligatory to return the merchandise given that you stole it.3 This section
discusses logical approaches to modeling both types. The reader will find that connexive
ideas arise quite naturally in developing formal systems of conditional obligation.
3One might wonder whether there are any unconditional obligations. To adapt an example of Plato’s (Rep.
I, 331c), it might seem to be obligatory to return what one has borrowed, but should one return borrowed
weapons to a friend if they have become deranged? I take the question of the existence of unconditional
obligations to be a substantive philosophical issue about which logic should remain neutral (see the brief
remarks on necessitation in subsection 4.1.1).
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4.1.1 Deontic Modal Logic
Contemporary deontic logic has its roots in von Wright [131], in which the deontic modalities
obligatory and permitted were treated as applying to symbols denoting act-types. Subsequent
work largely shifted the emphasis from what agents ought to do to what ought to be the
case. As a result, the deontic modalities (like the alethic modalities) are now predominantly
viewed as applying to arbitrary formulae. I follow this approach below.4
For the purposes of this chapter, let φ be read: it is obligatory that (or: it ought to
be the case that) φ. Consequently, via the definition ♦φ ≡ ¬¬φ, it is natural to read ♦φ
as: it is permissible that φ (i.e. it is not obligatory that not φ). Given these interpretations,
the logic of obligation and permissibility can be explored within the syntactic and semantic
framework of modal logic.
An important early work in this vein is Lemmon’s “New Foundations” [62]. What is
most characteristic of Lemmon’s five deontic systems—the D-systems—is the axiom:5
¬⊥ (D)
(D) encapsulates the claim that what is impossible cannot be obligatory, i.e. that whatever
ought to be can be. Since plausible deontic logics tend to be quite weak, it is a matter
of contention what other axioms should be adopted. Lemmon (I think rightly) holds that
(NEC) has little plausibility in deontic logic. After all, why should logic say that there are
any obligations [62, p. 185]? Consequently, Lemmon’s deontic systems are not generally
normal (i.e. do not generally contain the system K).
One of Lemmon’s subnormal systems deserves special mention. Following Lemmon [62]
(also [63, p. 47]), the system D2 can be axiomatized by adding to classical propositional
4For a more detailed account of the relevant history (and also for a different approach), see Horty [44,
Ch. 1].
5Or, in Lemmon’s notation, CLpNLNp [62, p. 184].
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logic (K) and (D) and closing under the rule,6
φ→ ψ
φ→ ψ (RM)
To borrow the terminological conventions of Chellas [14], D2 is the smallest regular system
of modal logic containing all instances of (D), i.e. EMCD.
By weakening or strengthening D2, other important deontic systems can be obtained.
Dropping (K) yields Chellas’ ‘minimal deontic logic’ [14, p. 202]. The system known widely
as ‘standard deontic logic’ is just KD, that is, D2 closed under (NEC); or, if you prefer, K
extended by (D).7
Concerns about (NEC) notwithstanding, KD fares reasonably well under the deontic
interpretation of the modal connectives. However, even if KD is adequate for analyzing
unconditional obligation, it is is infamously inadequate for analyzing conditional obligation.
It will help motivate what follows to examine why in some detail.
Under its deontic interpretation, φ ψ is read: given φ, ψ is obligatory. It may be
speculated that is definable using the resources of KD or some other deontic modal logic.
However, a paradox due to Chisholm [16] suggests that this is not the case (my presentation
of this paradox generally follows McNamara [83, §4.5]). Observe that the following four
statements seem to be jointly consistent:
1. It is obligatory that (it be the case that) John go to the assistance of his neighbors
2. Given that John is going to the assistance of his neighbors, it is obligatory that (it be
the case that) he tell them he is coming
3. If it is not the case that John is going to the assistance of his neighbors, it is obligatory
that (it be the case that) he not tell them he is coming
6(RM) is applicable only if the premise is a theorem.
7For standard deontic logic, see Chellas [14] and McNamara [83].
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4. John is not going to the assistance of his neighbors
The most natural ways of symbolizing (1), (3), and (4) are as φ, ¬φ → ¬ψ, and ¬φ
respectively. The issue is how to interpret (2). If φ  ψ ≡ (φ → ψ), then (2) is
interpreted, a` la Chisholm [16, p. 35], as (φ → ψ). By (K) and (1), this implies ψ. (3)
and (4) imply ¬ψ. ψ and ¬ψ jointly implies ⊥, which contradicts (D).
Other symbolizations of the four claims are possible, but as McNamara [83] (cf. Chellas
[14, p. 201]) points out, each of them engender significant problems. For example, if (2) and
(3) are translated analogously, i.e. if the definition φ ψ ≡ φ→ ψ is endorsed, then (2)
simply follows from (4). But this is not plausible: it is false that there is rampant starvation
in Ireland right now, but it does not follow from that that given rampant starvation in
Ireland, it is obligatory that they increase food exports.
The upshot of this paradox is that no plausible definition of can be given within de-
ontic modal logic: all definitions result in inconsistency or other unreasonable consequences.
Accordingly, the connective must be taken as primitive. Therefore, a logic must be de-
scribed for this connective, only after which can the details of its connections to the deontic
box be examined. Before turning to this project in subsection 4.1.2, one desideratum on the
connection between deontic modal and conditional logic should be addressed.
Von Wright [132], in discussing a logic for “relative” (i.e. conditional) permissibility and
obligation, notes that the system, in a sense, includes his old system of unconditional deontic
logic. More specifically, the proposed system of conditional obligation contains,
The old system of “absolute” permission, prohibition, and obligation by virtue
of the fact that the laws, which hold in the old system, appear in the new system
in the form of laws for permission, prohibition, and obligation under tautologous
conditions (emphasis his) [132, p. 509]
In effect, von Wright’s (unary modal) logic of unconditional obligation is recoverable in his
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(dyadic) conditional logic of obligation under definition (Df. 2): φ ≡ > φ.
This definition shows up occasionally in the general conditional logic literature (see, e.g.,
Lowe [71, p. 360]), but frequently in the more specialized deontic conditional logic literature
(see, e.g., Chellas [14, p. 275]), and with good reason. > φ states that, given >, φ is
obligatory. But since > always obtains, φ is always obligatory. Therefore, > φ states
that φ is simply (i.e. unconditionally) obligatory. I take it to be a desideratum that for any
conditional logic to qualify as a proper logic of conditional obligation, it must determine a
plausible deontic modal logic under (Df. 2).
4.1.2 Deontic Conditional Logic
I have argued that is primitive; now, its logic must be investigated. I proceed by freely
exploiting the definitions, rules, and axioms discussed in section 2.1.
Observe that the logic of conditional obligation must be classical in the sense of defini-
tion 3. Intuitively, this is because what determines an obligation (or what an obligation is
determined by) is something deeper than a formula (cf. [14, p. 273]). Take (RCEA) as an
example; if the state of affairs described by φ gives rise to the obligation described by χ, it
should do so under any equivalent description (say, ψ). Therefore, the logic of conditional
obligation must be closed under (RCEA) and (RCEC).8 Moreover, the logic of conditional
obligation should be monotonic, i.e. contain all instances of (CM).9 If ψ ∧ θ is obligatory
given φ, then each of ψ and θ are independently obligatory given φ. This much, at least,
should be uncontroversial.
The status of (CC) is somewhat more controversial. Chellas [14, p. 274] does not include
it among the axioms of his system of minimal conditional deontic logic. This, however, seems
to be mainly because he wants to construct a close analogue of his minimal (unconditional)
8Note that in classical systems of conditional logic, (AT1) and (AT2) are equivalent, as are (WBT1) and
(WBT2). I prove this in section 4.2.
9Equivalently, be closed under (RCM).
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deontic logic, which rejects a comparable principle of regularity for  [14, pp. 201-2].10
If one were to generalize the reasons given there to the conditional case, the concern
would seem to be that regular systems of conditional logic cannot distinguish between, on
the one hand, controversial theses like (WBT1) and (WBT2), and on the other hand, the
purportedly more innocuous:
¬(φ ⊥) (CD)
That these are indistinguishable in regular systems of conditional logic is indeed the case,
as I verify in proposition 6 (cf. Weiss [126]):
PROPOSITION 6. Given a regular system of conditional logic L, L contains all instances
of (CD) if and only if L contains all instances of (WBT1)
If L contains (CD):
1 φ ψ Assumption
2 ¬(φ ⊥) `
3 ⊥ ↔ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) `
4 (φ ⊥)↔ (φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) RCEC 3
5 ¬(φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) PL 2, 4
6 ((φ ψ) ∧ (φ ¬ψ))→ (φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) CC
7 ¬((φ ψ) ∧ (φ ¬ψ)) PL 5, 6
8 ¬(φ ¬ψ) PL 1, 7
9 (φ ψ)→ ¬(φ ¬ψ) PL 1-8
If L contains (WBT1):
10In particular, it lacks the scheme (C): φ ∧ψ → (φ ∧ ψ).
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1 φ ⊥ Assumption
2 ⊥ ↔ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) `
3 (φ ⊥)↔ (φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) RCEC 2
4 (φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ))→ ((φ ψ) ∧ (φ ¬ψ)) CM
5 (φ ψ) ∧ (φ ¬ψ) PL 1, 3, 4
6 (φ ψ)→ ¬(φ ¬ψ) WBT1
7 ⊥ PL 5, 6
8 ¬(φ ⊥) PL 1-7
Since Chellas does not consider (WBT1) or (WBT2) and explicitly disavows (CD) (which
he calls (COD+)) at [14, pp. 273-4], this is clearly not his reason for rejecting (CC). In any
case, the possibility of distinguishing these should be weighed as a factor of importance
only if at least one of them is to be endorsed as a principle of conditional obligation. Since
my own position is that (WBT1), (WBT2), and (CD) should all be endorsed as principles
of conditional obligation, again, the inability to distinguish between these is unimportant.
Therefore, I endorse (CC) and move on to considering defenses of weak Boethius’ theses and
(CD).
Before I do so, however, some remarks are in order about conditional permissibility.
Consider a binary connective such that φ ψ is read: given φ, ψ is permissible. I take
only as primitive and adopt the definition,11
φ ψ ≡ ¬(φ ¬ψ) (Df.)
It is clear that (Df.) directly parallels the definition of (unconditional) permissibility in
11Under the counterfactual interpretation of these connectives, this equivalence is of course famously
endorsed by Lewis [67, p. 2]. It shows up under their deontic interpretation (in reverse) at least as far back
as von Wright [132, p. 509].
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deontic modal logics like KD. Now observe that, under (Df.), (WBT1) is equivalent to
the scheme: (φ ψ) → (φ ψ). That is, (WBT1) encapsulates the claim that what is
obligatory given some condition is also permissible given that condition.
Before saying a few words in defense of (WBT1) as a principle of conditional obligation,
the prevelance of it (and axioms equivalent to it) in the literature on deontic conditional logic
deserves comment. Von Wright, who states it in terms of conditional permissibility, claims
that its self-evidence “can hardly be disputed” [132, p. 509]. (WBT1) is also endorsed by
van Fraassen [33] and features in all of the systems surveyed by Lewis [70]. Despite this,
there is (to my knowledge) not a single comment in any major work of deontic logic on
connexive logic, nor in connexive logic on deontic logic.
In any case, (WBT1) should be endorsed as a principle of conditional obligation. Since
it seems highly plausible to regard the set of obligatory states as a subset of the set of
permissible states, and more generally, the set of obligatory states conditional on φ as a
subset of the set of permissible states conditional on φ, (WBT1) (and for the same reasons
(WBT2)) is unobjectionable. To deny it is to hold that there is some φ which occasions
obligations that are impermissible on the same basis; I hold this to be incoherent.
Turning now to (CD), observe that it is the direct conditional analogue of (D). Whereas
(D) represents the thesis that there are no impossible obligations (full stop), (CD) represents
the claim that no circumstance gives rise to impossible obligations. So why does Chellas, who
endorses (D), take issue with (CD)? His main concern seems to be that, given an impossible
situation, there might be impossible obligations. For this reason, he holds that ¬(⊥ ⊥),
an instance of (CD), should not be a theorem [14, p. 274].
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that ⊥ ⊥ were true. Then it easily follows that
¬(⊥ ⊥):
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1 ⊥ ⊥ Assumption
2 ⊥ → > `
3 (⊥ ⊥)→ (⊥ >) RCM 2
4 (⊥ >) PL 1, 3
5 (⊥ ¬⊥) PL, RCEC 4
6 ¬(⊥ ⊥)  def., 5
As I argued above, it is incoherent for there to be obligations which are impermissible. If
⊥ were obligatory given ⊥, then it would also be impermissible given ⊥ by the foregoing
argument. Hence, ⊥ ⊥ cannot possibly be true. Consequently, (CD) should be endorsed
without qualification.
One consequence of (CD) is that ⊥ > is a theorem: given ⊥, > is permissible. More
generally, it might be held that, given ⊥, everything is permissible. This seems at least
prima facie plausible; to appeal to authority, Lewis [70, pp. 9-10] takes this position, albeit
somewhat arbitrarily. But if everything is permissible given ⊥, nothing is obligatory given
⊥. This last statement corresponds to the scheme:
¬(⊥ φ) (CAD)
Observe that (CD) and (CAD) yield, respectively, ¬(¬⊥ ⊥) and ¬(⊥ ¬⊥), special
instances of (AT2) and (AT1). I endorse (CAD) as a principle of conditional obligation.
The principles of conditional obligation so far endorsed determine a weak regular system
of conditional logic, the exact properties of which will be more precisely investigated in
section 4.2. While this system is deontically plausible, most extensions of it by other axioms
from table 2.2 are not.
Note, for example, that the logic of conditional obligation should not be normal (defi-
nition 3), i.e. not contain (CN). (CN) is deontically implausible because it mandates the
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existence of (trivial) obligations in arbitrary circumstances. Surely, however, given that Am-
sterdam is in the Netherlands, it is not obligatory that I either read the Times or do not read
the Times. (ID) is even more absurd: it is not the case that given that there is starvation,
this ought to be so!
While some connexive principles are, as I have argued, eminently plausible on the deontic
interpretation of, others are not. Aristotle’s theses, for instance, are not (in general)
deontically credible, for (AT1) would have it that:
Given that there is murder, it is obligatory that there not be murder
is false. Despite the deontic implausibility of Aristotle’s theses, these too can in fact be found
in the literature on conditional obligation, though of course not named as such (see, e.g.,
T3 in van Fraassen [33, p. 422]). For my part, I hold that all proper logics of conditional
obligation are only partially connexive.
4.2 Axiom Systems
In this section, I axiomatize several connexive (and half-connexive) systems of conditional
logic. I divide these systems into two categories: deontic and non-deontic. I prove various
results about systems of both types and show how to recapture deontic modal logics in
systems of deontic conditional logic.
Before examining specific systems and results concerning them, it will be useful to for-
mally define two types of connexive system and prove some general results for these.
DEFINITION 29. A system of conditional logic L is half-connexive if it contains all
instances of (WBT1) and (WBT2). L is connexive if it contains all instances of (WBT1),
(WBT2), (AT1), and (AT2).
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The following results will help axiomatically characterize half-connexive and connexive
systems of conditional logic. They should be compared with results of Unterhuber [121] and
Weiss [126].
PROPOSITION 7. Every classical system of conditional logic containing all instances of
(AT1) also contains all instances of (AT2)
1 φ↔ ¬¬φ `
2 (¬φ φ)↔ (¬φ ¬¬φ) RCEC 1
3 ¬(¬φ ¬¬φ) AT1
4 ¬(¬φ φ) PL 2, 3
Note that the converse of proposition 7 also holds by an analogous proof.
PROPOSITION 8. Every classical system of conditional logic containing all instances of
(WBT1) also contains all instances of (WBT2)
1 φ ¬ψ Assumption
2 (φ ¬ψ)→ ¬(φ ¬¬ψ) WBT1
3 ¬(φ ¬¬ψ) PL 1, 2
4 ψ ↔ ¬¬ψ `
5 (φ ψ)↔ (φ ¬¬ψ) RCEC 4
6 ¬(φ ψ) PL 3, 5
7 (φ ¬ψ)→ ¬(φ ψ) PL 1-6
Again, note that the converse of proposition 8 holds by an analogous proof.
PROPOSITION 9. Every regular system of conditional logic containing all instances of
(AT1) also contains all instances of (WBT1)
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1 ⊥ ↔ (φ ∧ ¬φ) `
2 (φ (φ ∧ ¬φ))→ ((φ φ) ∧ (φ ¬φ)) CM
3 (φ ⊥)↔ (φ (φ ∧ ¬φ)) RCEC 1
4 (φ ⊥)→ ((φ φ) ∧ (φ ¬φ)) PL 2, 3
5 (φ ⊥)→ (φ ¬φ) PL 4
6 ⊥ ↔ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) `
7 (φ ⊥)↔ (φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) RCEC 6
8 ¬(φ ¬φ) AT1
9 ¬(φ ⊥) PL 5, 8
10 ¬(φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) PL 7, 9
11 ((φ ψ) ∧ (φ ¬ψ))→ (φ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) CC
12 ¬((φ ψ) ∧ (φ ¬ψ)) PL 10, 11
13 (φ ψ)→ ¬(φ ¬ψ)) PL 12
It is important to note that the converse of proposition 9 does not hold. This is a corollary
of some results obtained using semantic methods in section 4.3.
In the previous section, I noted that (CN) and (ID) are deontically implausible. In fact,
however, these schemes cannot generally be consistently combined with connexive principles.
More specifically, note the following limitations:
PROPOSITION 10. Every normal connexive system of conditional logic is inconsistent
1 ¬⊥ `
2 ⊥ ¬⊥ RCK 1
3 ¬(⊥ ¬⊥) AT1
4 ⊥ PL 2, 3
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PROPOSITION 11. Every monotonic half-connexive system of conditional logic contain-
ing (ID) is inconsistent
Every monotonic half-connexive system of conditional logic contains all instances of (CD) as
theorems (see the second half of the proof of proposition 6). Therefore, if L is a monotonic
half-connexive system of conditional logic, since by (CD) `L ¬(⊥  ⊥) and by (ID)
`L ⊥ ⊥, L is inconsistent.
4.2.1 Deontic Connexive Systems
I argued in subsection 4.1.2 that (WBT1) and (CD) are principles of conditional obligation,
but that (AT1) is not. Consequently, deontic systems of conditional logic are half-connexive,
but not (fully) connexive. In this subsection, I examine two half-connexive systems with
plausible deontic interpretations.
DEFINITION 30. A system of conditional logic L is deontic if it is regular and half-
connexive, but not (fully) connexive. Moreover, L must determine a deontic modal logic
under (Df. 2).
It is immediate from definition 30 that all deontic systems of conditional logic extend
the basic regular system of conditional logic CR (recall table 2.3). While some philosophers
may advocate for weaker systems (see the discussion in subsection 4.1.2), I have found no
good reason to reject (CC).
To axiomatize the systems I will be interested in, one more axiom, not yet encountered,
is needed:
> > (CN∗)
(CN∗) should be carefully distinguished from (CN). (CN∗) is equivalent in any classical
system of conditional logic to rule (RC3) from van Fraassen [33, p. 421] and rule (RN) from
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Lowe [71, p. 360]. It corresponds to the claim that what is necessary is obligatory given
what is necessary.
Table 4.1: Deontic Systems of Conditional Logic
CRD CR, (CD), (CAD)
CND CRD, (CN∗)
Observation. By proposition 6, CRD and CND contain all instances of (WBT1). By
proposition 8, CRD and CND are half-connexive.
CRD is what I take to be the correct logic of conditional obligation: it is the system
corresponding to all of the principles of conditional obligation endorsed in subsection 4.1.2.
CND is a slight strengthening of it, important mainly due to its connection to the deontic
modal logic KD (more on this anon).
DEFINITION 31. Let τ ′ : Φ→ Φc be the same function as τ from definition 4 except:
3. τ ′(φ ψ) = τ ′(φ) ∧ τ ′(ψ)
THEOREM 20 (Consistency). Each of the systems in table 4.1 is consistent
The proof is essentially as in that of theorem 2, but using the function τ ′ from definition 31
(cf. Lowe [71, p. 360]).
The proof that the systems in table 4.1 are deontic, in the sense of definition 30, re-
quires showing that (AT1) is independent of them. I show this using semantic methods in
section 4.3. Here, I verify that each of these systems in fact determines a deontic modal
logic. I show that CRD determines Lemmon’s D2, and then indicate how the result can be
extended to show that CND determines KD.
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DEFINITION 32. Let σ′ : Φ → Φ be the same function as σ from definition 5 except:
4. σ′(φ) = > σ′(φ)
LEMMA 25. If `D2 φ, then `CRD σ′(φ)
The result follows by induction on the length of proof. For (D), note that σ′(¬⊥) = ¬(>
σ′(⊥)), which can be obtained from (CD). For (RM), suppose that `CRD σ′(φ → ψ) =
σ′(φ)→ σ′(ψ). Then it must be shown that σ′(φ→ ψ) = (> σ′(φ))→ (> σ′(ψ))
is provable in CRD; this follows immediately from the assumption and (RCM).
DEFINITION 33. Let σ′−1 : Φ → Φ be the same function as σ−1 from definition 6
except:
4. σ′−1(φ ψ) = (σ′−1(φ) ∧ σ′−1(ψ))
LEMMA 26. If `CRD φ, then `D2 σ′−1(φ)
Again, the result is obtained by induction on the length of proof. As a representative
case, consider (CD): σ′−1(¬(φ  ⊥)) = ¬(σ′−1(φ) ∧ σ′−1(⊥)), which is equivalent to
¬(σ′−1(φ) ∧ ⊥). The proof of this in D2 is easy:
1 ¬⊥ D
2 (σ′−1(φ) ∧ ⊥)→ ⊥ `
3 (σ′−1(φ) ∧ ⊥)→ ⊥ RM 2
4 ¬(σ′−1(φ) ∧ ⊥) PL 1, 3
LEMMA 27. `D2 φ↔ σ′−1(σ′(φ))
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. Consider the case where φ is of the formψ;
the induction hypothesis is that `D2 ψ ↔ σ′−1(σ′(ψ)). Then: σ′−1(σ′(ψ)) = σ′−1(>
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σ′(ψ)) = (σ′−1(>) ∧ σ′−1(σ′(ψ))), which (by the induction hypothesis) is equivalent to
(> ∧ ψ). It must be shown that `D2 ψ ↔ (> ∧ ψ). But this is easily proved:
1 ψ → (> ∧ ψ) `
2 ψ → (> ∧ ψ) RM 2
3 (> ∧ ψ)→ ψ `
4 (> ∧ ψ)→ ψ RM 3
5 ψ ↔ (> ∧ ψ) PL 2, 4
THEOREM 21 (Modal Embedding). `D2 φ if and only if `CRD σ′(φ)
The result follows immediately from lemmata 25, 26, and 27.
To show that `KD φ if and only if `CND σ′(φ), only one more case must be examined in
lemmata 25 and 26. For the first, since `CND σ′(>) = > >, it is clear that (NEC) will
present no problems. For the second, since `KD (>∧>), it is clear that (CN∗) is provable
under σ′−1.
4.2.2 Non-Deontic Connexive Systems
In this subsection, I discuss connexive and half-connexive systems without plausible deontic
interpretations. Of these, special interest attaches to two systems of Lowe [71], which are
intended to formalize nonmaterial natural language conditionals.12
In addition to the schemes that I discussed above, two more must be introduced:
((φ ψ) ∧ (ψ θ))→ (φ θ) (CT)
12Lowe [71, p. 357] does not (logically) distinguish between indicative/non-counterfactual and subjunc-
tive/counterfactual conditionals. Though it will not be a concern of this chapter, Lowe’s ultimate project is
to reduce conditional logic to modal logic. Interestingly, Angell’s PA1 admits of such a reduction [3].
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((φ ψ) ∨ (> ¬φ))↔ (> (φ→ ψ)) (CL)
Each of these correspond to axioms from Lowe [71] (D1.7 and D2.9, respectively).
The systems that I will be concerned with for the remainder of this section are listed in
table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Non-Deontic Systems of Connexive Conditional Logic
CX CR, (AT1)
LD1 CR, (WBT1), (CMP), (CT)
LD2 LD1, (CN∗), (CL)
Observation. By propositions 7, 8, and 9, CX is (fully) connexive. By proposition 8, LD1
and LD2 are half-connexive.
CX is the smallest (fully) connexive regular system of conditional logic. LD1 and LD2
are the systems Lowe [71] calls D1 and D2 (to avoid confusion with the Lemmon systems, I
have changed their names). By proposition 6, LD1 (LD2) could be equivalently axiomatized
using (CD).
THEOREM 22 (Consistency). Each of the systems in table 4.2 is consistent
The proof is exactly as in the proof of theorem 20. The result for LD1 and LD2 is due to
Lowe [71, p. 360-1].
It is clear that none of the systems from table 4.2 are deontically plausible. CX is
not a plausible deontic logic due to its inclusion of (AT1). LD1 and LD2 are deontically
implausible due to their inclusion of (CMP).13 None of these systems really seem satisfactory
13Here’s a deontic counterexample to (CMP): from “given that there is global warming, it is obligatory
that we reduce carbon emissions” and “there is global warming,” “we are reducing carbon emissions” does
not follow.
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as an account of any sort of natural language conditional either (pace Lowe). Observe that
all of these systems contain (CD) as a theorem; but surely, it is natural to hold that if ⊥
were the case, then ⊥ would be the case. Therefore, it remains opaque what philosophical
significance these systems have, if any.
It is worth emphasizing that LD2 is a particularly unusual system of conditional logic,
in that the conditional is supposed to be stronger than the strict conditional, which it
is when  is defined in accordance with (Df. 2).14 Indeed, under (Df. 2), it follows
straightforwardly from (CL) that `LD2 (φ ψ) → (φ → ψ). Again, it is hard to see
what philosophical sense this makes.
4.3 Semantics
In this section, I semantically investigate the systems from tables 4.1 and 4.2. Determination
results for each of these systems with respect to their semantics are proved. Finally, I prove
some independence results which establish that the systems from table 4.1 satisfy a constraint
from definition 30.
4.3.1 Proposition Indexed Interpretations
Since all of the systems listed in tables 4.1 and 4.2 are classical, the semantic framework
from subsection 2.2.1 can be utilized. The reader should recall the definition of a proposition
indexed interpretation (definition 7) and the constraints listed in table 2.5. Table 4.3 lists
additional constraints that may be imposed on an interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈
P}, V 〉.
14Lowe [71, p. 363] both acknowledges and endorses this feature.
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Table 4.3: Deontic and Connexive Function Constraints
∅ 6∈ fX(w) (cd)
f∅(w) = ∅ (cad)
If Y ∈ fX(w), then − Y 6∈ fX(w) (wbt1)
−X 6∈ fX(w) (at1)
If S ∈ fX(w) and T ∈ fS(w), then T ∈ fX(w) (ct)
W ∈ fW (w) (cn∗)
(S ∈ fX(w) or −X ∈ fW (w)) iff (−X ∪ S) ∈ fW (w) (cl)
The semantic constraints listed in table 4.3 correspond to the axioms discussed in this chapter
in the obvious way. I adopt the same conventions here as in chapter 2 concerning the naming
of classes of proposition indexed interpretations. Thus, for example, CCRD is the class of
proposition indexed interpretations in which fX satisfies (cm), (cc), (cd), and (cad).
PROPOSITION 12. Given a proposition indexed interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈
P}, V 〉 which satisfies (cm) and (cc), I satisfies (cd) if and only if it satisfies (wbt1)
It is obvious that this is the semantic counterpart of proposition 6. Consider an interpretation
I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 satisfying the hypothesis of the proposition. Suppose I satisfies
(cd) and Y ∈ fX(w); if −Y ∈ fX(w), then by (cc), Y ∩−Y = ∅ ∈ fX(w), which is impossible.
Thus, −Y 6∈ fX(w), and I satisfies (wbt1). Conversely, suppose that I satisfies (wbt1); if
∅ ∈ fX(w), then Y ∩ −Y ∈ fX(w), so by (cm), Y ∈ fX(w) and −Y ∈ fX(w), which is
impossible. Therefore, I satisfies (cd).
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Soundness and completeness proofs for the systems from tables 4.1 and 4.2 with respect
to the semantics sketched above are just extensions of the proofs given in subsection 2.2.3.
For what follows, let L be any system from table 4.1 or 4.2.
THEOREM 23 (Soundness). Σ `L φ implies Σ |=CL φ
I take (CD), (AT1), and (CT) as representative cases. If L contains (CD), then for any
I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 ∈ CL, fX satisfies (cd). Take an arbitrary world w of an
arbitrary I ∈ CL. Then by (cd), [⊥] = ∅ 6∈ f[φ](w). Therefore, since 6|=Iw φ ⊥, it follows
that |=Iw ¬(φ  ⊥), as desired. If L contains (AT1), then for any I ∈ CL, fX satisfies
(at1). Consequently, given an arbitrary world w of an arbitrary interpretation I ∈ CL,
by (at1), −[φ] = [¬φ] 6∈ f[φ](w). Therefore, |=Iw ¬(φ  ¬φ), as desired. Finally, if L
contains (CT), take an arbitrary world w of an arbitrary interpretation I ∈ CL such that
|=Iw (φ ψ)∧ (ψ θ). Since [ψ] ∈ f[φ](w) and [θ] ∈ f[ψ](w), by (ct), [θ] ∈ f[φ](w), whence
|=Iw (φ θ), as desired.
Canonical models for these systems are defined as in definition 15 and the truth lemma
(lemma 14) goes through as before. For completeness, it simply remains to verify that the
canonical model for each system is in the appropriate class of interpretations. Recall that
dφeL = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is maximally L consistent, φ ∈ Γ} (again, superscripts are suppressed
except if needed to disambiguate).
LEMMA 28. Let IL be the canonical model for L. Then IL ∈ CL
I take (cad) and (cl) as representative cases. For (cad), suppose that L contains (CAD)
and take some arbitrary w ∈ W . By (CAD) and the maximal consistency of w, f∅(w) =
fd⊥e(w) = {dψe ∈ P : (⊥ ψ) ∈ w} = ∅, as desired. For (cl), suppose that L contains
(CL) and take some arbitrary w ∈ W and dφe, dψe ∈ P . −dφe ∪ dψe = dφ→ ψe ∈ fW (w) =
fd>e(w) if and only if > (φ→ ψ) ∈ w if and only if (by PL and (CL)) ((φ ψ)∨(>
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¬φ)) ∈ w if and only if either dψe ∈ fdφe(w) or −dφe = d¬φe ∈ fd>e(w) = fW (w), which was
to be proved.
THEOREM 24 (Completeness). Σ |=CL φ implies Σ `L φ
The result follows from lemma 28 as in the proof of theorem 8.
4.3.2 Conditional Algebraic Interpretations
Algebraic semantics can easily be given for the systems from tables 4.1 and 4.2 (the reader
should recall the discussion of such semantics from subsection 2.2.2).15 For the sake of
establishing independence results, the algebraic semantics is to be preferred. Table 4.4 lists
a number of constraints (in addition to those listed in table 2.6) that might be imposed on
a conditional algebraic interpretation I∗ = 〈A, g〉.16
15I note that Pizzi [95] used algebraic semantics to characterize a connexive conditional logic, albeit of a
kind rather different than those examined above. See also Weiss [126].
16These correspond in the obvious way to the constraints listed in table 4.3.
CHAPTER 4. CONNEXIVE CONDITIONAL LOGIC 94
Table 4.4: Deontic and Connexive Algebraic Constraints
a ∗ 0 = 0 (cd?)
0 ∗ a = 0 (cad?)
a ∗ b ≤ −(a ∗ −b) (wbt1?)
a ∗ −a = 0 (at1?)
(a ∗ b) ∩ (b ∗ c) ≤ (a ∗ c) (ct?)
1 ∗ 1 = 1 (cn∗?)
(a ∗ b) ∪ (1 ∗ −a) = 1 ∗ (−a ∪ b) (cl?)
I follow the established convention of denoting classes of conditional algebraic interpre-
tations using the ∗ subscript. Observe that the equivalence theorem (theorem 6) can be
extended and (weak) soundness and completeness results can be obtained for the systems
from tables 4.1 and 4.2 with respect to classes of conditional algebraic interpretations using
the results of subsection 4.3.1 (cf. corollaries 1 and 2). However, since the main concern of
this section is with independence results, I will simply sketch soundness proofs and display
pertinent countermodels.
THEOREM 25 (Soundness). For L from tables 4.1 and 4.2, `L φ implies |=CL∗ φ
I take (CAD) and (AT1) as representative cases. If L contains (CAD), then take an arbitrary
I∗ ∈ CL∗ . Since 0 ∗ g(φ) = 0 by (cad?), it follows that g(⊥  φ) = 0. Therefore, |=I∗
¬(⊥ φ), as desired. For (AT1), let I∗ ∈ CL∗ be arbitrary and note that g(¬(φ ¬φ)) =
−(g(φ) ∗ −g(φ)) = −0 = 1 by (at1?). Therefore, |=I∗ ¬(φ ¬φ), as desired.
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I now complete the demonstration that CRD and CND are deontic in the sense of
definition 30. I do this by producing algebraic countermodels to (AT1) and (AT2). To
obtain these countermodels, I used the automated theorem proving program Vampire [123].
PROPOSITION 13. (AT1) and (AT2) are independent of CRD
Since (AT1) and (AT2) are equivalent in CRD (see proposition 7), it suffices to show that
(AT1) is independent. Consider the four element boolean algebra B based on the set B =




Now consider the conditional algebra A based on B with ∗ given by the following table:
∗ 0 a b 1
0 0 0 0 0
a 0 0 a a
b 0 0 0 b
1 0 0 0 0
It is tedious, though not hard, to verify that ∗ satisfies all of the conditions imposed on
CCRD∗ . Now consider a conditional algebraic interpretation I∗ = 〈A, g〉 in which g(p) = a.
Then g(¬(p ¬p)) = −(g(p) ∗ −g(p)) = −(a ∗ −a) = −a = b. Therefore, by theorem 25,
6`CRD ¬(φ ¬φ).
PROPOSITION 14. (AT1) and (AT2) are independent of CND
The proof proceeds just as before, but the operation ∗ is now defined by the table:
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∗ 0 a b 1
0 0 0 0 0
a 0 0 a 1
b 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
Consider a conditional algebraic interpretation I∗ = 〈A, g〉 in which g(p) = a. Then, once
more, g(¬(p ¬p)) = b. Consequently, 6`CND ¬(φ ¬φ).
Chapter 5
Counterpossible Logic
This chapter deals with counterpossibles—counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Such
conditionals arise frequently in ordinary discourse, as well as mathematical and philosophical
discourse. I take all of the following to be examples of counterpossibles:1
If Tully weren’t Cicero, Cicero wouldn’t have been Tully
If Hippasus had discovered that the square-root of two is rational, he would not
have drowned at sea
Were there a counterexample to the law of the excluded middle, Brouwer would
have been wrong to mistrust that law
As the range of these examples indicates, finer distinctions could be drawn within the genus
of counterpossibles. The first could be classified as a countermetaphysical, the middle as
a countermathematical, and the last as a counterlogical. Whatever the benefits of such a
taxonomy, it won’t concern me here.2
1In recent work on counteridenticals, Kocurek [54] has defended contingent identity and, consequently,
would deny that the Cicero conditional is really a counterpossible. I have implicitly assumed, with Kripke
[61], that identities are (metaphysically) necessary if true at all.
2The class of counterlogicals is an exception to this rule, for reasons that will become clear in section 5.1.
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What will concern me is classifying counterpossibles according to their truth or falsity.
I claim that there are true counterpossibles (for example the first) and that there are false
counterpossibles (for example the last). A venerable tradition, including Lewis [67], Stalnaker
[116], and Williamson [128, 129, 130], holds that all counterpossibles are vacuously true.
I argue that this tradition is mistaken and subsequently develop counterpossible tolerant
conditional logics, or simply, counterpossible logics.
Prominent arguments for and against “vacuousness” are discussed in section 5.1. I
claim that the arguments against vacuous truth for counterpossibles are decisive. In subsec-
tion 5.1.2, I explore a semantic framework for handling counterpossibles nontrivially. Systems
of counterpossible logic are examined in section 5.2. Finally, determination results are given
in section 5.3.
5.1 Vacuousness and Counterpossibles
This section discusses and weighs in on the debate between proponents and opponents of
vacuousness for counterpossibles. Before diving into the specifics, however, I should clarify
exactly how vacuousness arises in standard treatments of counterfactuals.
First, it should be observed that the problem of vacuousness (to the extent that it is a
problem) is really fundamentally a semantic one. Vacuousness appears in proof theory only
if certain counterlogicals are being considered:
PROPOSITION 15. If L is a monotonic system of conditional logic containing all in-
stances of (ID), then `L ⊥ φ
1 ⊥ → φ `
2 (⊥ ⊥)→ (⊥ φ) RCM 1
3 ⊥ ⊥ ID
4 ⊥ φ PL 2, 3
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While proposition 15 may not seem terribly illuminating, it does gesture at how vacuousness
arises in standard semantic treatments of counterfactuals: it has something to do with the
conditions required for (CM) and (ID).3
Now consider the uniform semantics from subsection 2.2.1 and take some arbitrary world
w of some arbitrary interpretation I = 〈W,P, {fX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 for which fX satisfies (cm)
and (id). Let φ be impossible (in whatever sense you like); then [φ], the set of worlds where
φ is true, is empty. By (id), [φ] = ∅ ∈ f∅(w) = f[φ](w). Take some arbitrary ψ; then [ψ] ∈ P
and, since ∅ = ∅ ∩ [ψ] ∈ f[φ](w), [ψ] ∈ f[φ](w) by (cm). Therefore, |=Iw φ ψ.
While the uniform neighborhood-type semantics shows how the problem arises for any
counterpossible given minimal background assumptions, it doesn’t really provide a clear
sense of the issue. A more intuitive picture can be obtained by considering formula indexed
interpretations (see subsection 2.3.1). Recall that the intuitive idea behind this semantics is
that counterfactuals are evaluated by looking at worlds that are ceteris paribus the same as
a given world except that the antecedent holds. This guiding idea essentially requires the
addition of a semantic constraint corresponding to (ID):
fφ(w) ⊆ [φ] (id)
Take some arbitrary world w of an arbitrary formula indexed interpretation IΦ = 〈W, {fφ :
φ ∈ Φ}, V 〉 such that fφ satisfies (id). If φ is impossible, then by (id), fφ(w) ⊆ [φ] = ∅. Since
∅ ⊆ [ψ] for arbitrary ψ, |=IΦw φ ψ.
Finally, the problem can be considered, as it most often is, using either variant of Lewis
semantics. Since there is not, however, any technical mystery about where the vacuousness
comes from here—it’s built into the truth conditions (see subsection 2.3.2)—I will not belabor
3But note that the condition required for (CM) is obscured in most semantic treatments and the condition
required for (ID) is obscured in many.
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the point.
So much for where vacuousness comes from. Why does it matter? It matters because,
arguably, it’s both the case that counterpossibles satisfy properties like (ID) and that not all
counterpossibles are true. If this is so, then the standard semantic treatments of counterfac-
tuals must be reexamined so as to accommodate counterpossibles. The now well-established
way to go is to augment the worlds machinery with impossible worlds; then counterpossibles
get evaluated at these worlds, worlds at which their antecedents can obtain.4 But before
doing all that, I first must show that not all counterpossibles are true. I turn to this issue
now.
5.1.1 The Case against Vacuousness
At the beginning of this chapter, I gave an example of a counterpossible that seems to me
to be intuitively false: “Were there a counterexample to the law of the excluded middle,
Brouwer would have been wrong to mistrust that law.” Why do I think this conditional
is false? In thinking about it, I imagine scenarios in which there is a counterexample to
the law of the excluded middle—say, neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation are
true—but everything else is basically as is. In particular, Brouwer still holds his skeptical
views about it and is, I take it, not wrong to mistrust it. Thus, I think the conditional is
false. The fundamental argument against vacuousness is simply this: many counterpossibles
are intuitively false.
The advocate of vacuousness has two basic options for responding to this claim. The
first is to deny that there are such intuitions. The second is to concede that such intuitions
exist, but reject them as unsound.5 Lewis [67] is an instance of the first approach while
4For some recent work in line with this approach, see Berto et al. [8] and Weiss [124].
5What does one imagine when one envisions a world satisfying an impossible antecedent—say, that
Hesperus is not Phosphorus? One might envision a situation in which there are two distinct celestial objects
satisfying many of the observational properties which Venus in fact satisfies (perhaps they are even called by
the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’). Nevertheless, according to Kripke [61, p. 102], this is not a situation
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Williamson [130] is an instance of the second.
Lewis [67] notes that at least some counterpossibles must be true since they are used
and asserted in proofs by contradiction.6 Why, then, should they all be vacuously true?
Apparently because there is no inclination to ever assert the negation of a counterpossible
[67, p. 25]. This is an empirical claim: people do not want to assert that counterpossibles
are false. However, experimental data collected by Ripley [108] suggests that this is not so.
Ripley found that (to take one example) the conditional “If Stephen Curry had been both
exactly five feet tall and exactly six feet tall, then ants would have had ten legs” was, on
average, rated between probably false and definitely false. Therefore, it should be conceded
that non-vacuous intuitions exist.7
One possible deflationary explanation of these intuitions goes as follows. Consider the
following variation on an intuitively false counterpossible from Nolan [90, p. 544]:
If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the Andes would have
been impressed
in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus, and to describe it as such is to misdescribe it. More generally, then, the
intuitions against vacuousness might be unsound because, in envisioning a counterpossible situation where
the consequent does not intuitively hold, one might be envisioning the “wrong scenario” and, consequently,
draw the wrong conclusions. I think this sort of skepticism is a general worry for counterfactuals (when I
imagine what is consequent upon my throwing the rock at the glass, am I imagining the right scenarios?), so
I will only offer two remarks in response here. First, the concern is epistemic in nature: if one regularly draws
conclusions about the truth or falsity of counterpossibles based on faulty imaginings, this may undermine
one’s justification for saying whether any counterpossible is false, but it would not show that none are false.
However, other reasons (e.g. theoretical reasons) might still militate in favor of some counterpossibles being
false. Second, I think this sort of skepticism is unwarranted against counterpossibles primarily concerned
with logical facts, e.g. “If intuitionistic logic were correct, then the law of the excluded middle would be
valid.” Surely we are in a position to say that conditionals like this are false (you might mis-imagine an
intuitionistic world in all sorts of ways but you don’t even need to imagine such worlds to see that this
conditional is false). Of course, one might take this to really be expressing a fact about a logical consequence
relation, but the burden is on the skeptic to say why that fact can’t be expressed using a counterpossible.
6Or rather, even if counterpossibles are not used in such mathematical reasoning per se, they are conse-
quent upon it (cf. Cohen [17, p. 92]). Thus, were the counterpossible summarizing such a reductio false, the
corresponding implication would intuitively be false as well.
7It may be objected that there is an important difference between asserting that something is false and
rating something as false (as part of a questionnaire, say). Consequently, it may be held that this data says
little about how people actually use language, which is what really matters. Later, in considering a case from
Jenny [52, 51], I will argue that there are examples of counterpossibles which are rejected in more natural
contexts.
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I think the intuition that this is false is rather strong. However, it may be claimed that in
judging this conditional to be false, speakers are not really reacting to it, but rather to the
more general conditional:
If Hobbes had proved X, then sick children in the Andes would have been im-
pressed
This latter conditional can be evaluated using possible worlds (even the actual world, assum-
ing Hobbes succeeded in proving something) and is, of course, false. The objection implicit
in this explanation is clear: in evaluating counterpossibles, speakers sometimes react to a
distinct but related conditional which is not a counterpossible, and therefore is possibly false.
Thus, speaker’s intuitions can go awry.
An explanation like this has some prima facie appeal for the counterpossible concerning
Hobbes, but is inadequate as a general explanation of non-vacuous intuitions. It is hard to
discern what alternative conditional speakers might be reacting to in judging the counter-
possible about Brouwer false, as I suspect most would. Moreover, just about any candidate
for a related conditional would still be an intuitively false counterpossible (“If there were a
counterexample to logical law X, then...”). Therefore, I do not think that a response such
as this has much force against non-vacuous intuitions generally.8
However, it is also not clear that speakers react to the counterpossible about Hobbes
in the way this explanation suggests. The base hypothesis must be that speakers, when
assessing a given conditional, assess that conditional, as opposed to some other one. It
may be that the base hypothesis should be rejected, but this should not be done without
good reason. The fact that the standard semantics for counterfactuals—which has much to
recommend it—endorses vacuousness is not a good reason to reject the base hypothesis: it
seems to be little more than a historical accident (one which is rapidly being corrected to
8Its bears emphasis that the same point can be made using counterpossibles other than counterlogicals,
e.g. “If Hobbes had disproved Euclid’s theorem, Wallis wouldn’t have checked for mistakes.”
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judge by recent publications on the subject) that vacuousness is part of the standard theory.9
Williamson [130] offers a different explanation of non-vacuous intuitions. He suggests
that a heuristic is at play when one (uncritically) assesses counterfactuals. When β and
γ are inconsistent, we incline to treat α β and α γ as inconsistent; indeed, in the
simplest case, Williamson states the heuristic as, “If you accept one of α β and α ¬β,
reject the other” [130, p. 364].10
As Berto et al. [8, §4.2] point out, the existence of such a heuristic seems rather implau-
sible. For example, there is an immediate inclination to accept both “If it were round and
not round, it would be round” and “If it were round and not round, it would be not round.”
Williamson need not hold that the heuristic applies in all cases (indeed, for him, one must
be able to critically override it), but its failing to apply in even such a simple case does not
speak in its favor.
Williamson seeks to buttress his heuristic hypothesis by discussing vacuous quantification.
There is a disposition to treat “Every σ φ’s” and “Every σ ¬φ’s” as inconsistent, but this
goes wrong when there are no σ’s [130, p. 366]. Hence, both “Every round square is round”
and “Every round square is not round” are true. Just as this quantificational heuristic goes
wrong in the limit case, the suggestion goes, the heuristic concerned with counterfactuals
can too in its own limit case. Therefore, the inclination to rule some counterpossibles false
should be resisted.11
But again, Berto et al. [8, §4.3] give reasons to be skeptical about the existence of such a
quantificational heuristic. Even if there were such a fallible heuristic, though, it is not clear
9It definitely seems to be a historical accident that vacuous truth for counterpossibles is part of the
standard view. Lewis is extremely lukewarm in his endorsement of vacuous truth over vacuous falsity,
writing, “I am fairly content to let counterfactuals with impossible antecedents be vacuously true. But my
reasons are less than decisive” [67, p. 25].
10The reader will note that this is a heuristic analogue of weak Boethius’ theses; see chapter 4.
11It bears remarking that the connection between these conditional and quantificational heuristics is mir-
rored in connexive logics by the connection between weak Boethius’ theses and existential import (see
especially McCall [79]).
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how this would help Williamson’s argument. Why shouldn’t the defender of non-vacuous
semantics simply deny the analogy? It is presumably consistent to hold that all vacuous
universal claims are true but not all counterpossibles are true.
In addition to intuitions, there are compelling methodological and metaphilosophical rea-
sons which militate against vacuousness. Jenny [51, 52] has built a case against vacuousness
from relative computability theory. Relative computability theory studies the reducibility of
various decision problems to others. For example, the following conditional, expressing such
a reduction, is taken to be true:12
If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem
would also be algorithmically decidable [52, p. 533]
Note that under standard assumptions,13 this conditional is a counterpossible: if there is
no algorithm for deciding validity, it is (at least) metaphysically necessary that this is so.
Consequently, this is also a counterpossible:
If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth
would also be algorithmically decidable [52, p. 533]
This conditional, however, is generally thought to be false by practitioners in the field. Con-
sequently, to endorse vacuousness is to challenge such judgments and disregard philosophical
humility [52, p. 536]. Jenny argues convincingly that such a transgression cannot be justified.
Therefore, both intuitive and theoretical reasons motivate a non-vacuous semantics for
counterpossibles. Nevertheless, it may be objected that actually implementing such a se-
mantics results in technical or philosophical incoherence. I now consider several objections
in this vein.
12Loosely, the question of the validity problem is whether the set of validities of predicate logic is algo-
rithmically decidable; it is, famously, not [52, p. 533]. For the other problems, see Jenny [52, 51] or any
standard mathematical logic text, e.g. Hunter [47].
13For a discussion, see Jenny [52, pp. 534-5].
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Lewis, with an eye towards counterlogicals, notes that “a counterfactual in which the
antecedent logically implies the consequent ought always to be true” [67, p. 24]. Such
a claim is highly plausible on its face. However, since a contradiction logically implies
anything, this has the effect of rendering a large class of counterlogicals vacuously true.
Moreover, the argument goes, if so many counterpossibles are trivially true, why hold that
any counterpossibles fail to be trivially true? What is the significant difference between those
counterpossibles and others?
The main problem with this line of argument is that the pertinent notion of logical
implication is ambiguous. Consider, for example, the following conditional:
If it were the case that the liar is true, its negation is true, and Priest’s LP is
the one true logic, then it would be the case that cats can fly
It is obvious that the antecedent—something of the form λ ∧ ¬λ ∧ φ—classically implies
anything. But the antecedent also explicitly invites consideration of scenarios which are not
classically closed, that is, scenarios in which the paraconsistent logic of Priest [99] holds.
Therefore, this argument doesn’t seem very persuasive, even restricted to the class of coun-
terfactuals with contradictory antecedents.14
Williamson, like Lewis, has appealed to proofs by contradiction to defend the orthodoxy.
In [130, §3] (cf. Lewis [67, p. 25]), Williamson rehearses a proof that there is no largest
prime number. It goes something like this:
1. If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be prime
2. If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be composite
3. If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be prime and composite
4. There is no largest prime
14For another criticism of this point, see Brogaard and Salerno [11, pp. 648-9].
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(1) is supported by general features of factorials and divisibility. (2) is immediate from the
antecedent. (3) follows from (1) and (2) by (CC). (4) follows from (3) by implicit appeal
to (CMP). It seems like all the conditionals used in this argument are true, a feature which
the orthodoxy captures. Thus, the argument is sound (given a reasonably strong logic of
counterfactuals).
Williamson [130, p. 363] suggests, however, that this is not so unless vacuousness is
endorsed. The basic point is that, were there a largest prime, the whole theory of natural
numbers would be very different, so it’s hard to discern if any of (1)-(3) are true.
Following Berto et al. [8, §3.3], context can be brought in to answer this objection.
The basic point is that context plays a role in determining what the relevant worlds are for
evaluating a counterfactual: to make the point using formula indexed interpretations, fφ(w)
is sensitive not only to the antecedent (φ) and base world (w), but to the situation in which
a counterfactual with φ as antecedent is uttered. Thus, to use a cliche´ example from Lewis
[67, pp. 66-7], both of the following conditionals can be read as true:
If Caesar had been in command [in Korea] he would have used the atom bomb
If Caesar had been in command he would have used catapults
In a context where the focus is on the (merciless) character of Caesar and the sort of weapons
available for use during the actual Korean war, the worlds selected are such that the first
conditional is true. In a context where the focus is on the historical Caesar’s knowledge of
war, worlds are selected such that the second conditional is true.15
Therefore, it can be responded that, in the context of a mathematical proof, (many) fea-
tures of arithmetic are fixed so that (1)-(3) continue to come out true [8, p. 704]. Williamson
complains that a contextualist response like this requires more specific motivation, without
15For additional discussion of issues of context and counterfactuals, see Priest [104, §2.3] and Berto et al.
[8, §3.3].
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which “the appeal to context-dependence is just an all-purpose objection to any valid argu-
ment” [130, p. 364]. Williamson seems to doubt whether there are (reasonable?) contexts in
which, for example, (3) can be heard as false (or untrue), a datum against the contextualist
thesis.
But (3) can surely be heard as untrue in any situation in which either (1) or (2) are heard
as untrue, and it seems that there are plausible situations that can be imagined for this. For
example (cf. [8, p. 704]), suppose the context is a discussion of ultrafinitistic mathematics
(there are only finitely many integers) with a “gappy” background logic; it’s plausible that
any statement about p! + 1 (where p is the largest prime) would be without a truth value in
such a situation, so none of (1)-(3) would be true.
Another objection to consider concerns the technical resources used for developing a
non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. Such semantics tend to make liberal use of
non-normal, or impossible, worlds.16 The idea is that counterpossibles are evaluated just
like counterfactuals are, except that the pertinent antecedent worlds are impossible, and so
not subject to at least some significant logical constraints. But it may be objected that
impossible worlds are incoherent or philosophically illegitimate.
A comprehensive discussion and defense of impossible worlds is beyond the scope of
this chapter.17 Let it at least be noted that impossible worlds present no special technical
difficulties. From a technical standpoint, an impossible or non-normal world is just one
where the truth conditions for at least some formulae are deviant. As Priest [100, p. 291]
observes, such worlds were originally devised by Kripke [60] for modeling non-normal modal
logics.18 Thus, they are technically legitimate and have been around since practically the
beginning of worlds semantics.
16See, for example, Mares [74], Nolan [90], Brogaard and Salerno [11], Berto et al. [8], and Weiss [124].
17For thorough treatments of impossible worlds, the reader is referred to Yagisawa [133], Krakauer [56],
and Jago [49, 50].
18Note that only the truth conditions associated with the special modal connectives are treated as deviant
at non-normal worlds in [60, p. 211].
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Of course, there are grades of deviance. At one extreme, all formulae can be assigned
truth values randomly at impossible worlds. In this case, impossible worlds will fail to be
closed under any significant consequence relation. On the other hand, impossible worlds
may be taken to be closed under some weak paraconsistent consequence relation; this will
render them inconsistency tolerant without thereby being trivial. The first approach is
sometimes characterized as ‘North American,’ while the latter is sometimes characterized as
‘Australasian’ [101, p. 484].
While some may hold that closure under a significant consequence relation is essential
to being a world of any type (see, e.g., Stalnaker [116, p. 59]), and therefore find the North
American approach objectionable, it is the approach I take below. Since any Australasian
world can be modeled by a North American world, but not conversely, the latter approach
is to be favored for its generality.19
Finally, it may be objected that accommodating counterpossibles leads to a logic that is
too weak to have any interest. Such an objection is suggested by Williamson [129, p. 95]
(see also the discussion in Berto et al. [8, §3.1]). I will bracket this concern for now, and
revisit it once a number of systems of counterpossible logic have been developed. At that
point, it will be more clear whether and to what extent this objection is fair.
In sum, I motivated non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles by appeal both to intu-
itions and theoretical principles. I considered and rebutted most of the substantial objections
against non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. Since vacuousness has now been dealt
with, its replacement must be found. I turn to this now.
19Note that this technically motivated preference need not imply any position on the philosophical issue
raised above. Whether or not closure under a substantial consequence relation is philosophically desirable
for all worlds, impossible or not, the North American approach can be used (just restrict your attention to
the subclass of North American models that are Australasian models of the desired kind as philosophically
required).
CHAPTER 5. COUNTERPOSSIBLE LOGIC 109
5.1.2 Non-vacuous Semantics
In what follows, I develop non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. The basic semantic
framework I use modifies that of formula indexed interpretations (recall definition 16). I
elaborate on the motivation for using this sort of semantics following its formal presentation.
The logics to be examined for the remainder of this chapter are to be constructed in a
language L⊥ which extends L with the unary connective . Let Φ⊥ be the set of all formulae
in L⊥ (the formation rules are standard).
DEFINITION 34. A counterpossible interpretation is a structure IΦ⊥ = 〈W,N, {fφ : φ ∈
Φ⊥},R, V 〉 such that:
1. W is a nonempty set of worlds
2. N ⊆ W is a nonempty set of normal worlds
3. fφ : N → P(W )
4. R ⊆ N ×N such that R is an equivalence relation
5. V : Φ⊥ → P(W )
Given a counterpossible interpretation IΦ⊥ = 〈W,N, {fφ : φ ∈ Φ⊥},R, V 〉, truth condi-
tions for complex formulae at normal worlds are given just as before, with one new addition.
If w ∈ N , then for p ∈ Π = Π⊥:20
1. |=IΦ⊥w p if and only if w ∈ V (p)
2. |=IΦ⊥w ¬φ if and only if 6|=IΦ⊥w φ
3. |=IΦ⊥w φ→ ψ if and only if 6|=IΦ⊥w φ or |=IΦ⊥w ψ
20Once again, [φ] = {x ∈W :|=IΦ⊥x φ}.
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4. |=IΦ⊥w φ if and only if {x : wRx} ⊆ [φ]
5. |=IΦ⊥w φ ψ if and only if fφ(w) ⊆ [ψ]
On the other hand, if w 6∈ N (that is, if w ∈ W − N), then the value of every formula is
assigned by V (for φ ∈ Φ⊥):
6. |=IΦ⊥w φ if and only if w ∈ V (φ)
DEFINITION 35. Where Σ is a set of formulae and CΦ⊥ is a class of counterpossible
interpretations, Σ |=CΦ⊥ φ if and only if for all worlds w ∈ N of all interpretations IΦ⊥ ∈ CΦ⊥ ,
if |=IΦ⊥w ψ for each ψ ∈ Σ, then |=IΦ⊥w φ. If Σ |=CΦ⊥ φ, the inference is called valid (in CΦ⊥).
φ is a valid formula (in CΦ⊥) if ∅ |=CΦ⊥ φ.
For the remainder of this chapter, I suppress subscripts (except if necessary to disambiguate)
to avoid unnecessary clutter. For example, a class of counterpossible interpretations will be
written as C, rather than CΦ⊥ .
Counterpossible interpretations contain a separate accessibility relation corresponding to
the modal connective . R is taken to be an equivalence relation (reflexive, transitive, and
symmetric) on N . Therefore, the modal logic determined by R is S5 (=KT45) (see, e.g.,
Chellas [14, Ch. 5]). The inclusion of an accessibility relation for  is desirable because
reasonable definitions of  in terms of will not, in general, be possible in counterpossible
tolerant conditional logics. I have made R an equivalence relation, partly for technical
convenience, but also because S5 is the standardly assumed modal logic in most of the
literature on counterpossibles (see, e.g., Berto et al. [8] and Weiss [124]).
Truth-functionality features only at normal worlds. While V is taken to be a function
defined on all formulae, for normal worlds, it only enters the truth conditions for propositional
variables. On the other hand, every formula is evaluated using only V at non-normal worlds.
This is how ‘North American’ impossible worlds are realized in the semantics.
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A number of constraints might be imposed on counterpossible interpretations. I list those
constraints which have been most prominent in the recent literature on counterpossibles in
table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Counterpossible Semantic Constraints
fφ(w) ⊆ [φ] (id)
If w ∈ [φ], then w ∈ fφ(w) (cmp)
If {x : wRx} ∩ [φ] 6= ∅, then fφ(w) ⊆ N (sic)
For the most part, it should be fairly obvious which axiom schemata from table 2.2 correspond
to the semantic constraints listed in table 5.1. Before commenting on the non-obvious case—
(sic)—let me preempt a concern the reader may have about the austere nature of table 5.1.
While many constraints in addition to those listed here might be considered, few of them
have much plausibility once counterpossibles are taken seriously (that being said, I will justify
some of the omissions in section 5.2). Moreover, it would be needlessly tedious to review all
variations of conditional logic in this setting.
Moving on, then, (sic) corresponds, approximately, to the condition given the same name
by Nolan [90, p. 566].21 The idea behind (sic) is that, if there are any accessible, normal,
antecedent-satisfying worlds, then all the worlds which are pertinent for evaluating a counter-
factual with that antecedent should be normal as well. Adopting the definition ♦φ ≡ ¬¬φ,
(sic) corresponds to the following (RCK)-like rule of inference (which applies—semantically
speaking—only if the premise is valid):22
21Nolan [90] works with a Lewis-style sphere semantics in which there is no separate accessibility relation.
The correspondence, to the extent there is one, consists in the characteristic validities associated with this
condition.
22The convention is adopted that when n = 0, (SIC) licenses the inference from φ to ♦ψ → (ψ φ).
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(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn)→ φ
♦ψ → (((ψ φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (ψ φn))→ (ψ φ)) (SIC)
PROPOSITION 16. (SIC) is validity preserving in any class of counterpossible interpre-
tations satisfying (sic)
The proof is by induction on n. For the basis case, suppose that |=C φ, and let w ∈ N be an
arbitrary normal world of an arbitrary I ∈ C such that |=Iw ♦ψ. Since {x : wRx} ∩ [ψ] 6= ∅,
it follows by (sic) that fψ(w) ⊆ N . Since N ⊆ [φ] (by assumption), fψ(w) ⊆ [φ]. Therefore,
|=Iw ψ φ.
The induction hypothesis is that if |=C (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk) → φ, then |=C ♦ψ → (((ψ 
φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (ψ  φk)) → (ψ  φ)). Suppose that |=C (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk ∧ φk+1) → φ;
then since |=C (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk) → (φk+1 → φ), by the induction hypothesis it follows that
|=C ♦ψ → (((ψ φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (ψ φk)) → (ψ (φk+1 → φ))). By (sic), it follows that
|=C ♦ψ → (((ψ  φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (ψ  φk)) → ((ψ  φk+1) → (ψ  φ))). The desired
result then follows by importation.
5.2 Axiom Systems
This section has two purposes. The first is to discuss principles of counterpossible logic from
an axiomatic standpoint, and evaluate how plausible these are. Once this has been done,
several systems of counterpossible logic will be axiomatized and evaluated.
5.2.1 Principles of Counterpossible Logic
Many of the standard axioms of conditional logic have little plausibility once counterpossibles
are taken seriously. To evaluate different counterpossible logics, and ultimately characterize
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what it is for a system of conditional logic to be a system of counterpossible logic, I discuss
a number of axioms and rules below.
To begin with, systems of counterpossible logic should be neither half-classical nor classi-
cal (recall definition 3). That is, they should neither be closed under (RCEA) nor (RCEC).
The reason for this is simple: closing under either trivializes a large class of counterlogicals.
For consider the following two conditionals:
If the Liar were true, then the Liar would be true and not true
If the Liar were true, then cats would be mammals and would not be mammals
The first conditional is a plausibly true, non-vacuous counterpossible. Its consequent, a con-
tradiction, is logically equivalent to the consequent of the second conditional. Consequently,
by (RCEC), both conditionals should be equivalent. Similar considerations suffice to show
that (RCEA) is inappropriate.
A rule for antecedent exchange can be restored by adopting (CSO) but, as I argued in
[124], (CSO) is itself objectionable. It is worth briefly reviewing the argument against it.
Consider the following scenario:
Fred is teaching George arithmetic. Fred asks George what 5 + 7 is, and George
mistakenly responds 13. Fred snidely remarks, “if 5 + 7 were 13, you would have
answered correctly.” This is true. What else might be the case if 5 + 7 = 13?
Plausibly, 5 + 6 = 12. Conversely, if 5 + 6 = 12, it would seem reasonable to
expect that 5 + 7 = 13 [124, p. 390]
In the context of this scenario, it is claimed that each of the following three conditionals is
true:
5 + 7 = 13 5 + 6 = 12
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5 + 6 = 12 5 + 7 = 13
5 + 7 = 13 George answered correctly
(CSO) then licenses the inference from these three conditionals to:
5 + 6 = 12 George answered correctly
However, the last conditional does not appear to be true; after all, George isn’t answering a
question about that sum. Since I advise against adopting (CSO),23 it is my position that none
of the Lewis systems—C0 or its extensions—have plausible counterpossible companions, at
least insofar as that entails endorsing (CSO).
Perhaps the most objectionable thesis of standard conditional logic, from the perspective
of counterpossibles, is (CN): φ  >. If (CN) were adopted, then every instance of the
following scheme would be a theorem (for any formula φ):
If the law of the excluded middle failed, then φ ∨ ¬φ
Since this is obviously unacceptable, no proper system of counterpossible logic can contain
(CN). For theorems to hold given arbitrary antecedents is characteristic of non-counterpossible
conditional logics.
(MOD) also must be rejected by any reasonable analysis of counterpossibles. For suppose
you are considering what would be the case were some instance of the law of non-contradiction
false. If ¬¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) were the case, then it should also be the case that ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) (for if
there were true contradictions, then said contradictions would also, presumably, be false).
By (MOD), it follows that, for any ψ, ψ ¬(φ∧¬φ). But for many instances of ψ, this is
implausible (for example, consider the case where ψ states that φ is without a truth value).
Other theses of conditional logic are perhaps not as objectionable, but still questionable.
(SIC) is a case in point. On the one hand, as Nolan [90, p. 566] notes, such a condition
23For an objection to (CSO) that doesn’t make use of counterpossibles, see Gabbay [35, p. 101].
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is desirable for maintaining a level of formal familiarity for conditionals with satisfiable
antecedents. However, (SIC) also seems to license some intuitively invalid inferences. Let
φ be the claim that “there are or there are not counterexamples to classic tautologies.” By
(SIC), this is a theorem:
♦φ→ (φ >)
Since φ is itself a classical tautology, by elementary modal logic, φ  > is a theorem.
But it seems bizarre to say that any arbitrary classical tautology would be the case were
there counterexamples to classical tautologies or not; surely, in evaluating this conditional,
consideration should be given to worlds where either disjunct holds, that is, both normal
and non-normal worlds (cf. [124, p. 388]).
There is little to say about (ID) or (CMP). Both are, arguably, essential to any theory
of counterfactual conditionality. Both may be subject to contrived counterexamples, but
neither seem to be subject to any objections as weighty as those considered above. I am
happy to endorse them both as principles of counterpossible logic.
5.2.2 Systems of Counterpossible Logic
In subsection 5.2.1, I examined a number of theses of conditional logic and assessed these
for plausibility. Below, I define what it is for a system of conditional logic to be a system
of counterpossible logic and axiomatize several systems. These are readily shown to be
consistent.
DEFINITION 36. A system of conditional logic L is counterpossible if it contains KT45
and 6`L ⊥ φ.24
24It would also be reasonable to require that 6`L ¬(⊥ φ), i.e. that counterlogicals with contradictory
antecedents not be treated as vacuously false (to put it semantically). While this condition will be satisfied
by all the systems I examine, I know of no philosopher who endorses vacuous falsity for counterpossibles
and, consequently, do not require its avoidance as part of definition 36.
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A couple remarks are in order about definition 36. First, the definition centers around
what I take to be the absolutely minimal condition of being a counterpossible system of
conditional logic, viz. not proving all counterfactuals with contradictory antecedents. While
a number of systems which handle counterpossibles poorly—for example, CE augmented by
KT45—meet the conditions of the definition, there is still some justice in labeling them as
counterpossible systems of conditional logic insofar as they avoid the problem of vacuousness
(as it is traditionally stated and understood). Of course, I will mainly be interested in systems
which not only meet the conditions of this definition, but also avoid the principles found to
be objectionable in subsection 5.2.1.
Second, it is pretty much immediate from definition 36 that the smallest counterpossible
system of conditional logic is simply KT45 (recall that the language includes both  and
). While this may seem like nothing more than a technical artifact, as will become
apparent in section 5.3, this is not the case.
While KT45 may be the smallest system of counterpossible logic, systems of any real
interest will extend it with various axioms discussed in subsection 5.2.1. The main systems
I will be interested in for the remainder of this chapter are listed in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Counterpossible Systems of Conditional Logic
KT45 K, (T), (4), (5)
CP1 KT45, (ID), (CMP)
CP2 CP1, (SIC)
KT45, CP1, and CP2 axiomatize several logics familiar from the literature on counter-
possibles. KT45 is characterized by the basic “no-constraints” semantics of Berto et al. [8]
and axiomatizes the logic I call C# in [124]. CP1 is what I take to be the correct logic of
counterpossibles: it embraces all and only the principles endorsed in subsection 5.2.1. CP1
axiomatizes C#1 from [124] and another of the logics discussed by Berto et al. [8]. Finally,
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CP2 corresponds to the final C# logic discussed in [124], viz. C#3 . It also corresponds to
the strongest logic discussed by Berto et al. [8].25
THEOREM 26 (Consistency). Each of the systems in table 5.2 is consistent
The proof is trivial. Let L be the system which results from combining KT45 and C1 in L⊥.
It is clear that L is consistent: all of its theorems can be mapped to classical tautologies using
a function τ which erases boxes (cf. Chellas [14, pp. 22-3]) and turns conditionals into
material conditionals. Now observe that all the systems listed in table 5.2 are subsystems
of L; in particular, note that any system closed under (RCK) is also closed under (SIC).
Therefore, all of these systems are consistent.
5.3 Determination Results
In this section, I establish soundness and completeness results for the systems from table 5.2
with respect to appropriate classes of counterpossible interpretations (subsection 5.1.2). I
again follow the convention of denoting by CL the class of all interpretations satisfying the
constraints associated with the characteristic axiom schemata of L. Note that CKT45 is just
the class of all counterpossible interpretations. For the remainder of this chapter, let L be
any system from table 5.2.
THEOREM 27 (Soundness). Σ `L φ implies Σ |=CL φ
The proof is trivial. The only difficult case involves (SIC), for which see proposition 16
above.
25Some of these axiomatic equivalences might be considered surprising since the semantics developed for
the C# family in my [124] is superficially weaker than the corresponding semantics in Berto et al. [8].
In particular, I used relational rather than functional interpretations in [124], a` la FDE (cf. Dunn [24]).
However, since I defined validity over the normal worlds, made the relational assignment functional at normal
worlds, and only let it be arbitrary for all formulae at non-normal worlds, the same effect can be achieved
with a function that is arbitrary at only non-normal worlds.
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As an application of theorem 27, it can be shown that each system from table 5.2 meets
the negative condition of definition 36, viz. 6`L ⊥ φ.
PROPOSITION 17. 6`L ⊥ φ
For concreteness, take ⊥ ≡ p ∧ ¬p (the result will go through however ⊥ is defined). Con-
sider the following interpretation I = 〈W,N, {fφ : φ ∈ Φ},R, V 〉: W = {w0, w1}, N =
{w0}, fp∧¬p(w0) = {w1},R = {〈w0, w0〉}, V (p) = V (q) = ∅, V (p ∧ ¬p) = {w1}, and for all
remaining formulae φ and w ∈ W , let V be arbitrary and put w ∈ fφ(w0) if and only if
w ∈ N ∩ [φ]. The reader can verify that I ∈ CL for any system L. Moreover, it is clear that
fp∧¬p(w0) 6⊆ [q], hence 6|=Iw0 p ∧ ¬p q. The desired result follows from theorem 27.
Proving completeness requires some straightforward modifications to the argument used
for formula indexed interpretations (subsection 2.3.1). One complication is that different
canonical models must be used depending on whether L is closed under (SIC). Let dφe =
{Γ ⊆ Φ : φ ∈ Γ} (i.e. dφe is the set of all subsets of formulae containing φ).
DEFINITION 37. The canonical model for a system L not closed under (SIC) is a structure
IL = 〈W,N, {fφ : φ ∈ Φ},R, V 〉 such that:
1. W = P(Φ)
2. N = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is maximally L consistent}
3. For w ∈ N , fφ(w) = {x ∈ W : {ψ : (φ ψ) ∈ w} ⊆ x}
4. For x, y ∈ N , xRy if and only if {φ : φ ∈ x} ⊆ y
5. V (φ) = dφe
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LEMMA 29 (Truth Lemma). Let IL be the canonical model for a system L not closed
under (SIC). Then for all φ ∈ Φ and all w ∈ W : |=ILw φ if and only if φ ∈ w (i.e. [φ] = dφe)
The proof divides into two cases depending on whether w ∈ N or w ∈ W−N . If w ∈ W−N ,
then |=ILw φ if and only if w ∈ V (φ) if and only if φ ∈ w. If w ∈ N , the proof proceeds by
induction on the complexity of φ. The only case of interest is that in which φ is of the form
α β.
Suppose that α β ∈ w ∈ N and x ∈ fα(w). Then by definition 37, β ∈ x. By the
induction hypothesis, it follows (as in the proof of lemma 15) that |=ILw α β. Conversely,
suppose that α β 6∈ w and consider the set x = {χ : (α χ) ∈ w}. It is clear that
x ∈ W = P(Φ), x ∈ fα(w), and β 6∈ x. By the induction hypothesis, x 6∈ [β]. Therefore,
fα(w) 6⊆ [β], that is, 6|=ILw α β.
LEMMA 30. Let IL be the canonical model for a system L not closed under (SIC). Then
IL ∈ CL
I examine both of (id) and (cmp). For (id), suppose that L contains (ID) and suppose that
w ∈ N and x ∈ fφ(w). Since w is maximal, φ φ ∈ w, from which it follows that φ ∈ x.
Then in IL, by lemma 29, x ∈ [φ]. By the arbitrariness of x, fφ(w) ⊆ [φ]. For (cmp),
suppose w ∈ N , w ∈ [φ] = dφe, and φ ψ ∈ w. By the closure of w under L, which
contains (CMP), ψ ∈ w. Since ψ is arbitrary such that φ ψ ∈ w, w ∈ fφ(w).
THEOREM 28 (Completeness). Let L not be closed under (SIC). Σ |=CL φ implies Σ `L φ
The result follows directly from lemmata 29 and 30.
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Observation. Theorems 27 and 28 jointly imply that KT45 is determined by the class of all
counterpossible interpretations. This is a sort of triviality result: the only valid formulae and
inferences involving in the basic counterpossible semantics are those which are instances
of patterns already valid in (the usual semantics for) KT45.
DEFINITION 38. The canonical model for a system L closed under (SIC) is a structure
IL = 〈W,N, {fφ : φ ∈ Φ},R, V 〉 defined exactly as in definition 37 except:
For w ∈ N, fφ(w) =

{x ∈ N : {ψ : (φ ψ) ∈ w} ⊆ x} if ♦φ ∈ w
{x ∈ W : {ψ : (φ ψ) ∈ w} ⊆ x} otherwise
LEMMA 31 (Truth Lemma). Let IL be the canonical model for a system L closed under
(SIC). Then for all φ ∈ Φ and all w ∈ W : |=ILw φ if and only if φ ∈ w (i.e. [φ] = dφe)
The proof is the same as the proof of lemma 29 except for the converse direction of the case
concerning normal worlds and conditionals. Suppose that w ∈ N and (α β) 6∈ w.
Either ♦α 6∈ w or ♦α ∈ w. If ♦α 6∈ w, the proof proceeds as in lemma 29. If ♦α ∈ w, the
proof proceeds by modifying the argument used in the proof of lemma 15. Let S = {χ :
(α χ) ∈ w} ∪ {¬β}. I prove that S is consistent. If it were not, then ∃χ0, . . . , χn ∈ S
such that χ0, . . . , χn `L ⊥. Then:
χ0, . . . , χn,¬β `L ⊥
`L (χ0 ∧ . . . ∧ χn)→ β
`L ♦α→ (((α χ0) ∧ . . . ∧ (α χn))→ (α β))
w `L α β
Since this is impossible, S is consistent. By lemma 12, S can be extended to a maximally L
consistent set (i.e. a normal world). Then it clearly follows that 6|=ILw α β, as desired.
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The proof that the canonical model for L is in the appropriate class (IL ∈ CL) proceeds just
as before.
THEOREM 29 (Completeness). Let L be closed under (SIC). Σ |=CL φ implies Σ `L φ
The result follows immediately from lemma 31.
At this point, it is worth revisiting Williamson’s complaint that counterpossible logics are
too weak to be interesting (see subsection 5.1.1 above). The point seems to be fair, insofar as
the weakest “natural” logic of counterpossibles is being considered. For, as I observed above,
the weakest natural semantics for counterpossibles—a semantics found, in variant forms, in
both Berto et al. [8] and Weiss [124]—determines a logic no stronger than its background
modal logic.
Nevertheless, the objection fails to be decisive because almost all advocates of non-
vacuous semantics actually support stronger semantic constraints which, in turn, determine
more robust systems. That being said, I support a fairly weak system, namely CP1. In
response to Williamson’s objection, my inclination is to concede that very little is valid on
my preferred semantics, but that this is how it ought to be. Weakness is not, in itself,
problematic; given the aberrance of impossible situations, one should expect few hard and
fast rules.26 Many formulae Williamson would call valid, I am happy to call merely true (or,
true in a context). For example, consider the following conditional, spoken in the context of
a discussion of intuitionistic logic:
If it were the case that there is a counterexample to the law of the excluded
middle and two is prime, then it would be the case that two is prime
26Hence, I am largely in agreement with Nolan, who writes, “Since most principles concerning the con-
ditional have counterexamples, when sufficiently strange antecedents are employed, I think that there will
be almost no distinctive theorems which hold of conditionals regardless of what propositions make up their
antecedents and the consequents” [90, p. 554].
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I claim that this conditional is true because conjunction simplification holds at all the rel-
evant impossible worlds (i.e. intuitionistic worlds satisfying the antecedent), though not all
impossible worlds.27 But if the reader prefers a stronger logic and does not find my concerns
over (SIC) convincing, CP2 is an option as well.
27Once again, I find myself in agreement with Nolan, who writes, “There are few exceptionless principles,
but restrictions of context mean that many inference moves which are not formally valid will be acceptable
in a wide range of circumstances” [90, p. 555].
Chapter 6
Intuitionistic Conditional Logic
Despite the variety of conditional logics and uses thereof, almost all extant conditional logics
extend classical logic.1 The project of this chapter is to examine both intuitionistic logic via
conditional logic and conditional logic extensions of intuitionistic logic.
First, I review intuitionistic logic both axiomatically and semantically in section 6.1.
In addition, I touch on the BHK interpretation of the connectives. The principal result
of this section is that intuitionistic logic can be embedded into a natural conditional logic
using a Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski inspired translation. I offer some brief remarks on what the
philosophical significance of this result might be in light of the BHK interpretation.
In section 6.2, I axiomatize a number of intuitionistic systems of conditional logic. I
discuss how to embed various intuitionistic modal logics into these and propose an epis-
temic reading of in two systems based on such embeddings. In subsection 6.2.2, both
worlds semantics and algebraic semantics are given for a number of systems of intuitionistic
conditional logic. The principal result of this subsection is theorem 34, which establishes
equivalences between various classes of algebraic and worlds interpretations. In section 6.3,
1A few notable exceptions are Mares [74], Mares and Fuhrmann [76], Genovese et al. [36, 37], and Weiss
[125]. Of these, the work of Genovese et al. is the only work on intuitionistic conditional logic that I am
aware of besides my own. Note, however, that there is little fundamentally in common between their work
and mine. For a fuller discussion of the relationship of their work to mine, see my [125].
123
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soundness and completeness results are proved.
6.1 Intuitionistic Logic
Let Li be the language of propositional intuitionistic logic, which is given as follows: there
is a denumerable set of propositional variables Π, a unary connective ¬, a set of binary
connectives {→,∨,∧}, and the parentheses. The formation rules are standard; let Φi denote
the set of intuitionistic formulae. The connectives↔,⊥, and > are defined in the usual way.
Informally, just as the significance of a statement of classical logic is explicated by its
truth conditions, the significance of a statement of intuitionistic logic can be explicated by
its proof conditions. The provability interpretation of intuitionistic formulae is typically
referred to as the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation. There are several
subtly different versions of this; I present the version from Priest [102, p. 104] (the notation
has been modified as needed):
1. A proof of φ ∧ ψ is a pair comprising a proof of φ and a proof of ψ
2. A proof of φ ∨ ψ is a proof of φ or a proof of ψ
3. A proof of ¬φ is a proof that there is no proof of φ
4. A proof of φ → ψ is a construction that, given any proof of φ, can be applied to give
a proof of ψ
It must be stressed that the BHK conditions are informal as stated. Ambiguity attaches to
several points, including whether ‘is a proof of’ is decidable (in which case the condition for
→ ought to include a verification clause) and what the pertinent notion of ‘construction’ is.2
The inexactness of the BHK conditions notwithstanding, they do adequately motivate
a number of non-classical conclusions. There is no proof of the Riemann hypothesis, nor
2For a discussion of these and related points, see van Dalen [18, pp. 231-2] and Dummett [23, pp. 12-3].
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is there any proof that there is no proof of the Riemann hypothesis. Consequently, where
φ states the Riemann hypothesis, there is no proof of φ ∨ ¬φ, and the law of the excluded
middle fails.3
6.1.1 Axiomatics and Semantics
In this subsection, I review an axiom system for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) and
its Kripke semantics. For concreteness, I use an axiomatization of IPL from Bozˇic´ and
Dosˇen [10, p. 219]. IPL is characterized by the axioms (axiom schemata) and rules listed
in table 6.1.
3Clearly, this will work for any undecided conjecture (cf. Priest [102, p. 104]).
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Table 6.1: Intuitionistic Axiom Schemata and Rules
φ→ (ψ → φ) (H1)
(φ→ (ψ → θ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ θ)) (H2)
(φ→ ψ)→ ((φ→ θ)→ (φ→ (ψ ∧ θ)) (H3)
(φ ∧ ψ)→ φ (H4)
(φ ∧ ψ)→ ψ (H5)
φ→ (φ ∨ ψ) (H6)
ψ → (φ ∨ ψ) (H7)
(φ→ ψ)→ ((θ → ψ)→ ((φ ∨ θ)→ ψ)) (H8)
(φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → ¬φ) (H9)




DEFINITION 39. IPL is the smallest system (set of formulae) closed under (MP) which
contains every instance of (H1)-(H10).
DEFINITION 40. `IPL φ (φ is a theorem of IPL) if and only if φ ∈ IPL. Γ `IPL φ if and
only if there is a sequence φ1, . . . , φn such that each formula in φ1, . . . , φn, φ is a theorem of
IPL, an element of Γ, or is obtained by (MP) from preceding formulae.
It is transparently obvious that IPL is consistent, and a subsystem of classical proposi-
tional logic (PL). There are many different semantic treatments of intuitionistic logic. I will
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primarily be concerned with its Kripke semantics, originally developed in [59].
DEFINITION 41. An IPL interpretation is a structure J = 〈W,R, V 〉 such that:
1. W is a nonempty set of worlds
2. R ⊆ W ×W such that R is reflexive and transitive
3. V : Π→ P(W ) such that if w ∈ V (p) and wRx, then x ∈ V (p)
Given an IPL interpretation J = 〈W,R, V 〉, truth conditions for complex formulae are
given as follows (w ∈ W ):4
1. |=Jw p if and only if w ∈ V (p)
2. |=Jw φ ∨ ψ if and only if |=Jw φ or |=Jw ψ
3. |=Jw φ ∧ ψ if and only if |=Jw φ and |=Jw ψ
4. |=Jw ¬φ if and only if ∀x such that wRx, 6|=Jx φ
5. |=Jw φ→ ψ if and only if ∀x such that wRx, either 6|=Jx φ or |=Jx ψ
Let CIPL be the class of all IPL interpretations. Then validity (|=CIPL) is defined as
usual.
THEOREM 30 (Determination). Γ |=CIPL φ if and only if Γ `IPL φ
The proof of this result, which is standard and well-known, is omitted.
4Once more, observe that [φ] = {x ∈W :|=Jx φ}.
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6.1.2 A Conditional Embedding of Intuitionistic Logic
In this subsection, I show that intuitionistic propositional logic can be embedded into a
natural extension of Lewis’ counterfactual logic C1. The result is inspired by the famous
Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski embedding [40, 82] of intuitionistic logic into S4 (=KT4), in con-
junction with the interpretability of various modal logics in conditional logic (for a discussion,
see subsection 2.1.2).
For the purposes of proving this embedding result, it is most convenient to utilize Lewis’
sphere semantics (recall definition 19 and the associated truth conditions for). Where
C$ is the class of all sphere interpretations, I wish to consider a narrower class of sphere
interpretations I$ = 〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉 subject to the following constraints (for all i, j ∈
W ):








Let the class of all sphere interpretations satisfying (cent) and (4s) be denoted by CC4$ , and
call such interpretations C4 sphere interpretations. Accordingly, I call the system charac-
terized by CC4$ C4. It is not hard to see that CC4$ is equivalent, in the sense of theorem 13,
to the class of all preorder interpretations satisfying (wc), (cs), and this condition:
If j ∈ Si, then Sj ⊆ Si (4≤)
As is well known, (cent) corresponds, axiomatically, to (CMP) and (CS). Thus, Lewis’ C1
is a subsystem of C4. (4s), on the other hand, corresponds to (4C), which the reader will
recall from the beginning of chapter 3. I am not particularly interested in treating C4 proof
theoretically, however, and will only consider it semantically hereafter.
Define a mapping from the set of formulae of intuitionistic propositional logic into the
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set of formulae of conditional logic as follows:
DEFINITION 42. The function τ : Φi → Φ is given by:
1. τ(p) = ¬p ⊥
2. τ(¬φ) = τ(φ) ⊥
3. τ(φ ∨ ψ) = τ(φ) ∨ τ(ψ)
4. τ(φ ∧ ψ) = τ(φ) ∧ τ(ψ)
5. τ(φ→ ψ) = (τ(φ) ∧ ¬τ(ψ)) ⊥
I prove that τ embeds intuitionistic propositional logic into C4. The result is proved
semantically and makes use of two lemmata.
LEMMA 32. If 6|=CC4
$
τ(φ), then 6|=CIPL φ
Suppose that 6|=CC4
$
τ(φ); then there exists a world w of a C4 sphere interpretation I$ =
〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉 such that 6|=I$w τ(φ). From I$, an intuitionistic interpretation J =
〈W,R, VJ〉 is constructed with the same set of worlds W but such that iRj if and only if
j ∈ ⋃ $i and VJ(p) = [τ(p)]I$ .
It must be verified that J = 〈W,R, VJ〉, so defined, is an intuitionistic interpretation.
By (cent), i ∈ ⋃ $i, hence R is reflexive. Suppose that iRj and jRk; then j ∈ ⋃ $i and
k ∈ ⋃ $j. By (4s), k ∈ ⋃ $j ⊆ ⋃ $i, hence iRk; therefore, R is transitive. For intuitionistic





$i. Since i ∈ [¬p ⊥]I$ , there are two cases to consider. If
⋃
$i ∩ [¬p]I$ = ∅,
then
⋃
$j ∩ [¬p]I$ = ∅, and so j ∈ [¬p ⊥]I$ = VJ(p). Otherwise, ∃S ∈ $i such that
∃k ∈ S ∩ [¬p]I$ and S ⊆ [¬p→ ⊥]I$ ; but then k ∈ [⊥]I$ , which is impossible.
It remains to show that, for all w ∈ W , |=I$w τ(φ) if and only if |=Jw φ. The proof of
this is by induction on the complexity of φ. I consider only the case where φ is of the form
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¬θ. |=I$w τ(¬θ) if and only if |=I$w τ(θ) ⊥ if and only if either ⋃ $w ∩ [τ(θ)]I$ = ∅ or
∃S ∈ $w such that S∩ [τ(θ)]I$ 6= ∅ and S ⊆ [τ(θ)→ ⊥]I$ . Since the latter case is impossible,⋃
$w ∩ [τ(θ)]I$ = ∅, whence by the induction hypothesis,
⋃
$w ∩ [θ]J = ∅. Pick an arbitrary
j such that wRj; since j ∈ ⋃ $w, j 6∈ [θ]J. Therefore, |=Jw ¬θ, as desired.
LEMMA 33. If 6|=CIPL φ, then 6|=CC4
$
τ(φ)
Suppose that 6|=CIPL φ; then there exists a world w of an IPL interpretation J = 〈W,R, VJ〉
such that 6|=Jw φ. From J, a C4 sphere interpretation I$ = 〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉 is constructed
as follows. W is the same and V (p) = VJ(p). For w ∈ W , let Rw be any well-order of the
set Yw = {x : wRx} such that w is the least element in Rw.5 Then, following Lewis [67, p.
139], define $w = {X ⊆ Yw : for j, k ∈ Yw, if j ∈ X and k 6∈ X, then jRwk}.
It must be verified that I$ = 〈W, {$i : i ∈ W}, V 〉 is a C4 sphere interpretation. Since i
is the least element in Ri, it is clear that {i} ∈ $i, as required by (cent). Suppose that, for
S, T ∈ $i, S 6⊆ T ; then ∃k ∈ S such that k 6∈ T and, consequently, for any j ∈ T , jRik. Then
T ⊂ S; for if not, then ∃h ∈ T such that h 6∈ S and both kRih and hRik, which is impossible
(since h 6= k). This suffices to show that (nest) is satisfied. For (uni), the argument proceeds
by contraposition; suppose that
⋃S 6∈ $i. Then ∃j, k ∈ Yi such that j ∈ ⋃S, k 6∈ ⋃S, and
it is not the case that jRik. Since j ∈
⋃S, ∃S ∈ S ⊆ $i such that j ∈ S, k 6∈ S, and it is
not the case that jRik, which is impossible. Thus, S 6⊆ $i, as desired. A similar argument
suffices for (int). Finally, suppose j ∈ ⋃ $i and k ∈ ⋃ $j. Then since iRj and jRk, by the
transitivity of R, iRk, from which it follows that k ∈ ⋃ $i, as required by (4s).6
Finally, it must be shown that, for all w ∈ W , |=I$w τ(φ) if and only if |=Jw φ. Again, the
proof is by induction on φ. I consider the cases where φ is either of the form p ∈ Π or ψ θ.
5Since R is reflexive, it is clear that w ∈ Yw.
6In general, observe that for i, j ∈ W , iRj if and only if j ∈ ⋃ $i. If iRj, then consider the set Yi itself.
It is clear that j ∈ Yi ∈ $i, thus j ∈
⋃
$i. Conversely, if j ∈
⋃
$i, then ∃S ∈ $i such that j ∈ S ⊆ Yi, from
which it follows that iRj.
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For the first, |=I$w τ(p) if and only if |=I$w ¬p ⊥ if and only if ⋃ $w ∩ [¬p]I$ = ∅ (the other
case is impossible) if and only if ∀x ∈ W such that wRx, x ∈ V (p) = VJ(p) if and only if
w ∈ VJ(p) (by reflexivity and heredity) if and only if |=Jw p. For the second, |=I$w τ(ψ → θ)
if and only if |=I$w (τ(ψ) ∧¬τ(θ)) ⊥ if and only if ⋃ $w ∩ [τ(ψ) ∧¬τ(θ)]I$ = ∅ (the other
case is impossible) if and only if ∀x ∈ W such that wRx, x 6∈ [τ(ψ)]I$ ∩ −[τ(θ)]I$ if and
only if ∀x ∈ W such that wRx, x ∈ −[ψ]J ∪ [θ]J (by the induction hypothesis) if and only if
|=Jw ψ → θ.
THEOREM 31. |=CIPL φ if and only if |=CC4
$
τ(φ)
Directly from lemmata 32 and 33.
The Go¨del embedding of intuitionistic logic into S4 realizes the BHK interpretation in the
sense that S4 can be interpreted as a provability logic. Where φ is intuitively understood as
expressing that φ is provable (in some mathematical theory, say), the characteristic theses of
S4 seem fairly plausible. With this interpretation of  in mind, it is natural to read φ ψ
as expressing that ψ is provable from φ. Under such an interpretation, φ can reasonably
be defined as ¬φ  ⊥: for to show that φ is provable, it suffices—in classical logic—to
show that its negation proves a contradiction.
It is implausible to hold that C4 exhausts the logic of , understood as a binary
provability connective. For instance, transitivity would seem to hold of such a relation.
Nevertheless, it appears that (almost) all of the theses of C4 respect such an interpretation.7
Thus, theorem 31 can be viewed as a natural generalization of the Go¨del embedding result.
7Admittedly, (CS) does not appear to respect such an interpretation. I suspect IPL can be embedded
into C4 sans (CS), since this system still suffices to capture S4, but I have not actually verified this.
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6.2 Intuitionistic Conditional Logic
In this section, I turn to conditional logic extensions of intuitionistic logic. Let the language
Li be an extension of Li by. The set of formulae (the formation rules are standard) in
Li is denoted by Φi . I begin by examining intuitionistic conditional logics axiomatically
in subsection 6.2.1. In subsection 6.2.2, I continue this investigation semantically. Results
relating the two approaches are presented later on in section 6.3.
6.2.1 Axiom Systems
In this subsection, I examine intuitionistic conditional logic from a syntactic perspective.
Where L is a classical system of conditional logic,8 I denote its intuitionistic companion by IL
(for a formal characterization of companionship, see definition 43 below). Thus, for example,
ICK is IPL extended by all instances of (CM), (CC), (CN), and closed under (RCEA) and
(RCEC), where the pertinent notion of theoremhood suitably modifies definition 40.
DEFINITION 43. A set of formulae is an intuitionistic system of conditional logic if it
contains IPL. An intuitionistic system of conditional logic is proper if it does not contain
PL (classical propositional logic). An intuitionistic system of conditional logic is nontrivial
if it contains axioms which are not already contained in IPL. The intuitionistic companion
of a classical system of conditional logic L is a system IL extending IPL with all instances
of the same conditional schemata and closing under the same conditional rules (modulo the
pertinent notion of theoremhood); classical companions are defined dually.
In this chapter, I will have occasion to discuss one schema that I haven’t yet explic-
itly mentioned, although it corresponds to a previously discussed semantic constraint, viz.
8Throughout this chapter, by ‘classical system of conditional logic’ I mean a system of conditional logic
that extends classical propositional logic.
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(norm). It is:
¬(> ⊥) (NORM)
Now, the main intuitionistic systems of conditional logic that I will be concerned with for
the remainder of this chapter are listed in table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Intuitionistic Systems of Conditional Logic
ICK IPL, (RCEA), (RCEC), (CM), (CC), (CN)
ICK+ ICK, (ID), (CMP)
ICE− ICK, (CS)
ICE ICE−, (NORM)
Table 6.2 requires a couple comments. First, I will not be interested in any subnormal
intuitionistic systems of conditional logic in this chapter. That is, all systems of intuitionistic
conditional logic I examine will contain ICK. I record the following important fact about
extensions of ICK.
PROPOSITION 18. Any extension of ICK is closed under (RCK)
Since the argument given for proposition 4 in chapter 2 is intuitionistically valid, it also
suffices to establish this result; see also Weiss [125, §3.1].
Second, I will, for the most part, not be interested in the intuitionistic companions
of stronger conditional logics like Lewis’ C1. The main reason for this is that a certain
ambiguity attaches to IC0 and its extensions. Recall the schema (CV), which I reproduce
below for the reader’s convenience:
((φ ψ) ∧ ¬(φ ¬θ))→ ((φ ∧ θ) ψ) (CV)
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Under definition (Df.), where φ ψ is defined as ¬(φ ¬ψ) (cf. Lewis [67, p. 2]),
(CV) is equivalent to:
((φ ψ) ∧ (φ θ))→ ((φ ∧ θ) ψ) (CV*)
Now, and will not generally be interdefinable in systems of intuitionistic conditional
logic (compare with ∀ and ∃ in intuitionistic predicate logic), at least not if they are given
their expected truth conditions. Consequently, these two versions of (CV) will come apart.
The original version, which is fit for a language including only, seems to correspond to no
particularly enlightening semantic condition; the latter version may, but at the cost of aug-
menting the language. While a detailed examination of intuitionistic systems of conditional
logic containing both and is desirable, due to the complexities such an undertak-
ing presents in its details, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. Consequently, I mostly
bracket consideration of strong systems of intuitionistic conditional logic for future work.
Nevertheless, one comment must be made about IC2.
It is a fact deserving of note that not all classical systems of conditional logic have proper
intuitionistic companions. That is, for some classical systems of conditional logic L, L and
IL coincide. The paradigmatic example of this is Stalnaker’s C2:
PROPOSITION 19. Any intuitionistic system of conditional logic containing all instances
of both (CMP) and (CEM) also contains all instances of:
φ ∨ ¬φ (LEM)
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1 (> φ) ∨ (> ¬φ) CEM
2 (> φ)→ (> → φ) CMP
3 (> ¬φ)→ (> → ¬φ) CMP
4 (> → φ) ∨ (> → ¬φ) IPL 1-3
5 > `
6 φ ∨ ¬φ IPL 4, 5
COROLLARY 4. IC2 is not proper: IC2 and C2 coincide
In the axiom schemata and rules from tables 2.1 and 2.2, if is replaced by the intu-
itionistic conditional→, not all of the resulting formulae are theorems of IPL. For example,
(MOD), under such a replacement, is not a theorem. Nevertheless, since IPL is a subsystem
of PL, consistency can be proved simply using translations into classical logic (I mention
only those schemata below that will be of concern hereafter):
THEOREM 32 (Consistency). Let L be any extension of ICK by (ID), (CMP), (CS),
(MOD), or (NORM). Then L is consistent
Let Φc be the set of all formulae of classical propositional logic. I define a function µ :
Φi → Φc which maps each standard intuitionistic connective to its classical counterpart
(e.g. µ(¬φ) = ¬µ(φ)) and µ(φ ψ) = µ(φ)→ µ(ψ). Under µ, every axiom of L is mapped
to a classical tautology, and the rules preserve this property. Then ⊥ is not a theorem of L,
since µ(⊥) is not a tautology.
I turn now to the development of intuitionistic modal logic within intuitionistic condi-
tional logic. The language of intuitionistic modal logic is Li extended by , Li , and the set
of its formulae is Φi . I adopt the same conventions for referring to these modal systems as
in subsection 2.1.2, but prefixing an ‘I’ as above. Thus, IKT (for example) is the smallest
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system closed under (NEC) and (MP) which contains IPL and all instances of (K) and (T).
With minimal modification to the proofs given in subsection 2.1.2, it can be shown that,
under (Df. 2), ICK and ICK+ exactly realize the intuitionistic companions of K and KT,
viz. IK and IKT [125, §4.2].9
With a view to potential applications of some of the intuitionistic systems of conditional
logic listed in table 6.2, two heterodox systems of intuitionistic modal logic recently discussed
by Artemov and Protopopescu [6, 105] deserve comment. Both systems include the so-
called“co-reflection” scheme:
φ→ φ (CO-R)
The system IEL− is IK extended by (CO-R); IEL is obtained by extending IEL− with (D)
[105, pp. 9-10].
IEL− and IEL are named as such because they are supposed to be intuitionistic epistemic
logics, that is, logics of knowledge or verification. Intuitively, φ is to be read as expressing
that φ is verified, where verification is a more liberal notion than proof. Since any proof
yields a verification, (CO-R) is intuitively valid given the BHK semantics for intuitionistic
logic: if φ is true, i.e. proved, then it is verified [105, p. 9]. Conversely, precisely because
not every verification is a proof, (T) fails. (D), then, is also intuitively satisfactory since ⊥
cannot be verified.
As the reader may have guessed, IEL− and IEL can be embedded into ICE− and ICE
respectively under (Df. 2). This, in turn, suggests an epistemic reading of in these
systems. Before examining that possibility, I sketch the embedding result; I prove this for
IEL and ICE, thereby also establishing the result for the weaker systems.
DEFINITION 44. Let λ : Φi → Φi be the function:
1. λ(p) = p
9Bozˇic´ and Dosˇen [10, 22] refer to these systems as HK and HT respectively.
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2. λ(¬φ) = ¬λ(φ)
3. λ(φ ∨ ψ) = λ(φ) ∨ λ(ψ)
4. λ(φ ∧ ψ) = λ(φ) ∧ λ(ψ)
5. λ(φ→ ψ) = λ(φ)→ λ(ψ)
6. λ(φ) = > λ(φ)
LEMMA 34. If `IEL φ, then `ICE λ(φ)
By induction on the length of proof. I show the only interesting case, viz. `ICE λ(φ→ φ).
Note that λ(φ→ φ) = λ(φ)→ (> λ(φ)).
1 λ(φ) Assumption
2 > ∧ λ(φ) IPL 1
3 > λ(φ) CS 2
4 λ(φ)→ (> λ(φ)) IPL 1-3
DEFINITION 45. Let λ−1 : Φi → Φi be the same as λ except:
6. λ−1(φ ψ) = (λ−1(φ)→ λ−1(ψ))
LEMMA 35. If `ICE φ, then `IEL λ−1(φ)
By induction on the length of proof.
LEMMA 36. `IEL φ↔ λ−1(λ(φ))
Exactly as in [125, §4.2].
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THEOREM 33 (Modal Embedding). `IEL φ if and only if `ICE λ(φ)
The result follows immediately from lemmata 34, 35, and 36.
In light of theorem 33, epistemic readings of  in the systems ICE− and ICE are
worth considering. For suppose that φ ψ is understood to express that, given φ is true
(or proved), ψ is verified. Then, since > is clearly proved, >  φ intuitively expresses
that φ is verified, i.e. φ. The axioms of ICE (ICE−) generally make good sense on this
interpretation, as do at least some of the omissions. (CS) can be justified in by noting that
if φ∧ψ is proved, then both of the conjuncts are verified, and therefore verified given either
conjunct. But (CMP) is not justified, since the fact that ψ is verified given a proof that φ
does not entail that ψ has a proof given a proof that φ, because verification is weaker than
proof.
6.2.2 Semantics
In this section, I examine intuitionistic conditional logic from a semantic perspective. I
develop worlds semantics for such logics using the framework of relational proposition in-
dexed interpretations, discussed in subsection 2.2.1. The motivation for using this sort of
semantics, as opposed to the neighborhood variant, is that the constraint required for in-
tuitionistic heredity can be more perspicuously stated in relational terms. In addition, I
develop algebraic semantics for these logics and present equivalence results.10
DEFINITION 46. An intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretation is a structure JR =
〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 where 〈W,R, V 〉 is an IPL interpretation (definition 41) and in
addition:11
10The results of this section generalize and expand on those I presented in [125].
11For R,S ⊆W , define R◦S = {(x, y) : ∃z(xRzSy)}. I typically just write RS for R◦S. I follow Bozˇic´ and
Dosˇen [10] in employing this device in the relational semantics. Incidentally, many tools from intuitionistic
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4. RX ⊆ W ×W such that R ◦RX ⊆ RX ◦ R
5. P ⊆ P(W ) such that:
(a) ∅ ∈ P
(b) If S ∈ P and T ∈ P , then S ∪ T ∈ P and S ∩ T ∈ P
(c) If S ∈ P and T ∈ P , then {x ∈ W : ∀y(xRy and y ∈ S ⇒ y ∈ T )} ∈ P
(d) If S ∈ P and T ∈ P , then {x ∈ W : ∀y(xRSy ⇒ y ∈ T )} ∈ P
6. For all p ∈ Π, V (p) ∈ P
Then the truth conditions for complex formulae at a world w are the same as above except :
|=JRw φ ψ if and only if {y ∈ W : wR[φ]y} ⊆ [ψ]
LEMMA 37. Given an intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretation JR = 〈W,R, P, {RX :
X ∈ P}, V 〉, for all φ ∈ Φi, [φ] ∈ P
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. The result holds when φ is a propositional
variable by definition 46. If S, T ∈ P , write S 7→ T = {x ∈ W : ∀y(xRy and y ∈ S ⇒
y ∈ T )}. Then if φ is of the form ψ → θ, it is clear that [ψ → θ] = [ψ] 7→ [θ] ∈ P by the
induction hypothesis and definition 46. Where φ is of the form ¬ψ, to show that [¬ψ] ∈ P it
suffices to show that [¬ψ] = [ψ] 7→ ∅, since the latter is in P by the induction hypothesis and
definition 46. Suppose w ∈ [¬ψ] and wRx; then x 6∈ [ψ]. Therefore, it is vacuously the case
that for all x such that wRx and x ∈ [ψ], x ∈ ∅. That is, w ∈ [ψ] 7→ ∅. Conversely, suppose
that w ∈ [ψ] 7→ ∅ and wRx; if x ∈ [ψ], it would follow that x ∈ ∅, which is impossible. Thus,
since it must be the case that x 6∈ [ψ], w ∈ [¬ψ]. The other cases are all straightforward.
modal logic can be adapted to intuitionistic conditional logic with ease. For an overview of intuitionistic
modal logic, see Simpson [112].
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LEMMA 38 (Intuitionistic Heredity). Given an intuitionistic proposition indexed interpre-
tation JR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉, for all φ ∈ Φi, [φ] is closed under R (i.e. if
w ∈ [φ] and wRx, then x ∈ [φ])
Again, the proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. The only case of interest is that in
which φ is of the form ψ θ. Suppose w ∈ [ψ θ], wRx, and xR[ψ]y. Since wRR[ψ]y,
there is a z such that wR[ψ]zRy. Then z ∈ [θ], from which it follows by the induction
hypothesis that y ∈ [θ], which was to be proved.
Stronger systems of intuitionistic conditional logic can be modeled by imposing various
constraints on intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretations. If S is a proposition in P ,
write ⇁ S for S 7→ ∅ = {x ∈ W : ∀y(xRy ⇒ y 6∈ S)}. Some constraints of significance are
listed in table 6.3 below.
Table 6.3: Intuitionistic Relational Constraints
{y : xRSy} ⊆ S (id)
If x ∈ S, then x ∈ {y : xRSy} (cmp)
If x ∈ S, then {y : xRSy} ⊆ {y : xRy} (sc’)
If {y : xR⇁Sy} ⊆ S, then {y : xRTy} ⊆ S (mod’)
{y : xRWy} 6= ∅ (norm)
Many of the constraints listed in table 6.3 can be found (in somewhat different notation) in
Segerberg [111, p. 163] and Unterhuber and Schurz [122, p. 905]. The conditions marked
with an apostrophe (’) are those which depart from the classical conditions in some nontrivial
way.
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Let L be any extension of ICK by (ID), (CMP), (CS), (MOD), or (NORM). I use CLR
to designate the class of all intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretations satisfying the
constraints (from table 6.3) associated with L. Validity is defined, in the usual way, with
respect to each such class.
DEFINITION 47. A Heyting conditional algebra is a structure H = 〈A, ∗〉 in which
A = 〈A, 1, 0,∪,∩, ↪→〉 is a Heyting algebra and ∗ is a binary operation on A subject to the
following conditions:
1. a ∗ (b ∩ c) = (a ∗ b) ∩ (a ∗ c)
2. a ∗ 1 = 1
Recall that a Heyting algebra is a bounded distributive lattice such that ∀a, b, ∃(a ↪→ b)
such that ∀c, a ∩ c ≤ b if and only if c ≤ a ↪→ b. Define the pseudocomplement of a, ÷a, as
a ↪→ 0.
DEFINITION 48. A Heyting conditional interpretation is a structure JH = 〈H, f〉 in
which H is a Heyting conditional algebra and f : Π→ A is extended in such a way that:
1. f(φ ∨ ψ) = f(φ) ∪ f(ψ)
2. f(φ ∧ ψ) = f(φ) ∩ f(ψ)
3. f(φ→ ψ) = f(φ) ↪→ f(ψ)
4. f(¬φ) = ÷f(φ)
5. f(φ ψ) = f(φ) ∗ f(ψ)
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Table 6.4: Heyting Algebraic Constraints
a ∗ a = 1 (id?)
a ∗ b ≤ a ↪→ b (cmp?)
a ∩ b ≤ a ∗ b (cs?)
÷a ∗ a ≤ b ∗ a (mod?)
1 ∗ 0 = 0 (norm?)
DEFINITION 49. For JH = 〈H, f〉, write |=JH φ if and only if f(φ) = 1. Let L be any
extension of ICK by (ID), (CMP), (CS), (MOD), or (NORM); write CLH for the class of
all Heyting conditional interpretations satisfying the constraints (from table 6.4) associated
with L. Then |=CLH φ if |=JH φ for all JH ∈ CLH, in which case φ is said to be valid (in CLH).
Where L is any extension of ICK by (ID), (CMP), (CS), (MOD), or (NORM), I wish to
show that CLH and CLR characterize the same validities. The proof of this fact modifies that
of theorem 6. It should be compared with the proof of theorem 1 from my [125, §2.3] and
related results in Nute [92, Ch. 7].
LEMMA 39. Given an intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretation JR = 〈W,R, P, {RX :
X ∈ P}, V 〉 ∈ CLR, there is a Heyting conditional interpretation JH = 〈H, f〉 ∈ CLH such that
|=JH φ if and only if |=IR φ
A Heyting conditional interpretation JH = 〈〈A, 1, 0,∪,∩, ↪→, ∗〉, f〉 is constructed from the
given intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretation JR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉.
Set A = {Q ∈ P : Q is R-closed} and take ∪ and ∩ to be ordinary set union and inter-
section respectively. ↪→ is 7→, ≤ is ⊆, 0 is ∅, and 1 is W . It is not difficult to verify that
〈A, 1, 0,∪,∩, ↪→〉, so defined, is a Heyting algebra. In particular, for S, T ∈ P , note that
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S 7→ T is R-closed whenever its arguments are; hence, if a, b ∈ A, a ↪→ b ∈ A. To show that
7→ satisfies the required properties, observe that if S, T, U ∈ P are R-closed, if S ∩ U ⊆ T ,
then S ⊆ U 7→ T ; for if w ∈ S, wRx, and x ∈ U , then x ∈ S, from which it follows by the
assumption that x ∈ T , which was to be proved. Conversely, if w ∈ S ∩ U and S ⊆ U 7→ T ,
then since wRw, w ∈ T , as desired.
To obtain a Heyting conditional algebra, set a ∗ b = {w ∈ W : ∀x(wRax ⇒ x ∈ b)}. It
must be verified that a ∗ b ∈ P is R-closed and that ∗ satisfies the conditions specified in
definition 47. Suppose w ∈ a ∗ b, wRx, and xRay. Since R ◦ Ra ⊆ Ra ◦ R, ∃z such that
wRazRy. Then, since z ∈ b, it follows from the fact that b is R-closed that y ∈ b, which was
to be proved. That ∗ satisfies the basic conditions is straightforward to show and is omitted;
I turn now to the specialized conditions.
If JR satisfies (id), it must be shown that JH satisfies (id?). Since by (id), {x : wRax} ⊆ a
for all w, it is clear that a ∗ a = {w ∈ W : {x : wRax} ⊆ a} = W = 1, as required.
If JR satisfies (cmp), it must be shown that JH satisfies (cmp?). Suppose w ∈ a ∗ b =
{x ∈ W : ∀y(xRay ⇒ y ∈ b)}, wRz, and z ∈ a. Since a ∗ b is R-closed, z ∈ a ∗ b. By (cmp),
z ∈ {x : zRax}. Thus, z ∈ b, which suffices to show that w ∈ a ↪→ b.
If JR satisfies (sc’), it must be shown that JH satisfies (cs?). Suppose w ∈ a ∩ b and
wRax; by (sc’), since w ∈ a and wRax, wRx. Thus, since w ∈ b and b is R-closed, x ∈ b,
which was to be proved.
If JR satisfies (mod’), it must be shown that JH satisfies (mod?). Suppose that w ∈
÷a ∗ a = {x ∈ W : {y : xR÷ay} ⊆ a}; then since {y : wR÷ay} = {y : wR⇁ay} ⊆ a, by
(mod’), {y : wRby} ⊆ a. That is, w ∈ b ∗ a, which was to be proved.
If JR satisfies (norm), it must be shown that JH satisfies (norm?). Suppose, for contra-
diction, that there were a w ∈ 1 ∗ 0 = {w ∈ W : {x : wR1x} ⊆ 0}. By (norm), ∃y such that
wR1y. Hence, y ∈ 0 = ∅, which is impossible.
To obtain the Heyting conditional interpretation JH = 〈H, f〉, set f(φ) = [φ] for all φ.
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It is clear from lemma 38 that each [φ] ∈ A. It only remains to verify that the conditions of
definition 48 are met; but this is trivial from the definitions of the operations. Finally, since
f(φ) = 1 if and only if [φ] = W , it is clear that the result obtains.
Recall the definitions of filters, proper filters, and prime filters from subsection 2.2.2.
Given a lattice 〈D, 1, 0,∪,∩〉, the filter generated by a nonempty set S ⊆ D is the set
{x ∈ D : ∃y0, . . . , yn ∈ S(x ≥ y0 ∩ . . . ∩ yn)}.
LEMMA 40. Given a filter ∇ such that a ∗ c 6∈ ∇, the filter generated by {b : a ∗ b ∈ ∇}
does not include c
The proof is the same as in my [125, §2.3], but I repeat it here. Suppose the filter generated
by {b : a ∗ b ∈ ∇} does contain c. Then ∃d0, . . . , dn ∈ {b : a ∗ b ∈ ∇} such that d0 ∩
. . . ∩ dn ≤ c. Since lemma 8 also holds for any Heyting conditional algebra, it follows that
(a ∗ d0)∩ . . .∩ (a ∗ dn) = a ∗ (d0 ∩ . . .∩ dn) ≤ a ∗ c. Since ∇ is a filter and each (a ∗ di) ∈ ∇,
a ∗ (d0 ∩ . . . ∩ dn) ∈ ∇. But then, since ∇ is upward closed, a ∗ c ∈ ∇.
LEMMA 41. Given a filter ∇ such that a 6∈ ∇, ∇ can be extended to a prime filter ∇∗
such that a 6∈ ∇∗
Proof is omitted; see [29], [106].
LEMMA 42. Given a Heyting conditional interpretation JH = 〈H, f〉 ∈ CLH, there is an
intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretation JR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 ∈ CLR such
that |=JH φ if and only if |=IR φ
An intuitionistic proposition indexed interpretation JR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 must
be constructed from JH. Let W be the set of all prime filters in H, let R be ⊆, and
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write bac = {w ∈ W : a ∈ w}. Then put P = {bac : a ∈ A}, xRbacy if and only if
{b : a ∗ b ∈ x} ⊆ y, and [φ] = bf(φ)c for all φ. This completes the construction; it remains
to verify that it satisfies all the requisite constraints.
It is obvious that R is reflexive and transitive since ⊆ is. If w ∈ V (p) = [p] = bf(p)c
and w ⊆ x, then clearly f(p) ∈ x, as required for heredity. Suppose that wRyRbacx; since
w ⊆ w and {b : a ∗ b ∈ w} ⊆ {b : a ∗ b ∈ y} ⊆ x, wRwRbacx, as required.
It is somewhat more complicated to verify that P satisfies its required conditions; I show
a few cases here. Note that ∅ ∈ P , because ∅ = b0c ∈ P . If bac, bbc ∈ P , then bac ∪ bbc ∈ P
because bac ∪ bbc = ba ∪ bc. For if x ∈ ba ∪ bc, since x is prime, x must be in either
bac or bbc; and the converse follows from the fact that x is upward closed. To show that
bac 7→ bbc ∈ P , it suffices to show that bac 7→ bbc = ba ↪→ bc. If a ↪→ b ∈ w, it is easily
shown that w ∈ bac 7→ bbc using the properties of filters and Heyting algebras. Conversely,
suppose a ↪→ b 6∈ w; then lemma 41 can be used to show that w 6∈ bac 7→ bbc. I turn now to
the special conditions.
If JH satisfies (id?), it must be shown that JR satisfies (id). Suppose that wRbacx, i.e.
{b : a ∗ b ∈ w} ⊆ x; by (id?), a ∗ a = 1 ∈ w, hence a ∈ x, i.e. x ∈ bac.
If JH satisfies (cmp?), it must be shown that JR satisfies (cmp). Suppose w ∈ bac and
a ∗ b ∈ w; to show wRbacw, it suffices to show that b ∈ w. Since a ∗ b ∈ w, by (cmp?),
a ↪→ b ∈ w; since a ∈ w, it follows that b ∈ w, which was to be proved.
If JH satisfies (cs?), it must be shown that JR satisfies (sc’). Suppose w ∈ bac and
wRbacx; then a ∩ a = a ∈ w, so by (cs?), a ∗ a ∈ w. Accordingly, a ∈ x since wRbacx. Since
a ∈ w is arbitrary, w ⊆ x, which was to be proved.
If JH satisfies (mod?), it must be shown that JR satisfies (mod’). Suppose {x : wRb÷acx} ⊆
bac and wRbbcy. It is clear, using lemmata 40 and 41, that ÷a ∗ a ∈ w. Hence, by (mod?),
b ∗ a ∈ w, from which it follows that a ∈ y, as desired.
If JH satisfies (norm?), it must be shown that JR satisfies (norm). Then 1 ∗ 0 = 0 6∈ w.
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Using lemmata 40 and 41, there is a prime filter y such that {b : 1 ∗ b ∈ w} ⊆ y, i.e. wRb1cy.
The truth conditions must be verified; I examine only the case of φ ψ (for the other
cases, see Fitting [29]). Suppose w ∈ [φ  ψ] = bf(φ  ψ)c = bf(φ) ∗ f(ψ)c and
wRbf(φ)cx. Then since {b : f(φ) ∗ b ∈ w} ⊆ x, f(ψ) ∈ x. Thus, x ∈ bf(ψ)c = [ψ], as desired.
Conversely, suppose that w 6∈ [φ ψ]; then f(φ) ∗ f(ψ) 6∈ w. Let ∇ be the filter generated
by {b : f(φ) ∗ b ∈ w}; by lemma 40, f(ψ) 6∈ ∇. Then, by lemma 41, there is a prime filter
x such that {b : f(φ) ∗ b ∈ w} ⊆ ∇ ⊆ x and f(ψ) 6∈ x. It is clear that wR[φ]x and x 6∈ [ψ],
which was to be proved.
Finally, if f(φ) = 1, [φ] = bf(φ)c = W , since every world is a filter. Conversely, if
f(φ) 6= 1, since {1} is a filter and f(φ) 6∈ {1}, by lemma 41 there is a world w such that
w 6∈ [φ], which was to be proved.
THEOREM 34 (Equivalence). |=CLR φ if and only if |=CLH φ
The result follows directly from lemmata 39 and 42.
Theorem 34 has useful applications for obtaining decidability and independence results.
I will not address these topics here, but the interested reader can find a discussion of both
topics in my [125].
6.3 Determination Results
Throughout this section, let L be any extension of ICK by (ID), (CMP), (CS), (MOD), or
(NORM). I prove soundness and completeness for all such L (including the systems described
in table 6.2) with respect to CLR. (Weak) soundness and completeness results with respect to
classes of Heyting conditional interpretations follow as corollaries.
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THEOREM 35 (Soundness). Γ `L φ implies Γ |=CLR φ
All the axioms of L must be shown to be valid in CLR and all the rules of L must be shown
to be validity preserving in CLR. I take (RCEC), (CMP), and (MOD) as representative cases.
For (RCEC), suppose that |=CLR φ ↔ ψ, but 6|=CLR (θ  φ) ↔ (θ  ψ). Without
loss of generality, there exists some world w of an interpretation JR ∈ CLR such that wRx,
|=JRx θ φ, and 6|=JRx θ ψ. Then there is a y such that xR[θ]y, y 6∈ [ψ], and y ∈ [φ]. But
since, by the assumption, [φ] = [ψ], this is impossible.
For (CMP), suppose that CLR is subject to (cmp) and that 6|=CLR (φ ψ) → (φ → ψ).
Then there is some w of some JR ∈ CLR such that wRx, |=JRx φ ψ, and 6|=JRx φ→ ψ. Hence,
∃y such that xRy, |=JRy φ, and 6|=JRy ψ. By (cmp), yR[φ]y. By lemma 38, |=JRy φ ψ. Thus,
y ∈ [ψ], which is impossible.
For (MOD), suppose that CLR is subject to (mod’) and that 6|=CLR (¬φ φ)→ (ψ φ).
Then there is some w of some JR ∈ CLR such that wRx, |=JRx ¬φ φ, and 6|=JRx ψ φ.
Hence, ∃y such that xR[ψ]y and y 6∈ [φ], and also {z : xR⇁[φ]z} = {z : xR[¬φ]z} ⊆ [φ]. Then
by (mod’), y ∈ [φ], which is impossible.
COROLLARY 5 (Algebraic Soundness). `L φ implies |=CLH φ
The (weak) soundness of L with respect to CLH is a straightforward consequence of theorems 34
and 35.
DEFINITION 50. A set of formulae Γ is nice if and only if:
1. Γ is consistent
2. Γ is closed under `L (i.e. if Γ `L φ, then φ ∈ Γ)
3. Γ is prime (i.e. if φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ, then either φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ)
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LEMMA 43. Given a set of formulae Γ and a formula φ, if Γ 6`L φ, then there exists a
nice set ∆ such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and φ 6∈ ∆
The proof of this lemma is standard and is omitted; see, e.g., [10, p. 225].
DEFINITION 51. dφeL = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is nice, φ ∈ Γ}.12
DEFINITION 52. The canonical model for L is a structure JLR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈
P}, V 〉 defined as follows:
1. W = {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is nice}
2. P = {dφe : φ ∈ Φ}
3. For x, y ∈ W , xRy if and only if x ⊆ y
4. For x, y ∈ W , xRdφey if and only if {ψ : (φ ψ) ∈ x} ⊆ y
5. V (p) = dpe for all p ∈ Π
LEMMA 44. Let JLR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 be the canonical model for L. Then
JLR is well-defined and J
L
R ∈ CLR
To show that Rdφe is well-defined in JLR, suppose that dφe = dψe. If 6`L φ ↔ ψ, then
by lemma 43, dφe 6= dψe. Hence, `L φ ↔ ψ, from which it follows by (RCEA) that
`L (φ θ)↔ (ψ θ). Since every w ∈ W is closed under `L, φ θ ∈ w if and only if
ψ θ ∈ w. It follows immediately that Rdφe = Rdψe.
It must be verified that JLR meets the conditions imposed by definition 46. Since L is
consistent, 6`L ⊥; hence, by lemma 43, W 6= ∅. R is reflexive and transitive because ⊆
is. To see that P satisfies the required conditions, note that ∅ = d⊥e ∈ P . Otherwise,
12Unless it is needed to disambiguate, I omit the superscript and write Φ for Φi .
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suppose S, T ∈ P ; then for some φ and ψ, S = dφe and T = dψe. Then it is obvious that
S ∩ T = dφ ∧ ψe ∈ P and S ∪ T = dφ ∨ ψe ∈ P (for the latter, note that any w ∈ dφ ∨ ψe is
prime). The proofs of the remaining cases parallel cases that must be proved in lemma 45,
so I only survey one of these. To show that dφe 7→ dψe ∈ P , it suffices to show that
dφe 7→ dψe = dφ→ ψe. Suppose w ∈ dφ→ ψe, wRy (i.e. w ⊆ y), and y ∈ dφe; then, since
φ, φ → ψ ∈ y and y is closed under `L, y ∈ dψe, which establishes that w ∈ dφe 7→ dψe.
Conversely, suppose that φ → ψ 6∈ w; then it is clear that w, φ 6`L ψ. By lemma 43, there
is a nice set y such that w, φ ⊆ y and ψ 6∈ y. That is, since wRy, y ∈ dφe, and y 6∈ dψe,
w 6∈ dφe 7→ dψe, which was to be proved.
To show that R ◦ RX ⊆ RX ◦ R, suppose that xRRdφey (X must be some such dφe);
then there is some z such that x ⊆ zRdφey, so clearly xRdφey, by definition 52, from which
it follows that xRdφeRy, since yRy. Finally, if w ∈ V (p) = dpe and w ⊆ x, it is clear that
x ∈ V (p) as well, so all of the conditions have been met. I turn now to the special conditions.
Suppose L contains (ID); it must be shown that JLR satisfies (id). Suppose wRdφex; it
must be shown that x ∈ dφe. Since w is closed under `L and L contains (ID), φ φ ∈ w.
Therefore, by definition 52, φ ∈ x, which was to be proved.
Suppose L contains (CMP); it must be shown that JLR satisfies (cmp). Suppose w ∈ dφe
and φ ψ ∈ w. By the closure of w under `L, ψ ∈ w. Since φ ψ is arbitrary in w,
wRdφew, which was to be proved.
Suppose L contains (CS); it must be shown that JLR satisfies (sc’). Suppose w ∈ dφe and
wRdφex; it suffices to show that wRx. Since φ ∈ w and w is closed under `L, φ∧φ ∈ w, and
consequently φ φ ∈ w by (CS). Thus, φ ∈ x since wRdφex. Since this will hold for any
φ ∈ w, it is clear that w ⊆ x, i.e. wRx.
Suppose L contains (MOD); it must be shown that JLR satisfies (mod’). Suppose that
{x : wR⇁dφex} ⊆ dφe and wRdψey; it suffices to show that y ∈ dφe. Observe that ¬φ
CHAPTER 6. INTUITIONISTIC CONDITIONAL LOGIC 150
φ ∈ w;13 then by (MOD) and the closure of w under `L, ψ φ ∈ w. Then, since wRdψey,
φ ∈ y, which was to be proved.
Suppose L contains (NORM); it must be shown that JLR satisfies (norm). Since w is L
consistent and L contains (NORM), > ⊥ 6∈ w, and consequently, ⊥ 6∈ {ψ : (> ψ) ∈
w}. It follows (by an argument rehearsed in the proof of lemma 45) that {ψ : (> ψ) ∈
w} 6`L ⊥. Consequently, by lemma 43, there is a world x such that {ψ : (> ψ) ∈ w} ⊆ x
and ⊥ 6∈ x. Therefore, by definition 52, wRd>ex.
LEMMA 45 (Truth Lemma). Let JLR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 be the canonical model
for L. Then for all φ ∈ Φ and all w ∈ W : |=JLRw φ if and only if φ ∈ w (i.e. [φ] = dφe)
The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. The only case of interest is that in which
φ is of the form ψ θ.
Suppose that ψ θ ∈ w and wR[ψ]x (for x arbitrary). By the induction hypothesis and
definition 52, wRdψex, that is, {χ : (ψ χ) ∈ w} ⊆ x. Then it is obvious that θ ∈ x, from
which it follows (by the induction hypothesis) that x ∈ [θ], which was to be proved.
Conversely, suppose that ψ θ 6∈ w; I show that {χ : (ψ χ) ∈ w} 6`L θ. Suppose
otherwise; then for some set S = {χ0, . . . , χn} ⊆ {χ : (ψ χ) ∈ w}, S `L θ. That is, using
the deduction theorem and rule (RCK):
S `L θ
`L (χ0 ∧ . . . ∧ χn)→ θ
`L ((ψ χ0) ∧ . . . ∧ (ψ χn))→ (ψ θ)
w `L ψ θ
But this is impossible since w is nice and ψ θ 6∈ w. Since {χ : (ψ χ) ∈ w} 6`L θ, it
13The essentials of the argument why are discussed in detail in the proof of lemma 45.
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follows by lemma 43 that there is a nice set x such that {χ : (ψ χ) ∈ w} ⊆ x and θ 6∈ x.
By the induction hypothesis, it follows that w 6∈ [ψ θ].
THEOREM 36 (Completeness). Γ |=CLR φ implies Γ `L φ
Suppose that Γ 6`L φ. By lemma 43, there is a nice set w such that Γ ⊆ w and φ 6∈ w. Where
JLR = 〈W,R, P, {RX : X ∈ P}, V 〉 is the canonical model for L, w ∈ W by definition 52
and JLR ∈ CLR by lemma 44. By lemma 45, for all ψ ∈ Γ, w ∈ [ψ], but w 6∈ [φ]. Therefore,
Γ 6|=CLR φ, which was to be proved.
COROLLARY 6 (Algebraic Completeness). |=CLH φ implies `L φ




In this dissertation, I have aimed to develop several “frontiers” of conditional logic. In
chapter 3, I gave sound and complete tableaux for a number of conditional logics in Lewis’
V-family, rounding out a notable gap in the literature. Connexive conditional logics and
applications of them to deontic reasoning were considered in chapter 4. I examined several
systems of counterpossible logic in chapter 5 and discussed the relationship of this work to
recently proposed non-vacuous semantics and debates over the legitimacy of a logic of coun-
terpossibles. Finally, in chapter 6, I pursued and motivated the development of conditional
logic in a non-classical context, viz. intuitionistic logic. Nevertheless, many frontiers of con-
ditional logic remain underdeveloped. In these concluding remarks, I would like to mention
some of these, and discuss how the issues, results, and ideas explored in this dissertation
intersect with them.
Throughout this dissertation, I have focused entirely on propositional conditional logic.
This is not a unique feature of this dissertation; there are exceptionally few treatments of
quantificational conditional logic in the literature.1 While this may be because philosophers
and logicians have generally thought quantifiers present no special problems for conditional
1A couple notable examples are Stalnaker and Thomason [117], Delgrande [19], and Priest [102, Ch. 19].
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logic that do not already occur in modal logic, this is not entirely obvious. For one, as noted
in Berto et al. [8, §2.3] (but see also Kocurek [54, §5]), issues specific to identity can be used
as another motivation for a non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. For if there were
only possible worlds and names are rigid designators (a` la Kripke [61]), then the following
inference (substituting ‘Cicero’ for ‘Tully’) would be valid, though it is not:
If Cicero had not been Tully, British classicists would have called him Marky.
Therefore, if Cicero had not been Cicero, British classicists would have called
him Marky.
Quantifiers also raise interesting issues in connection with connexive conditional logic, given
the close link between connexive theses on the one hand and existential import for universal
quantification on the other. It is beyond the scope of this conclusion section to say anything
detailed on the subject, but I note that Boethius’ theses allow the derivation of ‘some’ from
‘all’ with minimal additional assumptions about the conditional and quantifiers [79, p. 352].
Thus, a detailed examination of quantified conditional logic would be most welcome and
connect in interesting ways to some of the topics discussed above.
Another topic which deserves a close examination is the ‘might’ conditional/counterfactual,
typically symbolized using Lewis’. I indicated, in chapter 6, that this connective must
generally be treated as independent of in intuitionistic conditional logics. Accordingly,
an examination of the logic of in intuitionistic logic is arguably required for an adequate
treatment of strong intuitionistic conditional logics, given the (covert) occurrence of in
the scheme (CV). Lewis’ view that and are interdefinable also comes under pressure
from non-vacuous treatments of counterpossibles; for a discussion, see my [124, p. 389 n.
9].2 Thus, a clarification of the connection between and is needed for many contexts,
including counterfactuals.
2For other criticisms Lewis’ so-called duality thesis, see DeRose [20, 21].
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A third topic deserving more attention is non-classical conditional logic. Chapter 6 has
only scratched the surface of this field, but the techniques and tools developed in it are
actually widely applicable. To take one example, just as the algebraic semantics of Nute
[92] was “Heyting-ized” to characterize intuitionistic conditional logics, it can be adapted
to characterize many other non-classical conditional logics as well. Future work might try
to develop relevant conditional logics using a version of this algebraic semantics adapted
to (say) De Morgan monoids and link this to previous work on the subject by Mares and
Fuhrmann [76] and Priest [102, Ch. 10.7] via equivalence results.3
In summary, many interesting avenues for the future development of conditional logic
remain. These projects, I have suggested, intersect with many of the developments of this
dissertation, and can both motivate and be motivated by them. Therefore, it is hoped that
this dissertation’s contributions both inspire future work along new lines and that that work
also inspires deeper work along the lines pursued here.
3A large number of interesting algebraic structures for non-classical logics are canvassed by Restall [107],
and it could be an interesting project to explore the whole range.
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